



Linda Rantz

FOREWORD BY MIKE LINDELL

RETURN TO HAND COUNTING

Missouri Method Hand Count Process

Linda Rantz

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ISBN: 9798264460395 (Paperback)

ISBN: 9798264610059 (Hardcover)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2025919973

Independently published

September 16, 2025, Linn, Missouri

The hand-counting process and commentary in this manual reflect a layperson’s interpretation of Missouri statutes and rules by someone not qualified as a legal authority. This content is not offered as legal advice and should not replace advice from a licensed attorney. Readers are encouraged to consult a licensed attorney for legal guidance on Missouri’s (or other states’) laws, statutes, and rules, and to verify compliance with local election regulations before applying these methods. The author has made every effort to ensure the information in this book was correct as of August 2025. However, the author does not assume, and hereby disclaims, any liability for loss, damage, or disruption caused by errors, omissions, misuse of this manual, or unauthorized alterations, whether resulting from negligence, accident, or any other cause.

Names appearing on sample forms are fictional. Any resemblance to actual persons, living or deceased, is purely coincidental.

Dedication

When you are surrounded by greatness, you can do great things.

Patriotism

In honor of my late father, Peter McCue, who convinced his mother to give him permission to join the U.S. Coast Guard when he was 17. He served 22 years, from Seaman to CWO.

My father's love of The Guard taught me to love our Country.

Courage

Mike Lindell is the voice in the wilderness warning of the threat to our elections.

Mike says, "courage is contagious, so get courageous."

And "if you're saving your courage for a rainy day, it's pouring out there."

Loyalty

I have never met a person more loyal than my husband, Craig Rantz.

Craig is quick to sacrifice himself to care for the needs of others.

There is no stronger or braver warrior whom I would want standing watch over me.

I have the strength for everything through Him who empowers me.

With appreciation to all who did the work of the Missouri Canvassers,
to canvass Missouri's voter rolls in 2021 and 2022,
especially LW and MK.
This is where the path began.

Foreword by Mike Lindell

“This is the most exciting news I’ve had. What a way to end the year!” Those were my exact words when I first learned about the Missouri hand count method on December 29, 2022. It was less than two weeks before the 2nd anniversary of the day I was given the evidence of election crimes in the 2020 election. It was a very long two years of lawfare, sanctions, censorship, media attacks, cancellation of MyPillow, and thousands of miles traveled to speak with Secretaries of State, Attorneys General, election officials, and grassroots activists.

We are at a critical time in history. We will lose our country if we don’t get rid of these electronic voting machines. We need one state to be the first to go to all paper ballots and hand counting at the precinct level.

I know many state teams are working very hard to make this happen. Missouri has some advantages because its election laws go back to 1977 and allow the county clerks to make the decision to use hand counting instead of machines. No new legislation changes are needed. Plus, even before hand counting was on most people’s radar, the Missouri Legislature passed an election law in 2022 requiring paper ballots. We want to ensure ballots are hand-marked and hand-counted.

This eManual has 300 pages of information. It is centered around Missouri law because the work was done to read and understand those laws. However, it includes resources anyone can use, and most of the Missouri process could probably be adapted to your state. If you are unsure, contact Cause of America for help.

The past two years have been hard, but we always have Hope. It has been proven repeatedly that the Grassroots will save our country. This eManual is another example of a grassroots initiative, and it has my full support.

So, what can you do? Get educated. Make use of the information in this eManual. Arm yourself with knowledge so you can share the information and are ready to respond to objections.

Mike Lindell

December 2022

See Mike’s 2025 Update on Next Page

Mike Lindell Foreword (2025 Update)

Over four long years, since the 2020 election, many of us were the targets of scare tactics and lawfare, the likes of which haven't been used in this country to this magnitude since the 1700's. But January 2025 is the beginning of the Golden Age of America, and lawfare is starting to crumble.

They tried to take our country without firing a shot. They tried to take it by stealing elections. But we broke through the biggest cover-up of the biggest crime the world has ever seen. We have the evidence. As we move forward, we will work together to get the word out about what really happened in 2020.

More than 100 countries ban voting machines, and most ban mail-in ballots. Our elections are the worst of any place in the world and, to make America great again, we must secure our elections by getting rid of voting machines and mail-in ballots.

President Trump has a perfect plan to secure our elections – his approach is always focused on problem and solution. Evidence of stolen elections will come first and begin to pour out of DC. It will show the truth about the corruption of our current election platforms. Reforms will follow.

Our mission now is to get everybody to spread the word. Media has attacked me for years. I use those attacks to get the word out. But there are millions and millions of Americans who do not hear the truth and those are the people we must reach. Because, in the long run, the people of this country want and expect secure and honest elections.

This manual about hand counting is one of the tools in our arsenal. As I said in the Dec. 2022 foreword: Arm yourself with knowledge so you can share the information. We will save this country!

Mike Lindell
September 2025



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The first ‘objection’ usually offered on the topic of hand-counting ballots is that it will take an ‘X’ number of days or weeks to finish the count. I will happily compare the hand-counting process in this eManual against whatever process is used as the basis for that claim.

The hand-counting process presented in this eManual will show that any polling place in Missouri can complete a count of the ballots cast on election day. And, except for the super-large metro voting jurisdictions that bring in hundreds of thousands of early and absentee ballots, counting of those types of ballots in the other 100+ counties can also be accomplished on election day. (The super-large metro locations might need two days for absentee and early ballots ... or just more counting teams.)

“Well, you’ll never get enough people to stay after the polls close and count the ballots.” Any person making this statement is unaware that state law permits hand counting of ballots to begin one hour after the polls open. And, yes, we believe many, many people will want to be trained for ballot counting, including high school students who are also allowed to assist (per state law).

Another response is that voting machines make the election process easier for clerks. I'm afraid I must disagree. The terms I often hear about these machines include “tedious” and “complex.” Many clerks are dependent on the machine vendors to ‘make things work’ on election day; some even contract election tasks to third-party vendors at taxpayer expense.

And, speaking of taxpayer expense, the City of Milton in Fulton County, Georgia, announced on December 20, 2022, that they are taking control of their elections back from the County and removing machines. The City Council estimates they will save \$250,000 in 2023. (They have 30,000 registered voters.)

How much are counties in Missouri spending on voting equipment and the services required to keep everything running? If anyone has those numbers, I would love to see them. Unfortunately, we have found it challenging to obtain and identify these costs. It's not just a simple computer and software purchase. There are many related costs because we have industrialized the business of elections.


Elections have become a massive apparatus of vendors, associations, consultants, NGOs, and government agencies (and regulations) ... all leading back to private equity firms who turn profits from our elections. Our votes, which we mark on paper, are buried somewhere in the complexity.

Returning to hand counting will not eliminate the apparatus, at least not all of it. Still, it will save time and money, give election day results, and provide more transparency and better security while putting our election results back into human hands.

Linda Rantz
December 2022

2025 Update

Unbelievably, nearly three years have passed since this hand count process was developed, written into an eManual, and presented to Mike Lindell on the launch webinar on December 29, 2022. In those three fast years, we successfully used this process in an official election in Missouri. We have traveled the country spreading the truth that hand counting is easy, and training others to become trainers. And for more than three years, Mike Lindell has never backed an inch from his passionate belief that we must return to hand-counted paper ballots to save our country.



1 Webinar on Dec. 29, 2022, when we first shared this hand count process with Mike Lindell.

[Perma.cc/3XTU-BSE3](https://perma.cc/3XTU-BSE3)

Today, Mike is not alone as the ‘voice in the wilderness’ warning of the threat posed by using voting machines in our elections. Elon Musk is now speaking out against the risk of electronic voting machines. Many choruses of voices from “hand count champions” join Mike in declaring that we must secure our elections if our country is to survive. Many of those champions are mentioned in this eManual, but none are more prominent than our 45th and 47th President, Donald J. Trump.

**Elon Musk**  
@elonmusk

Electronic voting machines and anything mailed in is too risky.

We should mandate paper ballots and in-person voting only.

"What we found was disturbing," Halderman said in a [June 2017 Senate Intelligence Committee hearing](#). "We could reprogram the machine to invisibly cause any candidate to win. We also created malicious software – vote-stealing code – that could spread from machine-to-machine like a computer virus, and silently change the election outcome."

screen voting systems, causing concern among security experts

BY JOHN COOK on October 25, 2016 at 7:11 am



reporter for Vice News discovers that some Diebold voting machines that will be used in the 2016 election are still running outdated versions of the Microsoft operating system.

Vice interviews University of Michigan computer science professor J. Alex Halderman, who says the U.S. is "painting a bullseye" on its election system by using antiquated touchscreen voting machines.

Old voting machines

Some election officials scour eBay for decommissioned equipment they can cannibalize for parts.




2:48 AM · Jul 9, 2024 · 27.8M Views

2 Jul 9, 2024, Elon Musk: "electronic: voting machines and anything mailed in is too risky. We should mandate paper ballots and in-person voting only." [Perma.cc/UZ7Y-G27V](https://perma.cc/UZ7Y-G27V)

The belief of fraud in the 2020 election brought many of us to this cause. The results of that election were impossible to believe. And it was not just that evidence proving fraud was being stonewalled in the judiciary, but that lawfare was being used as an attempt to silence and punish election accountability activists.

Since the November 2024 election, when Donald Trump was re-elected, my personal belief has been that the new administration of President Trump will not only uncover the truth of 2020 and expose the fraud, but will adopt the necessary fixes to ensure our elections will always be secure, transparent, and honest. I believe it will require returning the counting of ballots to be hand-counted by The People.



3 @realMikeLindell on X, Jan. 27, 2025, responding to comments made about election security by President Trump in a speech, Perma.cc/GU4M-PUR9

I have agreed with Mike Lindell since I first heard his warnings in 2021 that we need to conduct elections without voting machines. I appreciate comments from Elon Musk and many others who concur that it is too risky to use electronic voting machines. And I am very excited by the public statements of our President that we must fix our elections.

Updates to the eManual

When I give presentations, I like to share that, although this hand count guide is available digitally and in print, I refer to it in either format as an eManual. I like to refer to it as an eManual and pronounce it “Emmanuel.” Each time I do so, it reminds me of the definition of Emmanuel and gives me strength, especially if I feel that someone in the room might not be a believer.

No Change to the Hand Count Process

The hand count process has no significant changes since it was originally written in 2022. There are some minor tweaks, most notably on the Ballots Tally form, where the options of “official” and “unofficial” were changed to “yes” or “no.” See pages 109 and 115 for explanations.

The minor tweaks in the hand count process are merely edits to provide clarity or correct typos or grammatical errors that slipped through the original proofreading effort.

The Hand Count Process is Accurate, Reliable, and Adaptable

The success of the hand counted election in Osage County proved that the process is accurate and reliable, so significant revisions were unnecessary (see page 293 for Osage County details).

Section 5, the hand count process, takes up only one-fifth of this eManual – less than 60 pages – because it is a simple and common-sense process. The rest of the document is information to empower others. The eManual teaches the hand count process, but its primary purpose is to guide others in learning election laws for their state, determining if the Missouri Method can be used with those laws, and adapting whatever is adaptable.

Newest Resources in the 2025 Update

Probably the most-asked questions have been how to respond to common “objections” to hand counting. Section 9 has been repurposed to explain how “objections” are usually “myths.”

Workbook for Debunking Myths

Many myths have become so popular that even ‘friendlies’ will unwittingly recite them: hand counting costs too much, takes too long, people won’t be able to do it, or smaller counties could hand count but not large cities or counties. Understanding the truth about findings (aka “receipts”) is essential. Read more in Section 9, *Myth-Debunking Workbook*, beginning on page 237.

The tools created to prove our findings and debunk myths are available for anyone to use. The red icon on the right identifies them throughout this eManual.



Training materials are also available and can be identified by the blue icon.



The tools, training materials, and other resources for the hand count method are available on a companion website:

ReturntoHandCounting.com

We are Still at the Beginning

We have traveled to or connected with nearly every state in the U.S. and met citizens who want to take action to secure elections. Three years ago, Louisiana was the only state I knew of that had anyone talking about hand counting. Now, whether as the result of this eManual or similar work by others, every state has Patriots making efforts to return America's elections to hand counting.

Many of us had a very long wait to get through Nov. 5th (2024) and Jan 20th (2025). But finally, there is light ahead, even if it has just started to shine. There is much work to do and room for anyone who wants to become part of the solution.

Afterword – Mike Was Right

The last myth covered in the debunking workbook is about Mike Lindell. There are so many myths about him, but I focus on one **myth**: that he is a conspiracy theorist without evidence. **Findings prove differently.** The eManual began with Mike Lindell's foreword and will finish with more about Mike. I do not doubt that everyone will eventually know the truth, proving Mike was Right.

Linda Rantz
September 16, 2025

They Are Right Where We Left Them

If you were a kid in 1977 when the first *Star Wars*™ movie was released, there's a good chance you were hooked, like most of us. The gifts you received in the coming years were probably movie-themed: the movie's characters, models of the spaceships, t-shirts, bed sheets, hats, and more. It was a collection you treasured.

Then life happened. Your priorities shifted. New things came along. The collection was boxed up, and you lost track of it.

But maybe now, nearly 50 years later, you're visiting a parent or grandparent and, while chatting, mention that collection and wonder what ever happened to it. They point you to a box in the closet in your old room. You open it and, to your amazement, there is precisely what you are looking for. Right where you left them.



Collection of Hand Counting Statutes

That pretty much sums up my reaction when I started reading Missouri statutes about elections. I had recently returned from Louisiana, where we joined the Louisiana and Florida teams to test-run Louisiana's ballot hand-counting method. Once back in Missouri, I wanted to check our statutes to see if we could utilize the Louisiana method.

Just like opening the box in the closet, I was shocked by my "discovery." While many of us kids were lined up in 1977 to see a battle of good versus evil in other galaxies, the Missouri legislature was working on statutes that would allow for the hand counting of ballots and give detailed steps for the process. It was signed into law and has been there all this time. It is like finding a box of the exact statutes you would want for those of us who are working to return Missouri to the process of hand-counting ballots.

Why Are Statutes for Hand Counting Important?

All the statutes from the 1970s related to elections show us that, at that time, our legislature invested a lot of time researching, studying, and codifying a complete set of election laws. They obviously had equal concerns for detailed procedures for hand counting and using electronic voting equipment because statutes for both methods were written and passed in the 1970s.

What are the Benefits of Using Electronic Voting Equipment?

It is a fair question. "We've been doing it this way as long as I can remember, or since I became clerk," are not what we consider benefits.

I expect that there will be claims that the machines are faster. Is that in ballot intake or tabulating results?

For ballot intake (when the voter casts their ballot after completing it), it takes less than a second to drop a ballot into the ballot box. An Election Judge who worked the November 8, 2022, midterm election said the machines in her polling place were at least 15 seconds per voter. The lines got long, with 1,800 voters casting ballots, and she saw some voters give up and leave without casting their ballots.

For tabulating results, a machine is faster when everything necessary is completed. What's necessary? All the machine servicing, updating, and testing before the election, loading the results from the polling places, and all the post-election machine auditing, reports, and verification. Those machine-related tasks go away with hand counting.

What are the Benefits of Hand Counting Ballots?

We cover these in the following sections, but here is a quick list:

1. Reduce Time clerks spend administering elections (see pg. 33)
2. Save Money (lots of money) (see pg. 38)
3. Election Results are completed on election day ... by human beings (see pg. 42)
4. More secure tabulation method while providing transparency to voters, including chain of custody (see pg. 45)

The hand-counting process is simple. Not much will look different for the voter except you won't wait in line to insert your ballot into an electronic voting machine. For the new Election Judges who will need to be trained to count and tally votes, if you can play Bingo or keep the score at a baseball game, you will likely have little trouble learning the process of counting votes.

Yes, Missouri will need its citizens to become more civic-minded and step up to help with elections. Still, it is probably easier than jury duty, only lasts one day plus training, and the law even allows high school students to assist Election Judges. That alone should increase the election work force.



4 Voting at the Courthouse in Kennett, Dunklin County, MO, 1942 Primary Election, Rothstein, Arthur, photographer. Dunklin County, Missouri.

[LOC.gov/item/2017835137](https://loc.gov/item/2017835137)

I.O.U.

Let's say you are short on cash, so a friend offers to lend you \$50 until payday. However, your friend wants to "get it in writing" and asks you to sign a note. You live across the county from your friend, so, as a convenience, the friend tells you it's okay if you click 'confirm' on an app for this kind of thing, or you can write a paper note and drop it off or mail it.



The convenience is too good to pass up, so you choose digital and click right through the TOS (terms of service) screen. Well, what happens if your friend is not such a good friend and tells you it's time to pay back the loan of \$5,000? You protest ... it was \$50, not \$5,000. But the app shows \$5K.


You threaten to take your friend and the app programmer to court, but the software is proprietary, so you cannot get a court to hear your case. The I.O.U. on the app will hold up in court because you have no proof – you're just \$4,950 poorer.

About now, you're wishing you went with paper.

Paper Audit Trail

Using the analogy above, maybe you are a traditionalist and would have done a paper I.O.U. If so, that might reassure you if you vote in a county that provides a paper ballot to cast your vote.

As a matter of fact, when some new election laws became effective in August 2022, a "paper ballot audit trail" was added. So, even if you vote on a "ballot marking device" (like a touchscreen), it must print out a paper ballot. (Admirable, but you might want to [read the study](#) by the National Science Foundation on pg. 214, "Can Voters Detect Malicious Manipulation of Ballot Marking Devices?")



Your “Digitized” Ballot

Whether you marked a paper ballot yourself or used a ballot marking device that then printed a paper ballot for you, your ballot will be inserted into a voting machine – either a tabulator or a scanner.

Your paper ballot will drop down to the bottom container of the machine. I have heard this referred to as the “trash bin” container.

The votes you cast, everything you marked on the ballot, are now digitized and are nothing more than a series of ones and zeros.

How Safe is Digital Code?

Ask the [City of Joplin, Missouri](#), which paid out \$320,000 in 2021 for a ransomware attack. (see the article reference on pg. 200).

There is no “Show Me” with Voting Machines

Some people have told me that we can check the ballots on election day as they are taken out of the voting machine, maybe even photograph them. Not so fast. You’ll need the Clerk’s permission before doing such a thing. The statutes say, “Immediately after signing the statements of returns, the election judges shall enclose the voted ballots, tally books, tally sheets, statements of returns and other election supplies in containers designated by the election authority.” (see [115.463](#) pg. 229). The Election Judges are then required to “immediately” return everything to the Clerk per Statute 115.475.

The Clerk is required to retain election records for 22 months, but elected officials will tell you that a court, grand jury, or legislative body must be involved for you to see any of the records. (see [115.493](#) pg. 231).

Hand counting ballots on election night is the best method to prevent our ballots from being digitized and allow The People to participate in tallying and calculating election results.

Please Show Me the Receipts

If you're organized, you have a shopping list prepared when you go to the store. Another approach is going up and down the aisles to see if anything reminds us that we need it. Either way, we're all looking for sale prices.




By the time we unload our shopping basket onto the checkout counter, we have a pretty good idea of how much it should cost – within \$3 to \$4 if you're keeping track (and weren't binge shopping).

Do You Trust Me?

But what if the store clerk tells you the total is \$30 to \$40 more than you expected? Logically, the next thing you say is, "show me the receipt." But what if the clerk tells you they don't give receipts ... they just give the total?

How do you figure out if you were charged for more items than you put on the checkout counter? How do you know if you were charged the wrong price for an item or did not get the sale price?

The clerk tries to help you, but they can only see what shows on the register screen. They cannot log in and pull up your receipt, list of items, or prices charged.



Totals versus List of Transactions

How can you search for the error in the computer system if you cannot look at a printout of the individual transactions? That's where you can pinpoint machine or software errors.

You are the Winner, You are the Loser

Unfortunately, this resembles how our election system reports voting results. The voting equipment prints out totals, and winners and losers are announced from those totals.

Don't believe the results? Does something look odd? Want to verify against the paper ballots? Nope. Sorry.

The previous Section, *I.O.U.*, discusses how the votes you cast on a paper ballot are digitized. From that digital information, the voting machine at the polling place prints out a “tape” of totals for each race on the ballot. (It resembles a cash register tape but with totals only.)

The digitized ballot data is stored on a removable device, like a USB drive or Compact flash card. Back at the Clerk's location, the removable device is inserted into a PC, and the digitized ballot data is uploaded. Then, reports are generated.



The polling place report (cash register tape) is compared to the Clerk's location reports. Since they were both generated from the same data, no one should be surprised that they match.

Asking for More Than Just the Totals

But what if a candidate strongly suspects that something is wrong? Like the case in Georgia, a candidate was told she came in 3rd place in her race. Looking at the polling place results, she saw that she received zero votes at the place where she and her husband cast their ballots. There should have been at least two votes.

She could push for an investigation only because she received zero votes. If there had been two votes, or 5, or 10, she likely would have been told the results were the results.

[The investigation](#), which involved hand counting the paper ballots, showed that not only did this candidate have uncounted votes at the polling place where she and her husband voted, but she was the legitimate 1st place winner of the race. (see “2022, Jun. 22 – ‘Wild Ride’ – Michelle Long Spears Wins Runoff Following Chaotic Primary Election” on pg. 202)

Cast Vote Records are the Receipts

Voters nationwide have been working to obtain the “receipts,” called “Cast Vote Records.” To continue the grocery store analogy, if a store only tells you the total of your purchases, e.g., you owe \$135.03, then election results are like only telling Candidate A that they received 135 votes.

What is being asked for would be the full grocery receipt, showing what items were purchased that came to the \$135.03 total. In an election, we are asking for the digitized ballot data. Mathematicians can analyze this data to detect any machine irregularities or manipulation. The data from cast vote records is vital to auditing election results.

Can Voting Machines Make Errors or Be Manipulated?

Yes. Election results have been contested, and, in some cases, results were reversed due to machine issues, usually called glitches, programming errors, coding mistakes, and the like.

Are those ‘honest’ mistakes or manipulations? It would take a forensic inspection of the machine to make the determination.

Some articles in the Newsroom section of this eManual highlight machine issues, none of which were resolved with forensic investigations. Here are a few:

2020, Jan. 10 – ‘Online and Vulnerable’: Experts Find Nearly Three Dozen U.S. Voting Systems Connected to the Internet (pg. 199 or [Perma.cc/NT8D-FBEU](https://perma.cc/NT8D-FBEU))

2020, Nov. 30 – Cyber Security Expert: Dominion Was Connected to the Internet on Election Day, Communicated Overseas (pg. 200 or [Perma.cc/EFW9-Q2XR](https://perma.cc/EFW9-Q2XR))

2022, Apr. 1 – EAC Issues Report on Tennessee Voting System Anomaly (pg. 201 or [Perma.cc/VH2U-HLVJ](https://perma.cc/VH2U-HLVJ))

2022, May 20 – EAC Approves Measure to Address Missouri Voting Machine Anomaly (pg. 202 or [Perma.cc/H4VZ-P646](https://perma.cc/H4VZ-P646))

2022, Jun. 3 – CISA Advisory: Vulnerabilities Affecting Dominion Voting Systems ImageCast X (pg. 202 or [Perma.cc/B3UU-QGEN](https://perma.cc/B3UU-QGEN))

2022, Jun. 22 – ‘Wild Ride’ – Michelle Long Spears Wins Runoff Following Chaotic Primary Election (pg. 202 or [Perma.cc/LX3D-KNAT](https://perma.cc/LX3D-KNAT))

2022, Jul. 15 – Clerk: Problem with Voting Equipment Fixed (pg. 202 or [Perma.cc/U24G-Z5ZL](https://perma.cc/U24G-Z5ZL))

2022, Jul. 20 – Rockford Area Election Glitch Affected 20K Ballots. Here's What Happened (pg. 203 or [Perma.cc/KMJ7-5TX8](https://perma.cc/KMJ7-5TX8))

2022, Sep. 22 – Pennsylvania County Sues Dominion Voting Systems Over 'Severe Anomalies' In 2020 Election (pg. 204 or [Perma.cc/83XM-M3UY](https://perma.cc/83XM-M3UY))

2022, Nov. 8 – Maricopa County Official Apologizes for Broken Voting Machines (pg. 207 or [Perma.cc/TJ3Y-C225](https://perma.cc/TJ3Y-C225))

2024, Dec. 3 – ‘This is a human error’: Carbon County Clerk Gwynn Bartlett Explains Weston County Election Controversy (pg. 260 – archive link unavailable)

Gain Transparency by Hand Counting Ballots

Hand counting ballots provides the needed transparency. Votes are counted and marked on the Ballots Tally form. It is easy for the Election Judges, watchers, challengers, and other observers to see the individual marked for each vote cast that makes up the total for each race or question on the ballot. More on the topic of transparency can be found in Section 9, especially on the topic of Transparency and Security on page 283.

What's so S.M.A.R.T. About a Thermostat?

Most people probably feel that when they buy something marketed as “smart,” it means it’s going to be helpful to them. But consider the origin of the term “smart”:

“The term “smart” originally comes from the acronym

Self-Monitoring,

Analysis and

Reporting

Technology

but [*has*] become widely known as “smart” because of the notion of allowing previously inanimate objects—from cars to basketballs to clothes—to talk back to us and even guide our behavior.”¹

S.M.A.R.T. was technology that computer hard drives used to try to predict the possibility of a drive failure before it happened and take action to avoid catastrophic loss of your data. (It didn’t always work, though, did it?) It is now a term adopted by the IoT (Internet of Things) market to mean any device thinking for you.



Self-Monitoring, Analysis, Reporting, Technology

Consider what that means.

Self-Monitoring: The device is continuously monitoring without any interaction from you. Does *Alexa* ever surprise you by asking you to repeat something when you’re not speaking to her? Do you notice lights on your cell phone, PC, TV, or other devices go on as if you turned them on but didn’t?

Analysis: This is not like a tape recorder that records what you say verbatim, and you can erase it if you want. The device is programmed to think and analyze your words and actions and those of you, your family, your home, and your life. Is there anything you would not want it to know about you?

Reporting: The device is sending information about you somewhere to someone. You agreed to this when you turned it on and flipped through the terms of service. (Did you read the TOS or quickly click “Agree” so you could get to the next screen?)

¹ Article by Net Lingo, smart tech, a.k.a. smart technology, wearable tech [Perma.cc/Z96S-X8HE](https://perma.cc/Z96S-X8HE)

The S.M.A.R.T. Thing Did Not Work So Well for Coloradans

In September 2022, temperatures in Colorado reached the 90s. However, over 22,000 Coloradans discovered that the utility company had locked their thermostats (the S.M.A.R.T. kind) and would not let homeowners cool their houses to anything below the high 70s.


Agree or disagree with the reason for this; the [utility company was quoted](#) as saying, “Let’s remember that this is something that customers choose to be a part of based on the incentives.” (see 2022, Sep. 2 – Colorado Utility Company Locks 22,000 Thermostats, In 90 Degree Weather Due To ‘Energy Emergency’ on pg. 204)

Can Thermostats Not Trust Coloradans?

Why would a utility company incentivize its customers to install S.M.A.R.T. thermostats? Are Coloradans not trustworthy when deciding what temperature to maintain in their home?


Remember that S.M.A.R.T. technology is NOT about setting a schedule, such as adjusting the thermostat to lower when the family is away at school or work.

S.M.A.R.T. technology is about monitoring you, analyzing your habits, and reporting all this back ... to someone or someplace. And then it starts to [make decisions for you](#). (see 2022, Sep. 9 – Smart Meters – The Household Device That Spies on You 24/7 on pg. 204)



5 Robert F Kennedy Jr post on X about S.M.A.R.T Devices
[Perma.cc/7YE8-LJ49](https://perma.cc/7YE8-LJ49)

Welcome to the Internet of Things (IoT)



Perhaps you wear a S.M.A.R.T. watch on your wrist, have S.M.A.R.T. features in your car, and let S.M.A.R.T. monitor home appliances, and you love the ‘order’ it brings to your life.

If you remember Pet Rocks, you will understand my comments about marketing. (If you’re too young, looking will help.) Over 1 million people bought a rock that came in a box with its own straw bed and was treated like a pet.

Identifying inanimate objects as “S.M.A.R.T.” is also done for marketing but is way more serious than paying for a rock. These devices monitor, analyze, and report about you.

The Net Lingo article said this about S.M.A.R.T. devices:

“With some help from crowdsourcing or artificial intelligence, they can be taught to distinguish between responsible and irresponsible behavior, and **then punish or reward us accordingly**—in real time.”
[emphasis added]

Some Critical Questions about IoT and S.M.A.R.T. Devices

- Who is training the artificial intelligence?
- Who belongs to the crowdsourcing groups that set behavior standards?
- Who makes the final decision on what is responsible or irresponsible behavior?
- What are the punishments or rewards?
- “In real time” – does that mean if my S.M.A.R.T. car decides I have driven too many miles for personal purposes, it will shut off the car?
- What aspects of your life are “out of bounds” for your device to monitor? Is anything out of bounds?
- If something I do is considered ‘irresponsible,’ does my connected device have the ability to change it?

How Do These Devices Stay Connected All the Time?

An upcoming section will have more technical details about connectivity and security. (see *Modems are so Passé* on pg. 30) For now, the question you should be able to answer is, “how do my devices stay constantly connected?”

If you cannot answer the question, how do you know what other devices, maybe some that do not belong to you, are still monitoring, analyzing, and reporting your behavior?

Can a Connected Device Change My Vote?

‘That’ is the question. Consider jumping to “Election Security: Ask the Experts” on page 289.

Who's Watching Out for My Vote?

Have you ever received a notice advising there was a data breach and that your personal information might be compromised? Unfortunately, hacking and cybercrime are real things. That's a fact.

But do people understand how to protect themselves? Technology has made life easy and convenient. In exchange, we have relinquished our ability to understand our tech products.

Elections are Not Immune from Cybercrime

In a Tennessee Oct. 2021 election, the counter on the voting equipment showed 98 total ballots cast. An Election Judge had **manually kept count** and [knew it should be 330](#) (see 2022, Apr. 1 – EAC Issues Report on Tennessee Voting System Anomaly pg. 201).

In Georgia, in May 2022, results of ballots tabulated on voting equipment showed a candidate as the 3rd place finisher. A **hand recount** confirmed the candidate as the [winner of the election](#) (see 2022, Jun. 22 – 'Wild Ride' – Michelle Long Spears Wins Runoff Following Chaotic Primary Election pg. 202).


In Cole County, April 2022, **Election Judges** caught the [voting equipment doubling votes](#) on the results (see 2022, Apr. 7 – Video: Election Judges Catch Voting Problems in Cole County pg. 201).

Anomaly? Programming error? Glitch? Perhaps. These examples were not called cybercrimes, but could they have been? "It would take a forensic analysis to be certain."

"Both sides seem to agree that no votes were changed in the 2016 election, and I said, the experts I talked to say that, until you have a forensic analysis of a vote, until you go in there and scrub the whole system, you can't really say that." Sen. Ron Wyden, D-OR

(see 2018 to 2020 – Video: Democrats Say It Is Easy to Hack Voting Machines on pg. 197)

Potential Victim or Bad Actor



Most companies and schools strive to put secure networks in place to protect their digital infrastructure. In our homes, it is left to us to figure this out. We buy hardware we are told will protect our home network, or we pay a subscription for security services, or someone we know sets it up for us. Or, maybe you are someone whose home network security uses the "wish and a prayer" approach.



The truth is, if you do not understand how to protect yourself, it's unlikely you are a bad actor, and the only role left to you is that of a potential victim.

Trusting the Guard

We expect there to be something or someone in between our votes and bad actors.

We believe that our clerks, counties, and state have put all the necessary protocols in place to protect our elections. We believe they have been as diligent as they can be, but the voting equipment systems are as complex as any other digital equipment, and for any technical questions we have asked, most clerks go to the vendor for answers. Unfortunately, we did not elect the vendor.

In a [2019 article by Kim Zetter on Vice](#), the author wrote, “Even proper configurations won’t secure a firewall if the firewall software itself has security vulnerabilities that allow intruders to bypass all the authentication checks, whitelisting rules, and other security parameters set in the firewall’s configuration file.”

Senator Ron Wyden was quoted in the interview as: “It’s an indictment of the notion that important cybersecurity decisions should be left entirely to county election offices, many of whom do not employ a single cybersecurity specialist.

Not only should ballot tallying systems not be connected to the internet, they shouldn’t be anywhere near the internet....”

(see 2019, Aug. 8 – Critical U.S. Election Systems Have Been Left Exposed Online Despite Official Denials on pg. 198)

Requiring a Cyber Security Review


In 2022, Missouri’s new election laws included a mandatory cyber security review of each clerk’s office every two years. This law can be found in [Statute 115.225](#). (see Cause of America–Missouri review of this statute on pg. 50)

But here’s a question: if we have not been doing these cyber security reviews all along, how do we know that any or all the voting machines are not already compromised?

Hand Counting Technology is a Battery-Operated Calculator

Returning to hand counting removes most of the cyber worries around elections. We had hoped to remove all technology from the process, but short of sending an abacus, the Election Judges at least need a calculator (and we suggest they not use an app on their cell phones).

Arizona's Box 3



6 X post by @tylerbower about convoluted and complicated voting systems (Dec 21, 2022) [Perma.cc/2F2R-4WFO](https://perma.cc/2F2R-4WFO)

Arizona 2022 Election – Machine Issues Result in Creation of Box 3

When tabulators in 40 voting centers in Maricopa County, Arizona, began malfunctioning and rejecting ballots during the 2022 midterm election, [officials offered voters three options](#) for casting their ballot:

1. Stay and [wait for the machines](#) to go back online;
2. Go to a different polling location, or,
3. Drop their ballot in a drop box labeled “Box 3.”

(see 2022, Nov. 8 – 'Box 3' and 'Maricopa County' are Trending Nationally on Twitter and 2022, Nov. 8 – Maricopa County Official Apologizes for Broken Voting Machines on pg. 207)

Solving a Machine Failure Almost Always Results in Returning to a “Traditional” Voting Method
Box 3 in Arizona in the November 2022 election was the “fast fix” for machine breakdowns. Interestingly, Box 3 looked a lot like a traditional Ballot Box. There were no lines – voters walked up and dropped their ballots into the box.

Accurate Performance of Voting Machines Cannot be Relied Upon

In the Lake v. Hobbs trial, which challenged the 2022 election results, one of the defendant’s expert witnesses, Kenneth Mayer, [gave testimony about tabulator malfunctions](#). Under oath, Mr. Mayer stated, “One of the most common issues that arises in the work on Election Day operations ... ‘It’ [*tabulator malfunctions*] can happen for reasons that are not anticipatable [*sic*]. It can be, sort of, machine breakdowns, or the sort of things that are hard to predict.”

“Arizona's election is once again in the national spotlight. This time, tabulator errors are to blame rather than a hand recount of Maricopa's 2020 votes.”

(see 2022, Nov. 8 – 'Box 3' and 'Maricopa County' are Trending Nationally on Twitter on pg. 207)

Evidence of Machine Failures is Both Historical and Current

A [New Yorker article](#) was already warning of machine errors and the complexity of running them back in 1988:

"At one point, we had tabulation errors in twenty-eight percent of the systems tested, and nobody cared." "Should citizens delegate the job of vote-counting to technicians? Most people do not know enough about computers to be able to tell what is happening during computerized vote-counting"

(see 1988, Oct. 30 – Counting Votes on pg. 197)

In 2019, Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), along with Senators Amy Klobuchar (D-MN), Ron Wyden (D-OR), and Mark Pocan (D-WI), [investigated election technology vendors](#). While the emphasis of their investigation was on private equity firms who owned the software that facilitates voting for 90% of U.S. voters, their findings also included criticism of the reliability and performance of voting equipment:

"Election security experts have noted for years that our nation's election systems and infrastructure are under serious threat, but voting machines reportedly continue to fail and breakdown across the country, as vendors fail to innovate, improve, and protect voting systems, putting U.S. elections at avoidable and increased risk."

(see 2019, Dec. 10 – Warren, Klobuchar, Wyden, and Pocan Investigate Vulnerabilities and Shortcomings of Election Technology Industry with Ties to Private Equity on pg. 199)

Election officials in the [State of Texas rejected ballot counting software from Dominion](#), based on the findings of reports done in 2012 and twice in 2019. Attorney General Ken Paxton was quoted as:

"We have not approved these voting systems based on repeated software and hardware issues. It was determined they were not accurate and that they failed — they had a vulnerability to fraud and unauthorized manipulation."

(see 2020, Nov. 19 – Texas Rejected Use of Dominion Voting System Software Due to Efficiency Issues on pg. 200)

Hand Counting: Only Reliable Method

I would venture to say that every election has incidents of machine errors or issues that require recounts. Election officials usually go with a machine recount, which I find perplexing. If you believe the machines are accurate but then run ballots through a machine a second time, giving you a different result, which was the correct result? The first or second?

Hand counts are the only reliable method for proving election results.

Accuracy of Hand Counts

Additional information has been added to the Myth-Debunking section regarding the accuracy of hand counts:

Myth: People are Less Accurate than Machines on page 249

Myth: The Hand Counted Verification of Machine Results Match Exactly **Every Single Time** on page 255

2: MOTIVATIONS

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A 2018 National Conference of State Legislatures' (NCSL) Brief stated, "No one knows how much it costs to run elections in the United States. For that matter, it's a rare state that knows how much election administration costs within its own borders due to the complexity of elections and the involvement of several levels of government."²

Even though the NCSL brief link is inactive, it was also quoted and appears in a newsletter article by The Appeal called "*The Count: The Gaslighting of the American Voter*."³ The Count's co-host, Emily Galvin-Almanza stated, "Most Americans are being gaslit into thinking that a wildly unpleasant hazard filled voting experience is somehow normal or necessary, or the only possible option."

Elections have become industrialized over the past century, growing a vast infrastructure – from private sector businesses to lobbyists, associations, consultants, government agencies, NGOs, and elected officials.

Large sums of money are in play, and there is motivation wherever there is money. Motivation is either because you are pocketing money, or because the money comes out of your pocket. The more money, the more motivation.

While the NCSL brief focused on which levels of government are covering the costs for elections – local, state, or even federal – the story appears to neglect that it is all taxpayer-funded. We, The People, are paying for all of this. Yet we have little to no transparency about how much money is being spent or who is on the receiving end of the money.

² "The price of democracy: Splitting the bill for elections." 2018 National Conference of State Legislatures (URL inactive)

³ "The Count #11: The Gaslighting of the American Voter" (Oct. 30, 2020), scroll down the webpage to "Show Me the Money" [Perma.cc/366A-YBJB](https://perma.cc/366A-YBJB)

According to the NCSL, “One of the most expensive items in an election administrator’s budget is the equipment used to cast and tabulate votes.”

The Count newsletter did **not** have praise for voting machines: “Voting machines across the country are prone to crashing and failing. In 2018, 41 states used equipment that was at least 10 years old. When early voting began in Texas, machines at all 30 sites in one county didn’t work for hours. But splashing cash on new machines and technology doesn’t mean it will be faultless if you don’t test and train adequately ...”


We are told to trust the system without the ability to reassure ourselves that the system is trustworthy. But the people, in almost all states, are unable to do their own post-election reviews or investigations, as election data is “sealed” and kept from us (as in MO Statute 115.493).

Vendors who are being paid with taxpayer money use a “proprietary” clause and the threat of “void of warranty” to conceal the very data for which taxpayers paid.

But in Missouri, we have a nearly half-century-old collection of statutes that gives us the right to return to hand-counted elections (and many other states do, as well). Yes, we, The People, have a lot to learn, teach, and do because we are the replacement for voting machines. We were once replaced by machines, and we are ready to take back our duties.

Our motivation is not just about reducing costs. It is also about transparency, trust, and civic duty. We will want YOU, our elected and election officials, to tell us *YOUR* motivations. When we speak with you, we will listen, but our assessment will be filtered by what experience and evidence reveal to be your true motivation.

What's in the Black Box?



No One's Telling Us

The term “black box,” used to describe voting machines, goes back at least to the 1990s. What was true in the 1990s that is still true today is that we are told we have no right to look inside the black box to check the hardware, nor can we inspect the source code.

Pandora's Black Box

If you read nothing else in this eManual, read [*Pandora's Black Box: Did It Really Count Your Vote?*](#) It was written in 1996. Here are a few excerpts:

“On November 5, 1996, millions of Americans voted by secret ballot for thousands of elected officials from the Presidency to the local dog catcher. What few realized is that a key aspect of the vote-counting was also done in secret. What's more, they have been legally denied the right to find out precisely how their vote is counted.”

“The counting of almost 70% of our votes is done inside a literal and figurative black box by a technical process that you have no legal right to inspect. The results from that black box are then counted by local election officials who send their results to the State where they are later “certified” as accurate and honest.”

“What most people do not realize is that no one other than these obscure voting machine vendors can examine the ‘source-codes’ or computer-programming instructions that tell the computer exactly how to count your votes: not the voters, not the poll workers, not the city clerk, not the county election supervisor, not even the state elections director or any federal election officials are allowed to view the source-code.” (see 1996, Nov. – Pandora's Black Box: Did It Really Count Your Vote? on pg. 197)

“Do the Quick-as-a-Wink, Computerized Systems Count Accurately?”

“Are they vulnerable to fraud, as well—even fraud of a much more dangerous, centralized kind?”

Written almost a decade **earlier** than *Pandora's Black Box*, an [article in *The New Yorker*](#) questioned the security of elections managed on computerized systems.

“This year, fifty-five percent of all votes — seventy-five percent in the largest jurisdictions — will be counted electronically. If ninety-five million Americans vote on Tuesday, November 8th, the decisions expressed by about fifty-two million of them will be tabulated **according to rules that programmers and operators unknown to the public have fed into computers.**” [*emphasis added*] (see 1988, Oct. 30 – Counting Votes on pg. 197)

51-49, Would You Believe a Whistleblower?

Who are the “unknown programmers and operators mentioned in the article above? One is Clint Curtis, a computer programmer. In 2004, he testified before Congress as a whistleblower. Curtis told us how he was employed to write an algorithm for a U.S. Congressman. The algorithm would “adjust” the votes in an election to consistently produce a 51/49 result for a specific candidate.

Curtis thought it was something being used as part of a congressional investigation. However, while watching election results during the 2004 election, he recognized that the algorithm was being used and became a whistleblower.

Our links will access Curtis' original [2004 testimony](#) and a [2022 interview](#) where he confirms that the algorithm is still being used. (see 2004 and 2022 – Clint Curtis, Democrat Whistleblower Exposes the Truth About How He Created the Machine Algorithm 51-49 on pg. 198)

What Do Our Clerks Learn About the Black Box?

I would venture to guess that most of Missouri's county clerks inherited electronic voting equipment when elected ... especially since around 35 new clerks were starting in 2023.

It is probably good odds that any "voting machine" training will consist of a manual covering how to use the software to upload election data and pull reports. Maybe there will be some pictures of the exterior of the black box to illustrate how to plug in the machine, turn it on, and set it up for voting.

No Looking – No Touching

But, without a doubt, there will not be any pictures of the inside of the black box. Nor will there be anything for the Clerk to learn about the inside of the PC, which the vendor sold to the county. It is used to run election software.

The Clerk is not allowed to be inside the voting machine or the PC.

How do I know? I listened to a clerk speak to some of his constituents after the April 2022 election and tell a story of how the PC used by the county (dedicated to election use only) was outputting 2012 as the date on election results instead of 2022.

A frantic call to the vendor resulted in a warning that if the clerk opened the PC or accessed the PC settings, the warranty would be voided, and the election could not be certified.



7 'Black Box' Machine Welcome Screen

What Clerks Don't Learn About the Black Box


I felt sorry for the Clerk because I was pretty sure I knew what was wrong. The image below is a motherboard; the arrow points to a silver circle on the board. That silver circle thing is a battery, one of those tablet types, probably #2032. The battery had probably died, so the PC had reverted its internal clock to the year it was built, 2012.

The clock on a PC motherboard like this one does not use electricity. It has its own battery right on the motherboard. Pop the battery out, replace it, and the clock is running again.

I wonder how much the county taxpayers are paying for a service contract with the vendor for the upkeep of the election equipment. Also, I wonder why the vendor doesn't change these batteries every few years to ensure they don't fail on election day.

What's a Motherboard?

Is it essential for a Clerk to know what a motherboard is? There is a motherboard in the black box machine – it cannot run without one. It may look different than this one. A motherboard for a laptop, for example, will be substantially smaller.



8 Motherboard Image

Should the Clerk know what processor or CPU is on the motherboard? Without a CPU, the machine has no brains and cannot operate. A CPU must be mounted on a motherboard, so both are critical components.

Should the Clerk Know Where the Motherboard and CPU were Manufactured?

I believe so. And I think clerks should know the origin of every electronic equipment used in elections.

The image to the right is a wireless PC mouse in an 'explode' view so the components can be seen. Notice the green circuit board? Every single electronic device has a circuit board or motherboard.



9 Explode View of Wireless Mouse

What Is on a Circuit Board or Motherboard?

That is the Ten Million Dollar Question! Who among us can look at a circuit board or a motherboard and identify every component on it? And could you also recognize it if it was disguised?

Col. Shawn Smith, USAF Retired, is an expert in “adversarial assessment,” a method of detecting cyber threats. In August 2022, Col. Smith gave a presentation titled “*Enemy Inside the Wire*.” (see 2022, Aug. 23 – “*Enemy Inside the Wire*” Ret. Col. Shawn Smith Speaks at The Moment of Truth Summit pg. 204)

Compromising Big Tech

In his presentation, Col. Smith showed the image of what appeared to be a computer power coupler but was not. Instead, it was disguised as a power coupler, but it was a chip that compromised the servers of some of the biggest tech companies in the world, including Amazon and Apple.

And, as Col. Smith explained, those tech companies did not detect it. Instead, it was discovered by someone else who alerted them – after nearly four months.


Note that the chip is smaller than the lead on a No. 2 pencil.

“If you think an election official, let alone the voting system testing labs, ... is going to detect a counterfeit or supply chain attack, they’re not.” (Col. Smith)

For more information, see:

2018, Oct 13 – The Tech Giants, The US, And the Chinese Spy Chips That Never Were... Or Were They? on page 198 or [Perma.cc/ZP3M-WZXM](https://perma.cc/ZP3M-WZXM)

2021, Feb. 12 – Years Later, Bloomberg Doubles Down on Disputed Supermicro Supply Chain Hack Story on page 200



10 Example of a Chip disguised as a power coupler

Modems are so Passé

Vendors of voting machines will assure you that, unless you request it, there are no modems in the voting equipment. But I don't believe it is about modems in the way many of us might remember those devices (or still have). What we used is already antiquated.

Current technology is talking about “modules” and global connectivity. No logging on ... you're just connected. It is about the technology to monitor, analyze, and report about us, combined with the ability for S.M.A.R.T. devices to judge our behavior as responsible or irresponsible and then reward or punish.

S.M.A.R.T. City –Everything is Connected, and Every Device is a Modem

In an earlier section, we covered the Internet of Things (IoT) , the constant connectivity of S.M.A.R.T. devices, and their purpose in monitoring you. (see Welcome to the Internet of Things (IoT) on pg. 16)

In a S.M.A.R.T. city, everything is connected. It is an actual ‘matrix.’ Every device becomes a modem. Every S.M.A.R.T. device you carry or wear, every S.M.A.R.T. appliance or device in your home, and every camera or traffic signal on the streets you travel all connect to the ‘network’ and become links on the web that connect every nearby device.



11 IoT – Internet of Things, Wireless Communication Network

Who's Connecting Everything?

Governments. Private-sector industries. Investors. Individuals who ‘plug in’ to the network. These companies are examples of the move to a global network:

Telit (telit.com)

Telit offers the “broadest global wireless IoT module portfolio in the industry.” Wireless Communication Modules, IoT Cellular Connectivity, IoT Platforms

Qualcomm ([qualcomm.com](https://www.qualcomm.com))

Watch the film on the homepage, where Qualcomm explains that they enable “a world where everyone and everything can be intelligently connected.”

- “That’s the power of AI. You don’t need to understand it. It understands you.”
- “Internet of Things that works seamlessly together ...” (meaning it connects without your direction).

“Our Voting Equipment Does Not Connect to the Internet”

If you are a Coloradan who accepted one of those S.M.A.R.T. thermostats and have changed your mind about it, could you open the thermostat, locate the communications chip, and disengage it?

If you had some other S.M.A.R.T. device but only wanted it to connect to the internet when you physically plugged it in or were within range of your home Wi-Fi, would you know how?

Do you know when your S.M.A.R.T. devices are in monitoring, analyzing, or reporting mode? Do you know when they are connected?

Remember, S.M.A.R.T. is Just a Marketing Term

Just because an electronic device does not have a S.M.A.R.T. label does not mean it does not have a component installed that gives it the ability to connect.

Electronic Poll Pads Can Act as Modems

Missouri’s 2022 election law bill restricted voting machines from connecting to the internet. Even to some of the legislators who worked to pass the bill, what was not clearly defined but explained after the Governor signed the bill is that electronic poll pads are not considered voting equipment. They ARE allowed to connect to the internet.

This makes electronic poll pads, which connect to the internet, active modems inside the polling place.

Let’s Ask Instead, “Do These Voting Machines Have Connectivity?”

A presentation by an Election Systems & Software⁴ representative to the Missouri Secretary of State’s staff included a slide about modems stating that they are only installed in Election Systems & Software machines in states where it is allowed and requested.

You might be interested in more details on this subject, which is posted in Election Systems & Software’s FAQ section.⁵

The last bullet point reads, “Today’s modern cellular modem technology also requires a private network service provider such as Verizon.”

The counties that use electronic poll pads connected to the internet are already paying for cellular network services from companies such as Verizon and AT&T. Some counties also provide cell phones to each polling place to track the movement of voting equipment using the phone’s GPS or to communicate with Election Judges.

Machine vendors will explain multiple levels of vetting and security with “trusted partners” to ensure a secure supply chain. Earlier in this chapter, we pointed out how Big Tech companies like

⁴ ES&S is a registered trademark of Election Systems & Software

⁵ ES&S website FAQ page [Perma.cc/H3UU-9EN6](https://perma.cc/H3UU-9EN6)

Apple and Amazon were reportedly fooled and hacked. Col. Smith's remarks that believing a voting system lab or an election official can detect a disguised chip is false hope. (pg. 29)

False Hope

Let's stop asking whether voting machines are connected to the internet and ask if the machines have connectivity.

Suppose a vendor tells a Clerk there is no connectivity, and a Clerk tells a constituent there is no connectivity. In that case, they should be able to present a detailed forensic audit for each piece of equipment that proves their assertion.

If they don't, they only speak with the false hope of no connectivity.

Motivation of The People: Hand Counting Reduces the Risk of Connectivity

Our motivation is to minimize the threat that comes with connectivity. Human beings sitting around a table without any electronic devices, reading votes cast, and dabbing a tally sheet with a marker is about the safest we can imagine.

Save Time



Giving Time Back to the Clerk



12 QR Code:
Statute 48.020

Depending on the County Classification and how the county budgets for elections, the person, or persons, responsible for elections within the county (or voting jurisdiction) is going to be either the County Clerk or Election Director(s).

Duties of these election officials can range from being full-time working only on elections with dedicated office space and work areas to being a full-time clerk who manages county business (like budgets, payroll, etc.) and still must coordinate elections. The Clerk may be working in a 100+-year-old county courthouse in the same office used by a clerk 100 years ago.

Whether the election authority is a clerk or a director, with 1 or 2 deputies or a department of employees, I believe that, if for no other reason, due diligence requires them to honestly review and consider whether returning to hand counting provides the outlined benefits.

Statutes Specific to Hand Counting

In an upcoming section, statutes that apply to the hand-counting process are listed in order of how the process should flow. Some statutes apply to both hand counting and voting machines, and they are included to give a complete understanding of the process. (see Step by Step by Statute, starting on pg. 58) [Missouri statutes](#) are located on the Revisor website ([Perma.cc/NVT8-72UM](https://perma.cc/NVT8-72UM)).

In my research, I have identified **seven** statutes specific to hand counting.

Statutes Specific to Electronic Voting Equipment

From how I read the statutes, the following list of 25 statutes includes those I identify as specific to voting machines.

- 115.225 Automated equipment to be approved by secretary of state — standards to be ... (8/28/2022)
- 115.227 Consistent provisions of general law to apply to electronic voting systems. (11/7/2018)
- 115.229 Electronic voting system may be used, when. (8/28/1985)
- 115.230 Voter verification, electronic system, or pad authorized. (8/28/2011)
- 115.233 Testing of automatic tabulating equipment, when done, procedure. (8/28/2002)
- 115.235 Preparation of marking devices required. (1/1/1978)
- 115.249 Standards required of voting machines. (8/28/2013)
- 115.255 Electronic voting machines used, paper ballots permitted, when. (8/28/2014)
- 115.257 Electronic voting machines to be put in order, procedure — absentee ... (8/28/2022)
- 115.259 Voting machines to be visible to election judges at polls. (8/28/2013)
- 115.261 Voting machine not to be unlocked or opened during election, exception. (8/28/2014)
- 115.263 No persons except voters to handle electronic voting machine during ... (8/28/2014)
- 115.265 Inoperative electronic voting machine, procedure to follow. (8/28/2014)

115.267 Experimental use, adoption of or abandonment of electronic voting equipment ... (8/28/2014)
115.269 Exhibition, demonstration and instruction on electronic voting machines ... (8/28/2014)
115.271 Electronic voting machines may be rented out or loaned to civic or ... (8/28/2014)
115.273 Consistent general law to apply in jurisdictions using electronic voting ... (8/28/2014)
115.467 Duties of judges after polls close (electronic voting). (8/28/1978)
115.473 Tally book, form of (electronic voting). (8/28/1978)
115.475 Return of ballots, memory cards, and election materials, procedure for ... (8/28/2014)
115.477 Ballots, procedure for counting (electronic voting). (8/28/2014)
115.479 Tabulating equipment to be tested, when (electronic voting). (8/28/2014)
115.481 Official return of polling place, contents of (electronic voting). (1/1/1978)
115.483 Duties of judge after polls close (voting machines). (8/28/2014)
115.495 Electronic voting machine to be kept secured — machine unlocked, when — ... (8/28/2014)

Pass, Amend, and Amend Again

Before considering time savings for the Clerk, consider the State Legislature and Executive Branch.



Legislation to Keep Voting Machine Statutes Updated

Of the list of voting machine-specific statutes, 17 have been amended in the past 10 years.

That is a considerable amount of time our elected officials have personnel researching technology and drafting language to amend the law (to keep up with technology).

With the speed at which technology is ever-changing, how much time will each legislative session have to be allocated to reviewing statutes for voting machines?

On the other hand, only three of the seven hand count statutes have been amended since 2014.

Were there any notable changes to technology since 2014? (I suggest skipping back a few pages to read about S.M.A.R.T. technology.)

Hand Counting Statutes Require Little or Infrequent Updates

In comparison, four of the seven statutes specific to hand counting have never been amended, and the three that were amended were done once – in 2013.

Complying with Statutes, and Rules and Manuals

It is up to the Clerk to comply with the statutes. A Clerk reviews and updates their processes for every update to one of these statutes (and then re-training staff).

The seven hand counting statutes are specific to counting ballots, but the voting machine statutes cover a range of requirements, including purchasing, leasing, upgrading, maintaining, storing, etc. Then there is the pre-election machine testing, transportation of voting machines to and from polling places, post-election testing, and inventory systems to control the storage of voting equipment and supplies.

State Rules for Voting Machines

There is a chapter in the [Code of State Regulations](#) with specific rules for voting machines (Title 15, Division 30, Chapter 10). The Clerk must also understand, implement, and comply with these regulations (see Missouri Code of State Regulations (CSR) on page 235).

Voting Machine Manuals: Hardware and Software

Voting machines come with several different manuals: they cover hardware, using the software program for election results, election reports, and maintenance.

Time that Could be Saved by Returning to Hand Counting

From my layperson's interpretation of the statutes, none of the 27 statutes listed on the previous pages would apply to the election if the Clerk opted to "abandon" the electronic voting system and return to hand counting. They have the right to do so, as set forth in statute 115.267 (see pg. 224).

There is a rule in the Code of State Regulations (CSR) that hand counting and voting machines have in common, but otherwise, the rule cited above should be moot.

And any manuals from the voting machine vendor could be returned or recycled. All the maintenance tasks would go away with the manuals.

Overall, Consider the Before and After Election Time Saved

Many duties will continue, such as scheduling and training election judges, voter registration duties, ballots preparation, etc. However, tasks associated with voting machine updates, programming, or testing will be eliminated when working to meet deadlines before the election. There will not be a need for public testing of the voting equipment. Logic & Accuracy and Risk-Limiting Audits will no longer be necessary.

Take Back Your Storage Space

Depending on the design of the ballot boxes (recommending a style that can stack inside each other), a significant footprint of space will return to the Clerk. Also, consider that the security requirements for empty ballot boxes will be much simpler than cyber security for electronic voting machines.

Motivation of The People: Secure our Elections

We want to work with our Clerks on the most efficient method for ballot counting and save the Clerk time.

Generally, when there is talk about saving time regarding ballots and elections, the conversation tends to pivot to how much faster or slower it is to use a machine versus a hand count. However, we must understand that significant work is involved with how to use voting machines and many laws and regulations. It is likely clerks are more overwhelmed than they want to admit. The result is that clerks rely on paid third-party vendors to give them 'Peace of Mind.' The truth is that the clerk would save considerable time if they went to the simplified system of hand-counting ballots.

We were replaced by machines at some point in the past. It is time for The People to step up and participate in securing their elections.

Save Money



Follow the Money

For the most part, it has been impossible to track down how much money is made in the ‘industrialized business of elections.’ Citizens are frustrated and so are elected officials.

Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA) worked with a team of 3 other U.S. senators to “Investigate Vulnerabilities and Shortcomings of the Election Technology Industry.” One [statement from their report](#) referring to the machine vendors was:

“These vendors make little to no information publicly available on how much money they dedicate to research and development, or to maintenance of their voting systems and technology. They also share little or no information regarding annual profits or executive compensation for their owners.”

(see 2019, Dec. 10 – Warren, Klobuchar, Wyden, and Pocan Investigate Vulnerabilities and Shortcomings of Election Technology Industry with Ties to Private Equity on pg. 199)

Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) is quoted in response to an investigation revealing [voting machines left connected to the internet](#) (possible for years) and the vendor denying the report:

“yet another damning indictment of the profiteering election vendors, who care more about the bottom line than protecting our democracy.”

(see 2019, Aug. 8 – Critical U.S. Election Systems Have Been Left Exposed Online Despite Official Denials on pg. 198)

Given the reactions of the U.S. Senators to the voting machine manufacturers, it appears someone is making a lot of money.

Possible Budget Line Items for Voting Machine Equipment

According to The Electoral Knowledge Network⁶, “technological solutions may cost significantly more than the equivalent manual processes...” A Clerk “... does not have to implement a high-cost, high-tech solution if a low-cost, low-tech alternative is acceptable. Using their website, a list of possible budget lines associated with machine voting is below.

- Initial costs: hardware and software (purchasing or leasing), vendor or consultant to set up a new system
- Ongoing maintenance and management costs
- Additional hardware or peripherals, such as computers, monitors, printers, scanners, photocopiers, communications equipment, electronic voting devices, touch screens,

⁶ ACE – The Electoral Knowledge Network on costs and benefits of technological solutions [Perma.cc/9A8K-SUMF](https://perma.cc/9A8K-SUMF) and budgeting [Perma.cc/SJ3W-4WFW](https://perma.cc/SJ3W-4WFW)

keyboards, modems, speakers, amplifiers, disk drives, disk writers, backup storage devices, ergonomic aids, emergency power supplies

- Additional Software such as office automation, database, finance, personnel, proprietary, communications
- Upgrades to hardware and/or software
- Network charges, satellite links, cabling, radio, telecommunications
- Supplies such as printer ink and toner, paper, USB, or removable devices
- Repair technicians and support, Maintenance agreements
- Salaries and training for staff, full- or part-time, to learn to work with the equipment
- Any consultants, project managers, technical consultants, or independent auditors
- Transportation, such as moving equipment to and from place of use
- Electricity costs to operate the technology and associated lighting and air conditioning, power generators for emergency use, or for use where local power supplies are unreliable
- Storage, whether internal space or rented/leased external space
- Creation of documentation, such as system specifications, technical maintenance manuals, user manuals, training manuals
- Back-up systems - for example, alternative systems such as manual systems to fall back on if technology fails, as well as systems for backing up and storing data in the event of system failure
- Disposal costs - for example, costs associated with disposing of or selling obsolete technology
- Depreciation and amortization estimates - for example, computer equipment expected to last three years has a cost that can be written off in three years

Estimated Cost to a County to Use Voting Machines

I have not seen any estimates for the cost to a county in Missouri that uses voting equipment. Still, a county in Tennessee put together a video with some estimates – more than \$800K for voting equipment. (see 2022, Dec. 10 – Video: Why [county] Should Not Jump into a Voting Machine Purchase Contract Right Now on pg. 208)

**TENNESSEE VOTERS**
FOR ELECTION INTEGRITY

SIMPLIFY #6: BUT TO REALLY MINIMIZE COSTS IN A RECESSION....

- Currently spending with ES&S:
 - **\$467,600** on machinery (200 BMDs, 75 scanners, EMS, DS450)
 - **\$10,000** on software, USB sticks, assorted items **\$550,185 (F)**
 - **\$114,000** on services (ES&S project mgt, training, support) **\$41,410 (S)**
 - Thermal paper costs? Unknown (\$21K @ .57) & not in contract. **\$591,595**
- Best price for WC? Use a hard negotiator?
- We suspect you've not performed full cost/lifecycle/benefit analysis...
 - Machine-based system vs. paper-based system.
- **\$591,595 + \$214,600 (Partial machine reimburse from County?) = \$806,191**
- **Doesn't include current election staffing costs -- Unknown**

Estimate for Returning to Hand Counting

The suggested budget line items in the previous section would not apply if a county returned to hand-counting ballots.

The costs for using voting equipment are not just the amounts a county pays – the State and federal governments also have costs for these machines. But it's still all taxpayer money, no matter whose budget line it hits.

“To install computerized voting across the nation would cost billions. By comparison, a return to paper ballots dropped into boxes (clear plastic to avoid false bottoms, etc.) would amount to peanuts. How Simple” Jackie Patru, Introduction to *Pandora's Black Box*

(see 1996, Nov. – Pandora's Black Box: Did It Really Count Your Vote? on pg. 197)

A Georgia City Returns to Hand Counting

The City of Milton, in [Fulton County, Georgia](#), voted to take control of their elections, remove machines, and return to hand counting. The city has about 30,000 registered voters. The city estimates that in 2023 alone, it will save about \$250,000. (see 2022, Dec. 20 – Georgia City Takes Over Election Control from Fulton County, Paving the Way for Populist Control, Removes Machines on pg. 209)

Anticipated Expenses for Missouri Counties to Return to Hand Counting

A list of supplies for the hand counting process is shown starting on pg. 164. Altogether, depending on the design and cost of ballot boxes, the expense per polling place is probably a couple of hundred dollars.

More Election Judges Will Cost More

Yes. More Election Judges are needed to serve as the counting team. They will need to be paid, which will increase the line items on the Clerk's budget for election support workers. But it feels very safe to say that this increase will be a fraction of the savings of the cost of voting equipment.


How to Estimate Hand Count Costs

The Myth-Debunking Workbook section provides tools for estimating hand-counting costs (see page 259).

Motivation of The People: Support the Clerk to Reduce Election Costs

If a less expensive but effective method of counting ballots exists, there is no reason to stay with the more costly method. “Just because I trust machines more than people” is not an acceptable motivation.

Election Day Results



Missouri Laws Make It Possible for Election Day Results

The idea that hand counting will take weeks, or even months, to give results is an uninformed assumption. It is like saying horses are faster than dogs when you do not know which dogs and horses are in the race.

Because ballots can begin to be counted one hour after polls open, it makes it possible to schedule counters to ensure election day results. Other states that have to wait until polls close to begin counting may go later into the night but should still be able to produce same-day results.

More Technology Seems to Be Slowing Down Election Results

The more a municipality relies on voting equipment, the longer it seems to take to get election results. In the weeks leading up to the Nov. 8, 2022, midterm election, city, county, and state officials around the country, right up to the White House, were warning not to expect results on election day ... even though most of those issuing warnings had 'streamlined' their voting processes by consolidating polling locations and building large 'ballot processing' operation sites.

- Why Election Results May Not Be Known Right Away (see pg. 206)
- Expect Delays from Harris County Reporting Results on Election Night (see pg. 206)
- Dominion Voting Machines Down in Texas, Arizona, New Jersey – Other Voter Irregularities Reported (see pg. 206)
- Maricopa County, Arizona, Experiences Large Number of Voting Machine 'Malfunctions' Early Tuesday (see pg. 207)

Basics of the Hand Counting Process

To make any claim that hand counting will take days or weeks to accomplish would require the speaker to consider a few things they may not know or have considered:

Count Ballots at the Polling Place

First, the process is based on ballots being counted at the polling place where they are cast, which is an excellent aspect of hand counting. It provides transparency and a chain of custody. The ballots are counted before they ever leave the building.

Counting Teams

Counting Teams consist of 4 Election Judges. These do not have to be the same judges who are already working all day on the election. We recommend they not be the same judges.

Counting may begin as early as one hour after the polls open. However, many counties will not need to start that early.



Election Judges, per statute, may be scheduled by the Clerk for a half day. Sometimes, only a half day will be needed to count ballots.

Help for the counting process should come from the political parties whose duty is to recruit and nominate Election Judges.

Also, high school students can assist Election Judges, which creates another pool of candidates to help.

Quantity of Ballots per Polling Place

The voter turnout for Missouri elections held in the past few years shows us that the average percentage of voter turnout is pretty standard between counties, regardless of population. But, without a doubt, there are large and small counties. Missouri has 116 voting jurisdictions (114 counties and 2 cities). The pie charts below show voter turnout by county, with the 116 Missouri counties grouped by ballots cast in the November 3, 2020, presidential and November 6, 2018, midterm elections.



13 Pie Charts showing voter turnout grouped by ballots cast in a presidential and midterm election

Note that 65 counties (56%) in a presidential election and 76 jurisdictions (66%) in a midterm election had less than 10,000 ballots cast. Just under 30% of counties in the next group receive between 10,000 and 50,000 ballots in either presidential or midterm elections.


The two tables below provide voter registration and turnout samples for counties that fall into these two largest groupings of ballots cast by county: Perry County (left) and Cape Girardeau County (right). **Note the drastic drop in ballots cast in other elections compared to a once-every-four-years presidential election.**

Election	Registered Voters	Ballots Cast	Turnout
Nov 3 2020	13,033	9,495	72.85%
Apr 5 2022	12,798	2,632	20.57%
Aug 2 2022	13,213	3,240	24.52%

15 Perry County Voter Turnout


Election	Registered Voters	Ballots Cast	Turnout
Nov 8 2016	52,510	37,565	71.54%
Apr 5 2022	53,712	8,097	15.07%
Aug 2 2022	54,135	11,964	22.10%

14 Cape Girardeau County Voter Turnout



16 Bar Graph - Cape Girardeau County, Voter Turnout by Polling Place, # of Counting Teams to Count Ballots in 8 hours

The bar graph on the left breaks down voter turnout across Cape Girardeau County's polling places, with vertical bars (color-coded for three elections) showing turnout levels. Horizontal bars display the number of counting teams (1, 2, or 3) needed to count all ballots in 8 hours. Interestingly, outside of presidential elections, this county rarely needs more than one team per polling place to complete hand counting ballots in 8 hours.



17 Bar Graph - Perry County, Voter Turnout by Polling Place, # of Counting Teams to Count Ballots in 8 hours

While Cape Girardeau County is representative of about 30% of the Missouri counties, receiving between 10,000 and 50,000 ballots in an election, Perry County represents 60% of Missouri counties with fewer than 10,000 ballots cast per election. The bar graph (above) shows no need for a third counting team, as counties like Perry rarely require more than one team per polling place for any type of election.

Creating Voter Turnout Charts and Graphs

The charts on these pages are easy to create. Jump to page 272 to read “**Myth:** Hand Counting Only Works in Small Counties.” A tool for preparing these charts, “Visualization of Voter Turnout,” can be found in that section.

Hand Counting Processes for Missouri

Hand Counting Process per Statute

For Missouri, an election process with forms, instructions, and resources has been created by following the details laid out in the statutes. Section 4 of this eManual, starting on page 59, Step by Step by Statute, outlines the steps of the hand counting process and identifies the applicable statute.

Hand Counting Process Details for Election Judges

The Election Judges are among the most important participants in the hand-counting process. To better describe the process, in Section 5, starting on page 73, the entire process is explained again with the details an Election Judge would want to see. This section is called the *Election Judge Workbook Addendum*.

Motivation of The People: Participate and Support

The more time passes from when the polls close until the election results are announced, the greater the feeling that something is wrong. The people need to be more involved in the process and support the elected officials conducting elections.

At the same time, we expect the motivation of elected officials to be in the best interests of The People – not the vendors, associations, themselves, or any other entity.

Transparency & Security



Someone shared a story with me about a conversation they said they had with one of our Missouri elected officials (so it is hearsay). They said the elected official told them Missouri probably has some election fraud, but not enough to worry about. If it gets worse, then they will do something about it.

That would mean that voting machines in Missouri are somehow the only ones with no vulnerabilities and have immunity to hacking.

Democrats Warn About Voting Machine Vulnerabilities

Members of the U.S. Congress were already sounding the alarm. They have been concerned about hacking and voting machine vulnerabilities since at least 2000.

“You could easily hack into them. It makes it seem like all these states are doing different things but, in fact, 3 companies are controlling them.”

– Senator Amy Klobuchar

I actually held a demonstration for my colleagues here at the Capitol where we brought in folks who, before our eyes, hacked elections machines. Those are being used in many states.”

– Then Senator Kamala Harris

“I continue to think that voting machines are too vulnerable.”

– Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA)

“Researchers have repeatedly demonstrated that ballot recording machines and other voting systems are susceptible to tampering.”

– Rep. Sheila Jackson Lee (D-TX)

“Even hackers with limited prior knowledge, tools, and resources are able to breach voting machines in a matter of minutes.”

– Rep. Val Demings (D-FL)

“In 2018, electronic voting machines in Georgia and Texas deleted votes for certain candidates or switched votes from one candidate to another.”

– Rep Jennifer Wexton (D-VA)

“These voting machines can be hacked quite easily.” “Workers were able to easily hack into an electronic voting machine. It was easy to switch votes.” “In a close presidential election, they just need to hack one swing state. Or maybe one or two. Or maybe just a few counties in one swing state.”

– Rep. Ted Lieu (D-CA)

“An external party could access the machine's wireless feature to record voting data or inject malicious data.”

– Rep. Robin Kelly (D-IL)

“The biggest seller of voting machines is doing something that violates cyber security 101. Directing that you install remote access software which would make a machine like that a magnet for fraudsters and hackers.”

Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR)

Democrats Denying Election Results

The preceding quotes are from a 2-minute compilation video, “*Democrats Say It Is [Easy to Hack Voting Machines](#)*.” The link is on page 197.

Another Video Compilation of Warnings from Democrats

Warnings about election fraud were coming from Democrats as far back as 2000. Another video compilation, “*[Democrats Denying Election Results](#)*,” is 12 minutes of claims by Democrats of election irregularities and fraud from 2000 up through 2016 (link on page 197).

Where Were Warnings from Republicans?

From 2000 until about 2016, I have not seen any compilations or videos of Republicans expressing similar concerns about the security of our elections. It doesn't mean they don't exist, but they were not getting through to me and others I know.

Only after 2018, and especially 2020, has the conversation shifted from Democrats raising warning flags about election security to Republicans being labeled “election deniers.” As a matter of fact, Democrats have become oddly silent about their previously voiced concerns about voting machine vulnerabilities.

Have “We, The People” Spoken?

In their book, “*[Votescam: The Stealing of America](#)*,” the authors begin the first paragraphs of the first chapter with a statement that on Inauguration Day of 1989, after the highly contested 1988 election, George Bush was sworn in as president. They claim that ‘The People’ did not speak. Instead, the election was decided by computers who “held their inner workings small boxes that contained secret codes that only the sellers of the computer could read.” (see *Votescam: The Stealing of America* (Book and Interview) on pg. 214).

Election Security is Not a Partisan Issue

It is foolish to paint concerns about election security as ‘red’ or ‘blue’ or to label the speaker as a ‘denier.’

What is vital to preserving our Republic is that we all treat election security as a critical issue and become active voices and participants in working to secure our elections.

What would help in Missouri is for the political parties to all become active in the election process, not just running candidates for office but finding Election Judges, Challengers, and Watchers, as outlined in the statutes. (see *Political Parties are Key to Ensuring Impartiality* on pg. 191)

Logic & Accuracy and Risk-Limiting Audits

If something is repeated often enough, it does not become true, but many people may start to believe it anyway. Such is the statement I frequently hear ... “the numbers at the polling place match the numbers after the ‘audit’ every single time, so it proves the machines are accurate.”

You realize that the polling place and audit results are output from the same machine. You might want to jump back and read “You are the Winner, You are the Loser” on page 13.

Debunking Machine Testing a Few Decades Ago

In the [Pandora's Black Box](#) article, Logic & Accuracy testing was discussed:

“Howard Strauss, the director of Advanced Computer Applications at Princeton University, is a nationally renowned expert in the field of computer voting. He categorically dismisses the efficacy of the so-called “logic and accuracy test” verification procedure. Strauss recently told Relevance:

“That turns out to be no test at all. That doesn’t prove a thing. Any system that was designed with a ‘trap door’ or a ‘Trojan horse’ or any kind of fraudulent thing in it could pass that test easily...”

“There are a hundred ways you could do this and probably any freshman in any school that teaches computer programming could figure out a half a dozen ways to do this. I’ve talked to folks who’ve said, ‘Oh no, we’ve fed a thousand votes in and then we looked at the other side and they were counted correctly’. I said, ‘So what? That doesn’t tell you what’s inside the box.”

“Strauss explained further that since most computers have clocks and are programmed to be aware of the date, the machine could be set up so that the fraudulent counting activity only occurs on a given date, such as November 5th 1996.”

(see 1996, Nov. – Pandora’s Black Box: Did It Really Count Your Vote? on pg. 197)



18 QR Code:
Statute 115.225

The new election law updates, which passed in Missouri in 2022 and were signed by the Governor, included a requirement for Clerks to conduct cyber security audits of their offices every 2 years, at a minimum.

Cause of America–Missouri: Review of 115.225

We asked our internal cybersecurity expert for Cause of America – Missouri to review the statute and provide comments. The following is the assessment:

The need for 3rd party review is very similar to the audit process in the accounting world. On the financial side, you can't have the person who does the books also check the books. It opens a whole potential set of concerns – everything from missing things due to familiarity to potential fraud attempts. Cybersecurity is the same way; you need someone independent to check your systems – no matter how good your team is.

The other aspect of having a 3rd party is the need to have true experts checking these systems. The stakes associated with election security are too high to have organizations of questionable capabilities be the ones to do these reviews.

When looking at the third party to do the review, there are a couple of things to look for:

- Ask about their process – what's the breadth and depth of their review? How wide a net do they cast?
- Ask about their team – what's the experience level? How many assessments have they done?
- Ask about their reports – what type of information do they provide? How well does it set up the organization to develop a plan to address the items found?
- Experience and expertise: The third-party organization should have a proven track record of conducting cybersecurity reviews and a deep understanding of the technical and organizational aspects of information security.
- Reputation: The organization should have a good reputation in the industry and be known for delivering high-quality, reliable services.
- Independence: It is important that the organization be independent and have no conflicts of interest with the county clerk's office or any other parties involved in the review.
- Methodology: The organization should have a clear and thorough methodology for conducting the review, including the specific techniques and tools that will be used.
- Communication and reporting: The organization should be able to clearly communicate the results of the review and provide a comprehensive report detailing any vulnerabilities or issues identified, as well as recommendations for addressing them.

I guess my big concern is that the SOS is using state and federal funds to compensate someone who is selected by the SOS to do the audit. The local election office should be able to receive the funds to select their own company to do the audit. Back to the point of a financial audit and having someone separate.

“Show Me” Election Results

Many Missourians who have attempted to investigate or contest an election have run into a ‘wall’ due to elected officials’ interpretation of [Statute 115.493](#). (see pg. 231) Like the other election law statutes, this one was passed in 1977. Then, it was amended in 2002 and 2013. The statute’s title is “Ballots and records to be kept twenty-two months,” but the “may be inspected” part of the statute, and the interpretation thereof, has become a ‘wall.’

The description of election materials has been interpreted very broadly, and the statute states that election materials are inspected “upon order of a legislative body trying an election contest, a court, or a grand jury.” So, if you need election information to show you have a valid case, you need a court order to get it. But you cannot get into court unless you have evidence showing you have a case. (According to my understanding and experience.)

Motivation of The People: Election Security We Can See (Transparency)

I have not met anyone in this State who loves to send Sunshine Requests (FOIA requests). Returning to hand-counting could, at least for elections, involve the citizens in the process and create a window of transparency, which might translate into a decrease in Sunshine Requests to election officials.

Incoming Storm

I lived in the State of Washington for most of my life, so I know what tall, beautiful mountain ranges look like. Missouri does not have tall mountains. If they did, I would urge everyone to go to the top of the mountain and look west. Watch what is happening in elections in the states on the West Coast. I feel like there’s a huge, dark cloud headed our way. It’s rolling out of California, Washington, and Oregon, right over Arizona and Texas, and is headed our way.



3: BALLOTS, BATCHES, RESULTS

THE HAND COUNTING PROCESS: BALLOTS, BATCHES, RESULTS _____54


The best process is one that is simple and quick to teach. Many who have already learned or tried this hand-counting process express their surprise. They expected it to be complex but realized they were “over-thinking” it.

The process has three segments: Ballots, Batches, and Results (BBR).

First,
tally **Ballots**.


Second,
tabulate the **Batches**.

Third,
calculate the **Results**.



The Hand Counting Process:

Ballots, Batches, Results



Elevator Pitch

Since every good explanation should start with an ‘elevator pitch,’ here’s a quick pitch of the hand-count process.

Ballots

Hand counting is done by bipartisan teams of Election Judges at the polling place using a simple tally form. Counting is **NOT** done by marking four tick marks and then crossing through them on the 5th. The Ballots Tally form is designed to be as quick as recording pitches at a baseball game and as easy as marking numbers called at Bingo.

Counting may begin 1 hour after polls open. A polling place with 1,400 ballots cast could start at 7 am, count 100 ballots per hour, and still be done by 9 pm on election night.



In the previous half dozen or so years, very few polling places had 1,400 ballots cast in an election, including the 2020 presidential election. The average number of ballots cast in polling places is 360 to 480. We have conservatively timed hand counting at **50 to 100** ballots per hour per counting team. If 400 ballots are cast, a team could count them in 8 hours if they counted 50 ballots per hour.

The current judges checking in voters are also not expected to count ballots (although they may), so more election judges will be needed for elections.

Collaborating with political parties, schools, and youth organizations will help to grow the election workforce.



Batches

As each batch of ballots is counted, the totals will be tabulated by copying the column totals onto a summary sheet whose layout lines up with the columns on the tally form. The Batches Summary sheet makes transferring totals quick and easy to double-check for accuracy.

Results

When polls are closed and all ballots are counted and tabulated, the calculations are done and entered on the Results of Polling Place worksheet. The bipartisan team of counting judges reviews and double-checks results again. When the agreement is reached on the results, the Statement of Returns is completed, and the Election Judges sign the Certification.

Anyone still at the polling place will see the results, offering transparency.

One Election Judge returns the Tally Book and supplies to the Clerk; another returns the ballots.

All the Clerk needs to do when receiving ballots and results from polling places is to combine the results into county-wide results (probably on a spreadsheet), which means no more USB drives or flash cards to download into a PC and print results pages. That’s all done.

The final step of the day is sending the county results to the Secretary of State.



4: STEP BY STEP BY STATUTE

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COUNT A BATCH OF BALLOTS	62
RECORD BATCH TOTALS	64
RECORD TOTALS FOR CANDIDATES & QUESTIONS	66
RETURN BALLOTS & TALLY BOOK TO THE CLERK	68

Missouri Statutes provide a comprehensive list of requirements for hand-counting ballots in an election. It seemed the quickest way to explain these Missouri Laws was to organize the statutes into a step-by-step overview referencing the statute ... step by step by statute.

The statutes most often referred to in this eManual are listed in the Resources Section (beginning on pg. 217), but we will also provide page number references for each “step” in this section.

In the section following this one, we provide the **Missouri Hand Count Process**. This is the complete teaching guide which is a ‘deep dive’ into the process details for those who want less legalese and more hands-on details (see pg. 70).

‘Advice’ from an Elected Official

In response to the questioning of election processes and results in 2022, an elected official in a large Missouri county prepared a document that was intended to be a sort of FAQ and included this suggestion to the voters in his county:

“if ... a citizen of Missouri feels that the law should be changed, I encourage them to research, draft an improved law, and lobby the legislature to pass such improvements.”

It is not the advice you would expect from an elected official who is paid full-time (six-figure salary) to work for The People, but it motivated me to open the statutes, and I hope this eManual does the same for others.

The Counting Location



Statutes for Counting Location

Location for Counting of Ballots: [115.013](#) and [115.449](#)

Hand counting of ballots takes place at the location where voters cast their ballots: the polling place. (see pg. 218 and pg. 226)


Prepare the Counting Area: [115.451](#)

The Counting Space is to be set up in a “private area within the polling place.” (see pg. 227)

Larger polling locations may offer a separate area for the team of Election Judges to use for counting ballots. Smaller polling places may not be in a facility with separate work areas. The Clerk will need to evaluate the polling places and determine the best solution for each.

Demonstrate that the Ballot Box is Empty: [115.423](#)

No earlier than 1 hour before the poll opens, Election Judges show that the Ballot Box is empty. The Ballot Box is then locked, and an Election Judge holds the key. The Ballot Box must always remain in public view until it is transferred to the Counting Judges for ballot counting. (see pg. 225)



19 Polling Place: Image showing the roles at the polling place, not an actual floor plan

Schedule Counting Team(s)



Statutes for Polls and Election Judges

Poll Opening and Closing: [115.407](#)

Polls open at 6 am and close at 7 pm. At 7 pm, anyone in line to vote at the polling place will be permitted to vote. (see pg. 224)

Election Judges May Be Employed for Half Days: [115.081](#)

Election Judges may be scheduled for the first or last half of election day. (They receive one-half the regular pay rate.)

Half days may be helpful for scheduling counting judges at polling places, which do not need a whole day to count the ballots cast at that location. (see pg. 220)

Counting Teams Consist of 4 Election Judges: [115.447](#)

Each Counting Team consists of 2 Counting Judges, 1 REP and 1 DEM, and 2 Recording Judges, also 1 REP and 1 DEM. (see pg. 226)

Hand Counting May Begin at 7 am: [115.451](#)

If counting began at a polling place at 7 am and continued until an hour after the polls were scheduled to close, that could be 13 hours of counting time. If the counting team averaged 100 ballots counted per hour, they could expect to count approximately 1,300 ballots.

If there appears to be a need for a full day of counting, one option is to schedule two half-day teams. One that counts in the first half of the day and another that continues the count in the last half of the day.

Also, we have not found anything in the statutes that precludes the Clerk from scheduling multiple teams of Counting Judges at a polling place. The Clerk could determine the anticipated turnout at a polling place and schedule Counting Teams accordingly. (see pg. 227)

Once Begun, Counting Must Continue: [115.449](#)

When hand counting of ballots has begun, it must continue without adjournment or postponement. (see pg. 226)

Count a Batch of Ballots

20 Ballots Tally form: combine baseball pitch count with Bingo for an easy method of tallying votes

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925	926	927	928	929	930
931	932	933	934	935	936
937	938	939	940	941	942
943	944	945	946	947	948
949	950	951	952	953	954
955	956	957	958	959	960
961	962	963	964	965	966
967	968	969	970	971	972
973	974	975	976	977	978
979	980	981	982	983	984
985	986	987	988	989	990
991	992	993	994	995	996
997	998	999	1000	1001	1002
1003	1004	1005	1006	1007	1008
1009	1010	1011	1012	1013	1014
1015	1016	1017	1018	1019	1020
1021	1022	1023	1024	1025	1026
1027	1028	1029	1030	1031	1032
1033	1034	1035	1036	1037	1038
1039	1040	1041	1042	1043	1044
1045	1046	1047	1048	1049	1050
1051	1052	1053	1054	1055	1056
1057	1058	1059	1060	1061	1062
1063	1064	1065	1066	1067	1068
1069	1070	1071	1072	1073	1074
1075	1076	1077	1078	1079	1080
1081	1082	1083	1084	1085	1086
1087	1088	1089	1090	1091	1092
1093	1094	1095	1096	1097	1098
1099	1100	1101	1102	1103	1104
1105	1106	1107	1108	1109	1110
1111	1112	1113	1114	1115	1116
1117	1118	1119	1120	1121	1122
1123	1124	1125	1126	1127	1128
1129	1130	1131	1132	1133	1134
1135	1136	1137	1138	1139	1140
1141	1142	1143	1144	1145	1146
1147	1148	1149	1150	1151	1152
1153	1154	1155	1156	1157	1158
1159	1160	1161	1162	1163	1164
1165	1166	1167	1168	1169	1170
1171	1172	1173	1174	1175	1176
1177	1178	1179	1180	1181	1182
1183	1184	1185	1186	1187	1188
1189	1190	1191	1192	1193	1194
1195	1196	1197	1198	1199	1200
1201	1202	1203	1204	1205	1206
1207	1208	1209	1210	1211	1212
1213	1214	1215	1216	1217	1218
1219	1220	1221	1222	1223	1224
1225	1226	1227	1228	1229	1230
1231	1232	1233	1234	1235	1236
1237	1238	1239	1240	1241	1242
1243	1244	1245	1246	1247	1248
1249	1250	1251	1252	1253	1254
1255	1256	1257	1258	1259	1260
1261	1262	1263	1264	1265	1266
1267	1268	1269	1270	1271	1272
1273	1274	1275	1276	1277	1278
1279	1280	1281	1282	1283	1284
1285	1286	1287	1288	1289	1290
1291	1292	1293	1294	1295	1296
1297	1298	1299	1300	1301	1302
1303	1304	1305	1306	1307	1308
1309	1310	1311	1312	1313	1314
1315	1316	1317	1318	1319	1320
1321	1322	1323	1324	1325	1326
1327	1328	1329	1330	1331	1332
1333	1334	133			

Statutes for Tallying Ballots

Voters Mark Ballots and Place in Ballot Box: [115.443](#)

Once a voter has marked their ballot, they drop it into the Ballot Box. They then immediately leave the polling place. (see pg. 226)

Counting Team Receives Ballot Box: [115.451](#)

When the Counting Team is ready, 2 Receiving Judges (1 REP and 1 DEM) deliver the Ballot Box to the Counting and Recording Judges. The Counting Team gives the Receiving Judges an empty ballot box, which is shown to be empty, and it is locked and returned to public view so voters may deposit their ballots.

Ballot Boxes may only be switched once per hour and only if at least 25 ballots have been cast since the last time it was switched. (see pg. 227)

Pull Ballots from the Ballot Box One at a Time: [115.449](#)

To proceed with counting, 1 Counting Judge pulls a ballot from the Ballot Box. Then, holding it so that the other Counting Judge can read it. (see pg. 226)

Check for Initials of Election Judges: [115.457](#)

As each ballot is pulled from the Ballot Box, it is first checked for the initials of 2 Receiving Judges. If the initials are missing, the ballot shall be rejected, except if it appears that the absence of initials is due to a mistake made by the Receiving Judges. (see pg. 229)

Distinguishing Marks Showing Voter Intent: [115.456 ¶2](#)

A distinguishing mark is defined as a mark in the square adjacent to the name of the candidate or issue, or a distinguishing mark adjacent to the name of the candidate or issue preference, or the name of the candidate or issue preference is circled. (see pg. 228)

Count Votes for Candidates: [115.453](#)

The Counting Judges go through an entire ballot, calling one race at a time, and where there are distinguishing marks for a candidate, they call a vote for the candidate. (see pg. 227)

Count Votes on Questions: [115.455](#)

The Counting Judges then go through an entire ballot, calling one question at a time. Where there are distinguishing marks for a question, they call a “for” or “against” vote for the question. (see pg. 228)


Votes for Write-In Candidates: [115.453](#), [115.468](#), and [115.469](#)

The statutes set forth the process necessary to be a valid write-in candidate and where and when the votes may be tallied. (see pages 227, 230, and 230) The CSR also provides instructions and examples of valid write-in votes. (see page 256)

Use the Ballots Tally form for Recording Votes

An easy-to-use Ballots Tally form was created to mark votes (see pg. 148).

Record Batch Totals



23 Batches Summary sheet: when counting complete, batches totaled and entered in the bottom Totals row

Statutes for Totals of Ballots Counted

For Each Batch of Ballots, Compare Tallies and Agree on The Count: [115.449](#)

When counting is completed (end of a batch), the two Recording Judges compare their tally totals.
When they agree on the count, they initial and sign each other's Ballots Tally form. (see pg. 226)

Write the Batch Totals on the Batches Summary sheet

For each batch completed, the Row Totals are written on the Batches Summary sheet (see pg. 146).

Continue Counting Batches Until Complete

When all ballots have been counted, total the rows on the Batches Summary sheets. Then, use the Results of Polling Place worksheet to record the totals from the Batches Summary sheets (see pg. 138).

Recording Judges Agree on Totals

When the Recording Judges agree on the vote totals, they begin the Poll Closing process.

Record Totals for Candidates & Questions

Column totals of batches are finalized and recorded on
Statement of Returns for Candidates and Questions



10	164	RACHEL ANDERSON	State Auditor
11	158	PEDRO ARROYO	
12	38	BOB WESTERSON	
13	2	Write-in	

24 Statement of Returns: totals transferred from Results of Polling Place, once confirmed, signed by judges

Statutes for Totals and Certification

Certify the Quantity of Ballots in the Tally Book: [115.459](#)


After the poll is closed, the Election Judges certify the information in the Tally Book. (see pg. 115.453
– Procedure for counting votes for candidates.227)

- quantity of ballots cast on Certification of Ballot Counts (see pg. 137); and,
- Statement of Returns for d Candidates (see pg. 140) and Questions (see pg. 143).

CERTIFICATION OF STATEMENT OF RETURNS – CANDIDATES			
We, the duly qualified and acting Judges of the polling place above-named, for the election above-named, held on the date above-named, in the county of <u>Freedom</u> , Missouri, do hereby certify that the foregoing pages of Statements of Returns for Candidates (initialed by us) and consisting of a total of <u>1</u> pages (excluding this certification), are a full and accurate return of all votes cast at this polling place for all candidates.			
JUDGE AFFILIATION (CIRCLE ONE)	Signatures of Recording Judges	JUDGE AFFILIATION (CIRCLE ONE)	Signatures of Counting Judges
REP DEM OTH	RECORDING JUDGE NAME PRINT: <u>Lana Vengell</u> RECORDING JUDGE SIGNATURE—SIGN WITH BLUE BALLPOINT PEN SIGN: <u>Lana Vengell</u>	REP DEM OTH	COUNTING JUDGE NAME PRINT: <u>Richmond Fields</u> COUNTING JUDGE SIGNATURE—SIGN WITH BLUE BALLPOINT PEN SIGN: <u>Richmond Fields</u>
REP DEM OTH	RECORDING JUDGE NAME PRINT: <u>Burt Jenkins</u> RECORDING JUDGE SIGNATURE—SIGN WITH BLUE BALLPOINT PEN SIGN: <u>Burt Jenkins</u>	REP DEM OTH	COUNTING JUDGE NAME PRINT: <u>Simin Takava</u> COUNTING JUDGE SIGNATURE—SIGN WITH BLUE BALLPOINT PEN SIGN: <u>Simin Takava</u>

25 Statement of Returns (example): Signed Certification for Candidates

Return Ballots & Tally Book to the Clerk



Statutes for Delivering Poll Reports to Clerk

Everything Packed after Statement of Returns Signed: [115.463](#)

After the Statement of Returns is signed, the Election Judges pack all ballots, statements, Tally Book, supplies, etc. (see pg. 229)

Voted Ballots are Returned to the Clerk: [115.465](#)

Depending on the Clerk's instructions, paper ballots are secured and returned to the clerk. (see pg. 229)

Supervisory Judges Return Election Items to Clerk: [115.491](#)

Two Supervisory Judges (1 REP and 1 DEM) return the election items to the Clerk as prescribed by the Clerk. (see pg. 231)

5: MISSOURI METHOD HAND COUNT PROCESS

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Each county should already have its own Election Judge Training Workbook, whether they developed it themselves or based it on the template provided by the Secretary of State.

A return to hand-counting of ballots will necessitate some updates and additions to the Clerk's workbook.

This section addresses the specific tasks of hand counting, except where tasks of Receiving Judges might differ from voting machines to hand counting. It has two purposes: one, to assist the Clerk with updating their county's election judge workbook, and two, to provide more detailed answers to experienced Election Judges who will have very specific questions about the hand-counting process.

Quick Checklist



Quick Checklists for Hand Count Team

Election-day tasks are provided in this entire section, but these hand-counting checklists are helpful on election day for Election Judges trained and experienced in hand-counting.

Some opening tasks are already performed by Election Judges but are included here because they overlap the hand-counting steps.

Page numbers in the item description refer to the corresponding page number for that topic in this eManual.



Check	1. Poll Opening Tasks	Judges
	1.1 Oaths spoken and signed by Election Judges (see pg. 82)	All
	1.2 Count the quantity of ballots received from the Clerk (see pg. 83)	All
	1.3 Enter ballot quantity on “Opening Certification & Election Judges Sign-in” in the Tally Book (see pg. 84)	All
	1.4 All Election Judges present at the opening of the Poll sign the Opening Certification (or Additional Judges document, if needed) (see pgs. 84 and 85)	All
	1.5 Demonstrate Ballot Box is Empty (see pg. 88)	Receiving

Check	2. Persons Arriving After Poll Opening	Judges
	2.1 For any Election Judges arriving after poll opening, the oath is spoken and signed (see pg. 82)	Any
	2.2 Sign-in on the “Election Judge Arriving After Poll Opened” page in Tally Book (see pg. 86)	Any
	2.3 Challengers, Watchers, or any other person arriving at Poll (either at opening or later) confirm they are pre-authorized (see pg. 87)	Any
	2.4 Challengers and/or Watchers take their Oath (see pg. 87)	Any
	2.5 The Election Judge witnessing the oath records Challenger’s or Watcher’s name on the form in the Tally Book (Judge signs) (see pg. 87)	Any

Check	3. Counting Team Setup	Judges
	3.1 Setup area with chairs/tables per Clerk's instructions (see pg. 90)	Any
	3.2 Place an empty Ballot Box on a small utility table, a chair, or other raised stand (see pg. 90)	Counting Team
	3.3 Organize equipment and supplies (see pg. 90)	Counting Team
	3.4 Organize forms and other paperwork from the Clerk (see pg. 90)	Counting Team
	3.5 Move Tally Book to possession of Counting Team (see pg. 90)	Recording
	3.6 Set Masking Tape labels for organizing ballots as they are reviewed/counted (see pg. 91)	Counting
	3.7 Remove Items not permitted in Counting Space (see pg. 93)	All
	3.8 Review sample ballots and compare to Statement of Returns (see pg. 97)	Counting
	3.9 Review List of Valid Write-In candidates (see pg. 100)	Counting

Check	4. Hand Counting Tasks	Judges
	4.1 Take a set of counting forms prepared by the Clerk; enter the top header details (see pg. 102)	Recording
	4.2 Receive ballot box with votes cast from Receiving Judges; trade for empty ballot box (see pg. 104)	Counting
	4.3 One ballot at a time – call votes cast (see pg. 104)	Counting
	4.4 For valid write-in votes, place an arrow flag next to the candidate's name (see pg. 100)	Counting
	4.5 Tally votes on Ballots Tally form (see pg. 105)	Recording
	4.6 At the end of the batch, record column totals on the bottom of the Ballots Tally form (see pg. 108)	Recording
	4.7 Calculate the sum of the Row Total (see pg. 109)	Recording
	4.8 Compare column totals on the Ballots Tally form of both Recording Judges (see pg. 109)	Recording
	4.9 When agreement on totals is reached, designate one tally form "YES" for Tally Book, the other "NO" (see pg. 109)	Recording
	4.10 Count the quantity of cast ballots, including ballots with valid write-ins (see pg. 109)	Counting
	4.11 Enter the quantity of cast ballots in the left sidebar on the front side of all Ballots Tally forms (see pg. 109)	Recording
	4.12 Write the end time on the top header of all Ballots Tally forms (see pg. 109)	Recording
	4.13 Initial front of all Ballots Tally form (two Recording Judges initial each other's tally forms) (see pg. 109)	Recording
	4.14 Sign the back of all Ballots Tally forms (see pg. 110)	Recording
	4.15 Copy bottom row totals from the Ballots Tally form "YES" to corresponding group Batches Summary sheet (see pg. 111)	Recording
	4.16 On <u>all</u> Ballots Tally forms, write the page & row number from the Batches Summary sheet (see pg. 114)	Recording
	4.17 Write details on ballot envelopes and place counted ballots, valid write-in ballots, and rejected ballots in corresponding ballot envelopes (see pg. 115)	Counting
	4.18 Clip Ballots Tally forms "NO" to the outside of the Counted and Write-in envelopes and place them in a secure container provided by the Clerk (see pg. 115)	Counting
	4.19 Insert Ballots Tally forms "YES" into the Tally Book (see pg. 115)	Recording
	4.20 Begin a new batch unless all ballots are counted	

Check	5. Poll Closing Tasks	Judges
	5.1 After the final batch, calculate the sum of each column on the Batches Summary sheet (see pg. 116)	Recording
	5.2 Calculate the sum of the bottom row of Batches Summary sheet (see pg. 116)	Recording
	5.3 Calculate the sum of Row Totals in the left column on Batches Summary sheet (see pg. 116)	Recording
	5.4 Reconcile to be sure totals of the bottom row and left column match (see pg. 116)	Recording
	5.5 Initial the front and sign the back of the Batches Summary sheets (see pg. 117)	Recording
	5.6 Cross out unused rows/columns on the Batches Summary sheet (see pg. 118)	Recording
	5.7 Post totals from Batches Summary sheet to the Results of Polling Place (see pg. 120)	Recording
	5.8 Initial the front and sign the back of the Results of Polling Place worksheets (see pg. 121)	Recording
	5.9 Post totals from Results of Polling Place to 2 copies of Statement of Returns for candidates and questions (see pg. 123)	Recording & Counting
	5.10 Sign the Certifications for each Statement of Returns (see pg. 124)	Recording & Counting
	5.11 Fill out the Certification of Ballot Counts in the Tally Book (see pg. 126)	Recording & Counting
	5.12 All Election Judges present sign the Certification (see pg. 126)	All
	5.13 Organize ballots, election materials, supplies, etc., for return to the Clerk (see pg. 128)	All

Who Is the Counting Team?



Counting Teams are Election Judges

Election Judges are the persons assigned by the Clerk to carry out the election functions at the polling place, including hand counting ballots. Sometimes referred to as poll workers, Missouri Statutes use the title “Election Judge” and has specific titles for some of the roles filled by Election Judges.

The Resource Section includes information about how to become an Election Judge (pg. 178).

Receiving, Counting, Recording, and Supervisory Judges

The Election Judge titles describe functions rather than individuals, and any Election Judge may perform more than one function at a polling place on election day. Also, keep in mind that Counties may use different titles. (see [115.447](#) pg. 226)

Most voters will be familiar with the Election Judges at the tables where voters sign in. They are called Election Judges unless they are the judges initialing ballots after they have “certified” a voter’s eligibility to vote. In this case, they are called **Receiving Judges**.

The **Recording Judges** tally the votes received by candidates and for or against questions on the ballot.

During the counting process, the **Counting Judges** are responsible for handling the ballot boxes and the ballots. They read out loud the number next to the distinguishing marks made by the voter so that the Recording Judges can tally the votes.

The Clerk designates two Election Judges as **Supervisory Judges**. According to statute, the primary responsibility of the Supervisory Judges is to return election supplies from the polling place to the Clerk. The Clerk may also prescribe additional duties for these Election Judges. (see [115.081](#) ¶4 pg. 220)

Multiple Counting Teams at a Polling Place

The Clerk may want to schedule multiple counting teams depending on anticipated ballots that will be cast and the time needed to hand-count them.

Election Judges May Work Half Days

Election Judges may be employed for half days – either the first half or the second half of election day, which is a decision made by the Clerk. The Clerk is required to ensure enough judges are present at all times the polls are opened.

The Clerk must also ensure that at least one Election Judge from each major political party serves a full day and that there will be an equal number of Election Judges from the political parties during the day.

Assigning Election Judges to the Counting Team(s)

Each counting team has 2 Counting Judges (1 DEM and 1 REP) and 2 Recording Judges (1 DEM and 1 REP). (see [115.447](#) pg. 226)

The Clerk may appoint Election Judges representing other established political parties or without political affiliation. These Election Judges may assist the REP and DEM Election Judges but may not fill the Recording or Counting Judges roles. Those roles are assigned explicitly to Election Judges representing the major political parties.

Questions Requiring Decision by Judges May Only Be Made by REP and DEM Judges

If a question requires a decision by the majority of Election Judges, only REP and DEM judges may make such decisions. (see [115.081.96](#) pg. 220)

Poll Opening & Oaths

Note: Names used for persons in these samples are fictional and not intended to resemble any real person.

Polling Place:	
TALLY BOOK	
County:	
Election Date:	
Election:	

Reference Missouri Statutes

115.461. Tally book, form of – tally sheet, form of – statements of returns, form of (paper ballots).
(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 12.035)
<http://www.missouri.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?Section=115.461>

115.459. Duties of judges after polls close (paper ballots).
(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 12.036)
<http://www.missouri.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?Section=115.459>

For any issues or questions, contact the Clerk:

Clerk Name
Clerk Phone Number

TALLY BOOK (REV 20230120) 1 ©2023-2023 JIMBA Books, Published with Consent of Missouri Secretary

The opening of the polling place is handled by election judges, including supervisory judges, who the clerk designates. These Election Judges may or may not also serve as part of the Counting Team. Some poll opening duties overlap with tasks required of the Counting Team, so they are outlined here.

The Tally Book

The heart of the hand-counting process could be said to be the Tally Book. A Tally Book is created by the Clerk for every Polling Place. The book is where Election Judges sign after taking their oath, counting results are recorded, and the certification of the Statement of Returns is placed when all results are finalized.



26 QR Code:
Statute 115.461

Security of the Tally Book at the Polling Place on Election Day is a high priority for all Election Judges. Follow the protocols in the Clerk's instructions.

An example of a Tally Book with the sections in order is included in the next section, starting on page 130.

Cover Information

Information about the Polling Place, the County, the election date and type, and contact information for the Clerk is included on the cover page of the Tally Book.

If the Clerk has not already completed it, enter the information.

Polling Place:	Liberty HS
TALLY BOOK	
County:	Freedom County
Election Date:	Nov. 8, 2022
Election:	General

27 Tally Book (example): Cover details for the county, polling place, election

For any issues or questions, contact the Clerk:
Samantha Miller 123-456-7891

28 Tally Book (example): Cover details, clerk contact info

Oaths

Oaths are taken by Election Judges and some others who will be working at, or are authorized to be at, the polling place on election day. For convenience, copies of the oaths are included in the final section of the Tally Book.

Note: Names used for persons in these samples are fictional and not intended to resemble any real person.

Oaths

Oath of Election Judges

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 3.030)
<https://www.missouri.gov/legis/legislation/legislation.aspx?docid=1151001>

I solemnly swear that I will impartially discharge the duties of judge according to law, to the best of my ability and that I will not disclose how any voter has voted unless I am required to do so as a witness in a proper judicial proceeding. I also affirm that I will not allow any person to vote who is not entitled to vote and that I will make no statement nor give any information of any kind tending in any way to show the state of the count prior to the close of the polls on election day.

Oath of Challengers and Watchers

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 4.015)
<https://www.missouri.gov/legis/legislation/legislation.aspx?docid=1151001>

I do solemnly swear that I will make no statement nor give any information of any kind tending in any way to show the state of the count prior to the close of the polls on election day.

Oath for HS students, and those supervising HS Students

(L. 1994 S.B. 632; A.L. 2014 H.B. 1136)
<https://www.missouri.gov/legis/legislation/legislation.aspx?docid=1151004>

I solemnly swear or affirm that I will impartially discharge the duties of a Missouri youth election participant by following to the best of my ability the instructions of any election judge, election authority, or teacher of my school. I also swear or affirm that I will not disclose how any voter has voted unless I am told to do so by an election judge, election authority, or a court of law in a proper judicial proceeding. I also swear or affirm that I will make no statement nor give any information of any kind tending in any way to show the state of the count of votes prior to the close of the polls on election day, nor will I make any statement during the conduct of my duties which tends to show my preferences for any issue or candidate involved in the election.

TALLY BOOK (REV 20230120) 1 ©2023-2025 UNIA Forms, Prepared for Courts of Arkansas, Missouri

29 Tally Book (example): Text of Oaths

Election Judges Say and Sign Their Oath

All Election Judges speak their oath and sign the Election Judge Oath document provided by the Clerk.

Quantity of Ballots and Election Judges Sign-In

COUNTY	POLLING PLACE	ELECTION	ELECTION DATE
FREEDOM	LIBERTY HS	GENERAL	NOV. 8, 2022

REV 12/10/22

OPENING CERTIFICATION & ELECTION JUDGES SIGN-IN

At opening of the polling place, the below-named Election Judges were sworn in as the law directs before beginning their duties.

We hereby certify that:

The number of ballots received at this polling place is 650

The information on the official ballots received at this polling place is the same as the information on the sample ballots received at this polling place.

ELECTION JUDGE NAME (PRINT)	AFFILIATION (CIRCLE ONE)	ELECTION JUDGE SIGNATURE	INITIALS
Janet Larson	☒ REP ☐ DEM ☐ OTH	<i>Janet Larson</i>	JL
William Henderson	☒ REP ☐ DEM ☐ OTH	<i>William Henderson</i>	WH
Claudia Buchanan	☒ REP ☐ DEM ☐ OTH	<i>Claudia Buchanan</i>	CB
Jose Enrico	☒ REP ☐ DEM ☐ OTH	<i>Jose Enrico</i>	JE
Joshua Kassan	☒ REP ☐ DEM ☐ OTH	<i>Joshua Kassan</i>	JK
Ginger Sullivan	☒ REP ☐ DEM ☐ OTH	<i>Ginger Sullivan</i>	GS
	☐ REP ☐ DEM ☐ OTH		
	☐ REP ☐ DEM ☐ OTH		
	☐ REP ☐ DEM ☐ OTH		
	☐ REP ☐ DEM ☐ OTH		
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	☐ REP ☐ DEM ☐ OTH		
	☐ REP ☐ DEM ☐ OTH		
	☐ REP ☐ DEM ☐ OTH		

After all judges have signed, cross out any unused name & signature rows. If more rows needed, attach an extra page.

☒ The Election Judges who have signed above represent ALL those who were present when the Polling Place was opened.
☐ An additional signature page for Election Judges is attached.

TALLY BOOK
©2022-2023 LINDA RALPH, PREPARED FOR GOVERNOR OF ARIZONA
CERTIFICATION & SIGN-IN

30 Tally Book (example): Opening Certification & Election Judges Sign-In

Tally Book: Opening Certification of Ballot Count

The Election Judges (minimum of 2 REP and 2 DEM) count the blank ballots provided by the Clerk.
Enter the number of blank ballots received at the polling place.

OPENING CERTIFICATION & ELECTION JUDGES SIGN-IN At opening of the polling place, the below-named Election Judges were sworn in as the law directs before beginning their duties. <i>We hereby certify that:</i> The number of ballots received at this polling place is 650 The information on the official ballots received at this polling place is the same as the information on the sample ballots received at this polling place.
--

31 Tally Book (example): certification of the number of ballots received at the polling place

Election Judges Sign and Initial

All Election Judges who take the oath and are present at the opening of the polling place write their name, sign, initial, and identify their party affiliation on the certification page in the Tally Book.

Signatures and initials of the Election Judges are important, as they are used to compare to other hand-counting forms to ensure that an actual Election Judge signed or initialed the other forms.

ELECTION JUDGE NAME (PRINT)	AFFILIATION (CIRCLE ONE)	ELECTION JUDGE SIGNATURE	INITIALS
Janet Larson	☒ REP ☐ DEM ☐ OTH	<i>Janet Larson</i>	<i>JL</i>

32 Tally Book (example): Election Judge printed name, party affiliation, signature, initials

When all judges have signed who are present at the opening of the polling place, cross out any unused lines.

☒	The Election Judges who have signed above represent ALL those who were present when the Polling Place was opened.
☐	An additional signature page for Election Judges is attached.

33 Tally Book (example): Election Judges signed in, all or additional page attached

Mark the appropriate box on the certification page to indicate if signatures are included on one page of all Election Judges present when the polling place opened or if an additional page was used for signatures.

Page for Additional Election Judge Signature (Open Polling Place)

If there are more Election Judges at the opening of the polling place than lines on the certification form, use the additional page provided.

[illegible]

34 Tally Book (example): Additional Election Judges at Opening of Poll

If any page of signatures or only some of the signature lines are not used, cross out the unused lines after the polls are **closed**.

35 Tally Book (example): Election Judges Arriving After Poll Opened

The Election Judge writes the name of the Challenger or Watcher in the Tally Book, indicates whether the person is a Challenger or Watcher, and then the Election Judge signs to indicate that the Challenger or Watcher spoke and signed the oath. The Challenger or Watcher is not required to sign in the Tally Book, but the oath they sign should be placed in the Tally Book.

36 Tally Book (example): Challengers & Watchers

Demonstrate Ballot Box #1 is Empty


Election Judges show that the Ballot Box is empty no earlier than one hour before the poll opens.

The Ballot Box is then secured with a security seal. The Election Judges record the ID number of security seals. The Ballot Box must always remain in public view until it is transferred to the Counting Judges for ballot counting.

This will be considered Ballot Box #1, as the Counting Judges will also have empty ballot boxes that will be “swapped” with the box filled with ballots when they are ready to begin counting.



Set Up the Counting Area



Furniture & Supplies for Counting Location

Instructions are provided by the Clerk on where to set up the counting space at the polling location. The Clerk will provide the following for each counting team (if there will be more than one team).

Furnishings and Other Items for Counting Location

- minimum 1 ballot box to be used when the polling place opens
- table with chairs large enough for 4 judges, 2 on each side, with room to handle the paperwork
- smaller utility table to hold the ballot box should be placed near the **Counting Judges**
- container or carrier for counted ballots and a designated location to keep them secure

Equipment for Each Counting Team(s)

- Empty ballot box (1 per team)
- Calculators with no connectivity, such as Wi-Fi or bluetooth (2 per team)
- Magnifier or Magnifying glass
- Flashlight (extra batteries)

Paperwork & Forms for Counting Team (s)

- Tally Book (1 per polling place)
- Recording Judge binders (2 per counting team)
- Sample Ballot(s)
- Counting Forms prepared and sorted
- List of Valid Write-In Candidates
- Envelopes for “Counted Ballots” and “Valid Write-in” ballots (1 for each batch counted) pre-printed to identify batch & # ballots
- Envelope for “Rejected” ballots (1 per counting team)

Counting Team Supplies

- Color Felt Markers (e.g., Sharpie™ style)
- Blue Ball Point pens
- Pencils, erasers
- Note paper
- Removable “Arrow Flags” stickers
- Paper clips
- Binder clips
- Scotch tape
- Masking tape




Working Space for Counting Team

The table where the Counting Team will tally votes should have nothing on it except the necessary forms and supplies. Any supplies not currently being used should be kept in a secure space where others cannot access them in the polling place.

Every ballot handled during the Hand hand-counting process will either be considered:

- Counted Ballot
- Rejected Ballot
- Counted Ballot with Valid Write-In vote(s)

Place pieces of masking tape on the counting table to make it easy to place each ballot in a pile as the team works through a batch.



37 Working Space for Counting Team - Masking Tape labels for ballot types

Authorized Persons in Polling Places

Understanding who is allowed to be in the polling place, especially near the counting location, is vital to maintaining the integrity of the election.

Besides voters eligible to vote at the polling place (and their minor children accompanying them), polling places are not open to the public. Additionally, once a voter has placed their ballot in the ballot box, they must immediately leave the polling place. (see [115.443](#) pg. 226).

A statute defines the persons who may be admitted to the polling place. (see [115.409](#) pg. 224)

- Election Authority Personnel
- Election Authority Deputies appointed by the Clerk (see [115.053](#) pg. 219)
- Election Judges
- Watchers and Challengers (appointed according to 115.105 or [115.107](#))
- Youth Election Participants
- Law Enforcement officials at the request of election officials or in the line of duty
- International Observers who have registered with the Clerk
- News Media (see next paragraph for details)

News Media

Members of the news media may be admitted to the polling place under these conditions:

- Must present identification satisfactory to Election Judges;
- Must be in the polling place only for bona fide news coverage;
- Coverage does not interfere with the general conduct of the election as determined by the Election Judges or Clerk;
- Read the entire statute (see [115.409](#) pg. 224)

Who Is Allowed in the Counting Space?

The Clerk will set the rules for their County, but, in state statute, anyone authorized to be in the polling place, except voters (and children accompanying them), may also be in the counting space.

Who Is NOT Allowed in the Polling Place or Counting Space?

Unless they are in the act of casting their own ballot, no one **not** on the list in statutes or approved by the clerk is permitted in the polling place. There have been “horror” stories shared of county commissioners and other elected officials acting as the hospitality team inside the polling place and greeting voters. BIG NO! The requirement to leave the polling place “immediately” after casting your ballot applies to everyone, including elected officials.

Class 4 Election Offense:

No one in the counting space may interfere with
or “breach the peace” of the election or
hand counting process.

(see [115.637 ¶\(17\)](#) pg. 233)

Items NOT Permitted in Counting Space

Other than members of the media, all persons who are authorized to be in the counting space were required to say and sign oaths to which they have sworn they will:

“... make no statement nor give any information of any kind tending in any way to show the state of the count before the close of the polls on election day.”

Recommended Rules for Counting Space WHILE POLL IS OPEN

No Pictures

Except for media members, no one in the polling place should take pictures of election materials or people while polls open.

All Electronic Devices Disconnected

Any cell phone or device, including calculators, that can connect to bluetooth, Wi-Fi, cell signal, or any type of network must be powered off, left outside the polling place, or kept in a faraday bag/container.

No Purses, Backpacks, Duffels, Etc., Within Reach of The Recording or Counting Judges

The Clerk should plan for a container or locker-type cage where Recording and Counting judges can store their personal items.

No Beverages on The Counting Table or Near the Ballots

An accidental spill could ruin or destroy ballots.

Keep Distance from Ballot Box Being Counted


No persons, other than Counting Judges, are within arm's reach of the ballot box being counted.

Other than the Counting Judges, no one is to touch or reach into the ballot box being counted.

After The Closing of The Poll

Only after the last voter has cast their ballot and left the polling place and the poll is considered closed should electronic devices be turned back on and pictures be taken.

- It is strongly recommended that no pictures be taken showing the full names or signatures of Election Judges, Watchers, Challengers, or others.



38 Eric Snowden quote about cell phones
"listening all the time"

Ballots & Voter Intent

MOCK BALLOT
GENERAL ELECTION
FREEDOM COUNTY

--	--

BUDGET REVENUE

INSTRUCTIONS TO VOTERS

→ Use ink to mark the ballot. No pencils.

→ Indicate your preference by making a "distinguishing mark." For example:

■ ☒ ☒ ☒

→ Write-In: To vote for a valid write-in candidate, indicate your preference with a distinguishing mark and write the person's name on the line provided.

→ Questions on the ballot: If you are in favor of the submitted question, mark "YES". If you are opposed to a submitted question, mark "NO".

→ Mistakes: If you spoil your ballot, return it to the election judge to receive a new ballot.

→ Numbers in Left Column: Small numbers in left column are assigned numerically and used when ballots are tallied.

REPUBLICAN (REP)
 DEMOCRAT (DEM)
 LIBERTARIAN (LIB)
 CONSTITUTION (CST)

FOR UNITED STATES SENATOR
Vote For One

1 ☐ JAMES HEIRSON REP

2 ☐ ANDREW CARLSON DEM

3 ☐ MARGARET BILLINGTON LIB

4 ☐ WES REMISINGER CST

5 ☐ _____
WRITE IN

FOR UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE DISTRICT 3
Vote For One

1 ☐ HOLLY KESTREL REP

2 ☐ CYNTHIA BRAZELL DEM

3 ☐ JOSEPH GARLAND LIB

4 ☐ _____
WRITE IN

FOR STATE AUDITOR
Vote For One

1 ☐ RACHEL ANDERSON REP

2 ☐ PEDRO ARROYO DEM

3 ☐ BOB WESTERSON LIB

4 ☐ _____
WRITE IN

STATE REP. DIST. 025
Vote For One

1 ☐ LIAM GRELLS REP

2 ☐ OLIVIA HUTTELS DEM

3 ☐ _____
WRITE IN

FOR STATE REP. DISTRICT 119
Vote For One

1 ☐ BRAD JENSEN REP

2 ☐ ELIJAH PANCILLI LIB

3 ☐ _____
WRITE IN

FOR ASSOCIATE CIRCUIT JUDGE
Vote For One

1 ☐ HEATHER INGLES REP

2 ☐ EMMA GENKINS DEM

3 ☐ _____
WRITE IN

FOR PRESIDING COMMISSIONER
Vote For One

1 ☐ JORDAN DANIELS REP

2 ☐ CHARLOTTE WILKINSON DEM

3 ☐ AMELIA FETTERMAN LIB

4 ☐ _____
WRITE IN

FOR CLERK OF THE COUNTY COMMISSION
Vote For One

1 ☐ BETHANY GILBERT REP

2 ☐ JAMES MCKENZIE DEM

3 ☐ LUCAS CONSTELL CST

4 ☐ _____
WRITE IN

FOR CIRCUIT COURT CLERK
Vote For One

1 ☐ RANDALL QUINCE REP

2 ☐ AVA RINCER DEM

3 ☐ _____
WRITE IN

FOR RECORDER OF DEEDS
Vote For One

1 ☐ HAROLD HARRISON DEM

2 ☐ _____
WRITE IN

FOR TREASURER
Vote For One

1 ☐ PRESTON WRIGHT REP

2 ☐ _____
WRITE IN

FOR PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Vote For One

1 ☐ BLAKE JENSTON REP

2 ☐ _____
WRITE IN

FOR COLLECTOR OF REVENUE
Vote For One

1 ☐ JANET BECK REP

2 ☐ _____
WRITE IN

Test Version 20221207v1

TURN BALLOT OVER

Statement of Returns Determines “Ballot ID” for Counting

The Clerk determines all candidates and questions appearing on the ballot in the county for an election.

Even though there are various versions of the ballots because some races or questions are limited to townships, school districts, etc., every candidate and question is included, in the appropriate order, on a “master” list.

The “master” list is then transferred, in order, onto the Statement of Returns – Candidates and Statement of Returns – Questions, as appropriate. The Statement of Returns is used by every polling place, even if some of the candidates or questions will not be voted on at that polling place.

The left column of a Statement of Returns contains a number (numerical order) that becomes the Ballot ID for counting for the candidate or question preference.

This approach creates a unique ID for every candidate/preference. For example, the candidate with ID #10 will have #10 on any ballot used in the county.

Ballot ID counting numbers for questions are preceded by “Q.” for example, Q.3 will be used for the same issue/preference on any ballot in the county.

FOR STATE AUDITOR		
Vote For One		
10	☐	RACHEL ANDERSON REP
11	☐	PEDRO ARROYO DEM
12	☐	BOB WESTERSON LIB
13	☐	
WRITE IN		

40 Ballot (example): close-up of Ballot ID for counting for a state race

COUNTY	POLLING PLACE	ELECTION	ELECTION DATE
FREEDOM	LIBERTY HS	GENERAL	NOV. 8, 2022

STATEMENT OF RETURNS - CANDIDATES

Statement of Returns – Candidates – We hereby certify that:

BALLOT ID	VOTES CAST	FOR CANDIDATE	FOR OFFICE OF
1		JAMES HEIRSON	United State Senator
2		ANDREW CARLSON	
3		MARGARET BILLINGTON	
4		WES REMISINGER	
5		Write-in	United State Representative District 3
6		HOLLY KESTREL	
7		CYNTHIA BRAZELL	
8		JOSEPH GARLAND	
9		Write-in	State Auditor
10		RACHEL ANDERSON	
11		PEDRO ARROYO	
12		BOB WESTERSON	
13		Write-in	State Rep. Dist. 025
14		LIAM GRELLS	
15		OLIVIA HUTTELS	
16		Write-in	
17		BRAD JENSEN	State Rep. Dist. 119
18		ELIJAH PANICLI	
19		Write-in	
20		HEATHER INGLES	
21		EMMA GINKINS	Associate Circuit Judge
22		Write-in	
23		JORDAN DANIELS	
24		CHARLOTTE WILKINSON	
25		AMELIA FETTERMAN	Presiding Commissioner
26		Write-in	
27		BETHANY GILBERT	
28		JAMES MCKENZIE	
29		LUCAS CONSTELL	Clerk of the County Commission
30		Write-in	
31		RANDALL QUINCE	
32		AVA RINCER	
33		Write-in	Circuit Court Clerk
34		HAROLD HARRISON	
35		Write-in	
36		PRESTON WRIGHT	
37		Write-in	Recorder of Deeds
38		BLAKE JENSTON	
39		Write-in	
40		JANET BECK	
41		Write-in	Treasurer
42			
43			
44			
45			Prosecuting Attorney
46			
47			
48			
49			Collector of Revenue
50			
51			
52			

©2022-2025, JAMES KENNY
PROPERTY OF CLERK OF ARIZONA'S NO. 10 COURTS

STATEMENT OF RETURNS: CANDIDATES - 1

39 Statement of Returns - Candidate (example): showing names of candidates entered by Clerk

Format of Ballots for Hand Counting

The hand-counting version of the ballot resembles the current layout used in most Missouri counties. The machine timing code markings around the perimeter of the ballot are omitted. Ovals are now squares. Instructions for marking the ballot are omit machine instructions. A very light, small Ballot ID counting number is to the left of every candidate or questions option.

Voters will probably not notice much difference. The definitions of “distinguishing marks” will make marking the ballot considerably easier for voters.

Distinguishing Marks

Stories of voters struggling to adequately fill in a small oval while keeping their marking within the border of the oval will no longer be an issue. Nothing in the statutes appears to restrict which type of marking device may be used (although pencil is discouraged, and black ink is not preferred). The Clerk or Secretary of State will communicate the rules, if any, of which marking devices may be used.

For candidates, a distinguishing mark appears preceding their name. (see 115.453 ¶1 pg. 227)

For questions, a distinguishing mark appears beside or below the YES or NO. (see 115.455 pg. 228)

CSR for Uniform Counting Standards – Paper Ballots

The [Code of State Regulations](#) (CSR) provides the standards Clerks use when counting ballots cast using paper ballots. For more information about CSR, see pg. 235.

INSTRUCTIONS TO VOTERS

⇒ Use ink to mark the ballot. No pencils.

⇒ Indicate your preference by making a “distinguishing mark.” For example:

☐ ☒ ☐ ☐

⇒ **Write-in:** To vote for a valid write-in candidate, indicate your preference with a distinguishing mark and write the person’s name on the line provided.

⇒ **Questions on the ballot:** If you are in favor of the submitted question, mark “YES”. If you are opposed to a submitted question, mark “NO”.

⇒ **Mistakes:** If you spoil your ballot, return it to the election judge to receive a new ballot.

⇒ **Numbers in Left Columns:** Small numbers in left column are assigned numerically and used when ballots are tallied.

REPUBLICAN (REP)
DEMOCRAT (DEM)
LIBERTARIAN (LIB)
CONSTITUTION (CST)

41 Ballot (example): Instructions to voters

Review the Sample Ballots (Counting Judges)

Election Judges compare the sample ballots to the official ballots to ensure there are no discrepancies.

The Counting Judges must be familiar with the races and questions on the ballot, especially if there are multiple versions of the ballot (for different townships, districts, etc.). Also, it is important to know if any races or questions allow voters to vote for more than one candidate.

MOCK BALLOT
GENERAL ELECTION
FREEDOM COUNTY

JUDGES' INITIALS

INSTRUCTIONS TO VOTERS

- Use ink to mark the ballot. No pencils.
- Indicate your preference by making a "distinguishing mark," for example: ☒ ☐ ☒
- Write-In:** To vote for a valid write-in candidate, indicate your preference with a distinguishing mark and write the person's name on the line provided.
- Questions on the ballot:** If you are in favor of the submitted question, mark "YES". If you are opposed to a submitted question, mark "NO".
- Mistake:** If you spoil your ballot, return it to the election judge to receive a new ballot.
- Numbers in Left Column:** Small numbers in left column are assigned numerically and used when ballots are tallied.

FOR UNITED STATES SENATOR
Vote For One

1. ☐ JAMES HEIRSON REP
2. ☐ ANDREW CARLSON DEM
3. ☐ MARGARET BILLINGTON LIB
4. ☐ WES REMISINGER CST
5. ☐ WRITE IN

FOR UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE DISTRICT 3
Vote For One

1. ☐ HOLLY KESTREL REP
2. ☐ CYNTHIA BRAZZEL DEM
3. ☐ JOSEPH GARLAND LIB
4. ☐ WRITE IN

FOR STATE AUDITOR
Vote For One

1. ☐ RACHEL ANDERSON REP
2. ☐ PEDRO ARROYO DEM
3. ☐ BOB WESTERSON LIB
4. ☐ WRITE IN

STATE REP. DIST. 025
Vote For One

14. ☐ LIAM GRELLS REP
15. ☐ OLIVIA HUTTELS DEM
16. ☐ WRITE IN

FOR STATE REP. DISTRICT 119
Vote For One

17. ☐ BRAD JENSEN REP
18. ☐ ELIJAH PANCILLI LIB
19. ☐ WRITE IN

FOR ASSOCIATE CIRCUIT JUDGE
Vote For One

20. ☐ HEATHER INGLES REP
21. ☐ EMMA GOWKINS DEM
22. ☐ WRITE IN

FOR PRESIDING COMMISSIONER
Vote For One

23. ☐ JORDAN DANIELS REP
24. ☐ CHARLOTTE WILKINSON DEM
25. ☐ AMELIA FETTERMAN LIB
26. ☐ WRITE IN

FOR CLERK OF THE COUNTY COMMISSION
Vote For One

27. ☐ BETHANY GILBERT REP
28. ☐ JAMES MCKENZIE DEM
29. ☐ LUCAS CONSTELL CST
30. ☐ WRITE IN

FOR CIRCUIT COURT CLERK
Vote For One

31. ☐ RANDALL QUINCE REP
32. ☐ AVA RINER DEM
33. ☐ WRITE IN

FOR RECORDER OF DEEDS
Vote For One

34. ☐ HAROLD HARRISON DEM
35. ☐ WRITE IN

FOR TREASURER
Vote For One

36. ☐ PRESTON WRIGHT REP
37. ☐ WRITE IN

FOR PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
Vote For One

38. ☐ BLAKE JENSTON REP
39. ☐ WRITE IN

FOR COLLECTOR OF REVENUE
Vote For One

40. ☐ JANET BECK REP
41. ☐ WRITE IN

Test Version 20221207v1

TURN BALLOT OVER

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT NO. 1
Proposed by the 101st General Assembly (First Regular Session)
HCS HR 35

Do you want to amend the Missouri Constitution to:

- Allow _____
- Allow _____

State governmental entities estimate _____

61. ☐ YES
62. ☐ NO

If you are in favor of the question, place an X in the box opposite "YES". If you are opposed to the question, place an X in the box opposite "NO".

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT NO. 4
Proposed by the 101st General Assembly (Second Regular Session)
SS2 SJR 38

Shall the Missouri Constitution be amended to authorize _____

State and local entities estimate _____

63. ☐ YES
64. ☐ NO

If you are in favor of the question, place an X in the box opposite "YES". If you are opposed to the question, place an X in the box opposite "NO".

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT NO. 5
Proposed by the 101st General Assembly (Second Regular Session)
HR 116

Shall the Missouri National Guard _____

State governmental entities estimate _____

65. ☐ YES
66. ☐ NO

If you are in favor of the question, place an X in the box opposite "YES". If you are opposed to the question, place an X in the box opposite "NO".

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT NO. 3
Proposed by Initiative Petition

Do you want to amend the Missouri Constitution to:

- Remove _____
- Require _____
- Allow _____
- Establish _____
- Issue _____
- Impose _____

State governmental entities estimate _____

67. ☐ YES
68. ☐ NO

If you are in favor of the question, place an X in the box opposite "YES". If you are opposed to the question, place an X in the box opposite "NO".

OFFICIAL JUDICIAL BALLOT
Submitting to the voters whether the judges named below, whose terms expire December 31, 2022, shall be retained in office for new terms.
VOTE ON EACH JUDGE

MISSOURI SUPREME COURT JUDGES

Shall Judge MADELAINE WRIGHT of the Missouri Supreme Court be retained in office?

61. ☐ YES
62. ☐ NO

If you are in favor of the question, place an X in the box opposite "YES". If you are opposed to the question, place an X in the box opposite "NO".

Shall Judge VINCENT STANGER of the Missouri Supreme Court be retained in office?

63. ☐ YES
64. ☐ NO

If you are in favor of the question, place an X in the box opposite "YES". If you are opposed to the question, place an X in the box opposite "NO".

MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS JUDGES, EASTERN DISTRICT

Shall Judge BRADLEY WILSON of the Eastern District Court of Appeals be retained in office?

65. ☐ YES
66. ☐ NO

If you are in favor of the question, place an X in the box opposite "YES". If you are opposed to the question, place an X in the box opposite "NO".

Shall Judge WILLIAM JACKSON, JR. of the Eastern District Court of Appeals be retained in office?

67. ☐ YES
68. ☐ NO

If you are in favor of the question, place an X in the box opposite "YES". If you are opposed to the question, place an X in the box opposite "NO".

Shall Judge COOPER JAMESON CHARTS of the Eastern District Court of Appeals be retained in office?

69. ☐ YES
70. ☐ NO

If you are in favor of the question, place an X in the box opposite "YES". If you are opposed to the question, place an X in the box opposite "NO".

Shall Judge BENITA GOODSON JAVIER of the Eastern District Court of Appeals be retained in office?

71. ☐ YES
72. ☐ NO

If you are in favor of the question, place an X in the box opposite "YES". If you are opposed to the question, place an X in the box opposite "NO".

Test Version 20221209

TURN BALLOT OVER

42 Example of Ballot - front and back

Voter Intent is Determined for Candidate or Issue Preference

The following criteria will be used by the Counting Judges, per statute, to determine voter intent if **any** of the following are present: (see [115.456 92.\(2\)\(a-c\)](#) pg. 229)

- a distinguishing mark in the square adjacent to the name of the candidate or issue preference;
- a distinguishing mark adjacent to the name of the candidate or issue preference;
- the name of the candidate or issue preference is circled.

Examples of Voter Intent for Candidates

The [Code of State Regulations](#) (CSR) has several examples showing votes for write-in candidates and whether they are valid (see pg 256). These are just two examples:

For Governor (Vote for one)		
☒	HARRY S. TRUMAN	PARTY
☐	LAURA INGALLS WILDER	PARTY
☐	MARK TWAIN	PARTY
☐	GEORGE WASHINGTON CARVER	PARTY
☐	WRITE-IN _____	PARTY

This constitutes a vote for Harry S. Truman.

For Governor (Vote for one)		
☐	HARRY S. TRUMAN	PARTY
☐	LAURA INGALLS WILDER	PARTY
☐	MARK TWAIN	PARTY
☐	GEORGE WASHINGTON CARVER	PARTY
☐	WRITE-IN _____	PARTY

This constitutes a vote for Laura Ingalls Wilder.

43 Examples of Voter Intent from CSR

Voting Machines and Hand Count Results Will Rarely Match Exactly

The examples above are screenshots directly from the CSR. Both examples constitute valid votes according to law, but will a voting machine accurately count these as valid? Two hand-counting teams could hand-count the same batch of ballots and have slightly different results due to their interpretations of voter intent.

The claim that the small sampling of ballots hand-counted in the post-election audits exactly matches the voting machines' totals every time is cause for concern. Are those doing hand counting being forced to count using the standards of voting machines?

Learn more about voter intent and distinguishing marks in “**Myth: The Hand Counted Verification of Machine Results Match Exactly Every Single Time**” on page 255.

Counted Ballots

A “counted ballot” is one on which votes were cast and counted on some or all the candidates and questions races without any valid write-in candidates.

When the ballot has been read by the Counting Judges and tallied by the Recording Judges, place it on the pile on the counting table labeled “Counted Ballots.”



44 "Counted Ballots" masking tape example

Rejected Ballots

A ballot is considered rejected if:

- it is missing initials of Election Judges; or,
- it is overvoted ALL candidates and questions; or,
- the voter is deemed to be unqualified by Election Judges; or,
- it is an absentee ballot without a completed and signed affidavit; or,
- the ballot was voted with unlawful assistance.

(see [115.447 ¶2.\(2\)](#) pg. 226)

When the Counting Judges deem a ballot to be Rejected, it is placed on a pile on the counting table near the “Rejected” label.



45 "Rejected" masking tape example

Valid Vote for a Write-In Candidate


To be considered as a write-in candidate, the candidate must have filed a declaration of intent to be a write-in candidate with the proper election authority. (see 115.453 ¶(4) pg. 227) If that was properly accomplished, the candidate will appear on the list of authorized write-in candidates given by the Clerk to the Election Judges with their supplies.

If a candidate is an authorized write-in candidate, then the following criteria must **all** be present for a vote for a write-in candidate to be considered valid. (see [115.456 ¶2.\(3\)\(a-c\)](#) pg. 229)

- distinguishing mark in the **square** adjacent to the name of the candidate;
- name of the candidate (misspelled does not disqualify; needs only to be similar);
- name of the office for which the candidate is to be elected.

Example of Valid Vote for Write-In Candidate

The [Code of State Regulations](#) (CSR) has several examples showing votes for write-in candidates and whether they are valid (see pg. 256).



47 Voter Intent (example): valid vote for Write-In Candidate



46 Arrow Flags: example of product type

“Flag” Valid Write-In Candidates

If a valid vote is cast for a write-in candidate, place a removable arrow “flag” pointing directly at the candidate's name, making it possible for the team that counts write-in votes to quickly identify which write-in candidates were counted at the polling place.

Ballots with Valid Write-In Candidates are Kept Separate

Continue calling votes for other candidates and questions on the ballot with the write-in candidate. When the tallying for this ballot is complete, place it on the counting table next to the tape for “Valid Write-Ins.”



48 "Valid Write-Ins" masking tape example

Ballots Tally form

A

BATCH # **1**

HOLE PUNCH

BALLOTS TALLY

COUNTY **Freedom** POLY PUNCH **Liberty #5** COUNTING LOCATION **Liberty #5** ELECTION DATE **11/8/2022** BATCH START TIME **2:00 PM** HOLE PUNCH **REP** WHEN FINAL REP JUDGE INITIALS **JD** WHEN FINAL DEM JUDGE INITIALS **CD**

POLING PLACE **Liberty #5** TYPE OF BALLOTS **Election Day** TALLY DATE **11/8/2022** BATCH END TIME **3:15 PM**

ENTER TOTAL # BALLOTS COUNTED THIS BATCH	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	
108	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	
POLITICAL PARTY REPRESENTED (CIRCLE ONE)	REP	DEM	REP	DEM	REP	DEM	REP	DEM	REP	DEM	REP	DEM	REP	DEM	REP	DEM	REP	DEM	REP	DEM	REP	DEM	REP	DEM	REP	
IS THIS TO BE USED FOR THE OFFICIAL COUNT? (CIRCLE ONE)	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	
IF OFFICIAL, COPY TOTALS TO BATCHES SUMMARY A THEN RECORD: PG #:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	
ROW #:	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	
Row Total	708	70	28	6	4	0	74	15	9	0	58	43	6	0	97	5	0	85	21	0	74	36	0	22	24	31

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49 Ballots Tally form - example of a completed form

Preparing the Ballots Tally form

The Recording Judges use the Ballots Tally form to tally the votes as the Counting Judges call them out. Ballots Tally forms for Candidates use an alpha-numbering system to identify their “Group.” The forms for Questions also use an alpha system, but the letter is preceded by “Q.”.

The Recording Judges, 1 DEM and 1 REP, tally votes on their copy of the Ballots Tally form. The optimal result would be that no mistakes were made by either Recording Judge, and their totals at the end of the batch match exactly.

Forms Prepared in Advance by the Clerk

Calculating the expected turnout at the polling place and the number of candidates and questions, the Clerk will print the estimated number of forms needed for the election. These are pre-sorted and clipped into batches with two copies of each batch.

Ink Colors to use the Ballots Tally form

Tally marks will be made using a fine or medium felt tip marker in any color other than blue or black. The felt tip makes it easy to “dab” as votes are tallied, like dabbing a Bingo card.

It is recommended that any other writing on the form be done with a ballpoint pen, preferably in blue ink (but it is recommended not to use black).

Front Side – Group and Batch Number

“Group” refers to the 25 tally columns on the form. The numeral at the top of each column tracks the Ballot ID for counting, listed on the Statement of Return (see pg. 95).


For Candidates:

- Group A: 1 to 25
- Group B: 26 to 50
- Group C: 51 to 75, and so on.

For Questions (the number is preceded by “Q.”):

- Group Q.A: 1 to 25
- Group Q.B: 26 to 50, and so on.

For the example in the Workbook, each batch will consist of Group A, Group B, and Group Q.A.



50 Ballot Tally form (example): marking Batch number in top header

The Clerk prepares **two sets** (1 for REP, 1 for DEM)) of Group A, B, and Q.A and marks them **Batch 1**.

Front Side – Top Header Details

COUNTY Freedom	HOLE PUNCH	COUNTING LOCATION Liberty HS	ELECTION DATE 11/8/2022	BATCH START TIME 2pm	HOLE PUNCH
POLLING PLACE Liberty HS		TYPE OF BALLOTS Election Day	TALLY DATE 11/8/2022	BATCH END TIME	

51 Ballots Tally Form (example): Location and date details in the top header

Enter details in the top header row:

- County Name
- Polling Place
- Counting Location (can be the name of the Polling Place or a specific location inside the polling place)
- Election Date
- Tally Date (may differ from the election date if military or other votes are counted later)
- Time Batch Start

Other information on the header and left sidebar remains blank until the batch is tallied.

To Begin Counting, Receive the Ballot Box

All four judges are seated and ready: 2 Counting Judges (from 2 major political parties) and 2 Recording Judges (from 2 major political parties). An empty ballot box is in the Counting Judges' possession.

At the top of the hour, when counting is ready to begin, a **Receiving Judge** delivers the ballot box to the **Counting Judges**, who, in turn, give the Receiving Judge their empty ballot box.

The Receiving Judge shows that the box is empty, locks it, and it remains in public view until the polls close or it is removed for counting another batch. (see 115.451 pg. 227)

Ballots pulled from Ballot Box One at a Time

"One Counting Judge closely observed by the other Counting Judge," takes a single ballot from the box and holds it so both Counting Judges can see it.

Check for the Initials of Election Judges

Missing initials means the ballot shall be rejected, although there is an exception. See the topic for "Rejected" ballots (pg. 99) section.

Counting Judge calls the vote next to the distinguishing mark

Begin to call out each vote, starting on the front page (candidates), in the leftmost column, and going down to the bottom of the column before beginning the next column.

When the front page is done, flip the ballot over and call votes on the back page.

READ THE NUMBER NEXT TO THE BOX, read the candidate's name and office sought, or question and preference.

FOR UNITED STATES SENATOR		
Vote For One		
1	☐ JAMES HEIRSON	REP
2	☐ ANDREW CARLSON	DEM
3	☐ MARGARET BILLINGTON	LIB
4	☒ WES REMISINGER	CST
5	☐ _____ WRITE IN	

52 Ballot: example of vote cast for a candidate

Marking Votes on the Ballots Tally form

This form is a 2-sided document. The front side has identification information and is used to tally the votes. The back side is for the signatures of the Recording Judges.

Hat tip to the Louisiana team (see pg. 192) for the idea of using a pitch count sheet to tally votes in their “Cajun Clothesline” ballot counting model. We put an example in the footnote if you have never seen a pitch count sheet.⁷

The Ballots Tally form is adapted from a pitch count sheet, except the columns are vertical rather than horizontal.

Also, marking the form is like marking a Bingo card – just a quick “dab” with a color marker.


Marking Device to Use to Tally Votes

Tallies must be made in ink, in any color other than blue or black—no pencil marks for tallies. A fine tip marker with a rounded tip is a good choice for making the mark; It leaves a sufficient size dot by simply touching it to the paper. There is no need to fill in the entire oval.

Tally the Vote When it is Called



When the Counting Judge calls a vote, the number on the ballot next to the candidate’s name or question preference is called.

Go to the corresponding column on the Ballots Tally Form for the number called. If the column is blank, “dab” the top-left oval with the number “1” in it.




⁷ Sample Baseball Pitch Count Sheet [Perma.cc/TZX9-MCL6](https://perma.cc/TZX9-MCL6)



The next time that candidate is called, you will dab the oval with the number 2, which is to the right. Continue going left, right, left, right, and down the column as that candidate receives more votes.



As more votes called for this candidate, continue dabbing left, right, left, right, as ovals are filled going down the column



54 Ballots Tally form (example) shows ovals being "dabbed" as votes called for a candidate



53 3-step example to correct tally (dab) made in the wrong column

Tip for Locating the Correct Column

Colored cardstock is cut to create a sort of “column guide” or bookmark 8.5” long and about 3” wide. When the vote ballot ID number is called, move the card to the left of the column (if you are right-handed) or the right side (if you are left-handed).

For example, if “9” is called, place the card to the left of 9 (or right side if you are left-handed).

A **B**

BATCH #

ENTER TOTAL # BALLOTS COUNTED THIS BATCH

POLITICAL PARTY REPRESENTED (Circle One)

REP

DEM

IS THIS TO BE USED FOR THE TALLY BOOK? (Circle One)

YES

NO

IS TALLY BOOK, COPY TOTALS TO BATCHES SUMMARY A THIN RECORD PG. #:

ROW #:

Row Total

1 2 3

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

55 Cardstock Marker used to assist in locating the correct column to "dab"

Recording a Tally in the Wrong Column


If a tally is accidentally marked in the wrong column, follow the steps illustrated on the previous page: 1) use a pencil to circle the oval in which the mistaken tally was marked, and 2) dab (or mark) the correct column. 3) If **another vote is called** for the column with the pencil-circled oval, use an eraser to remove the pencil marking. The mistakenly marked oval becomes the tally for the new vote, and the column total is accurate.

- If there are **no subsequent votes** called for the column with the pencil-circled oval during the remainder of the batch:
 - Leave the pencil marking as is.
 - Use a blue ballpoint pen and put an “X” on the oval circled in pencil.
 - Recording Judges (REP and DEM) initial below the oval with the “X.”
 - When recording the column total, disregard the oval with the “X” and use the number from the oval preceding it.

Continue Calling Votes until the Batch is Complete

Proceed to the next section to total the batch of ballots.

Totaling a Batch of Ballots



56 Ballots Tally form (example) - determining last oval dabbed

Two circumstances determine the completion of the batch:

1. All ballots in the ballot box have been called and tallied, or,
2. Any column on the Ballots Tally form reaches 100. When any candidate or question has received 100 votes, finish counting the remaining votes on the ballot. DO NOT PULL ANY MORE BALLOTS FROM THE BALLOT BOX.

Note: If a batch is completed before the ballot box is empty, close the ballot box and leave it in its place at the counting table. At all times, a minimum of two Election Judges (1 REP, 1 DEM) must remain at the table with the ballot box and ensure there is no tampering.

Determine and Record Column Totals

For each column, find the last oval that was “dabbed.” In the example to the left, the next visible number is 16, meaning the last number dabbed was 15, so 15 is the correct total for this column.

Record column totals in the Bottom Row Totals

When a batch is complete, the number of votes cast in the batch for each candidate or question is entered in the bottom Totals Row.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
1	2	3																						

Row Total Sum

Calculate the sum of the totals and write it in the Row Total box on the left end of the row.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
Row Total	70	28	6	4	0	74	15	9	0	58	43	6	0	97	5	0	85	21	0	74	36	0	22	24	31

58 Ballots Tally form (example): Sum of row total

POLITICAL PARTY REPRESENTED (CIRCLE ONE)

REP

DEM

IS THIS TO BE USED FOR THE TALLY BOOK? (CIRCLE ONE)

YES

No

59 Ballots Tally form (example): Recording Judges mark party affiliation and Tally Book status

Recording Judges Must Agree on Totals

The Recording Judges compare the totals on each Group form from the batch. Follow the Clerk's guidelines on how to work out discrepancies.

Once the recording judges have reached an agreement, they designate which Ballots Tally form (either the REP or DEM version) for each group will be returned with the Tally Book or the counted ballots.

- Forms marked "yes" will be placed in the Tally Book
- Forms marked "no" are attached to the outside of the envelopes containing the counted ballots.

In the left sidebar, each Recording Judge marks their political affiliation on their form.

Recording Judges Initial forms and Enter the Ending Time

In the top right corner of the header row, the Recording Judges initial their own and each other's Ballots Tally forms. They also enter the time that the batch was completed.

BATCH START TIME 2pm	HOLE PUNCH	WHEN FINAL, REP JUDGE INITIAL: JD	WHEN FINAL, DEM JUDGE INITIAL: CB
BATCH END TIME 3:15pm			

60 Ballots Tally form (example): Recording Judges initial the forms and record the ending time of the batch.

Total Number of Ballots in Batch

The Counting Judges will count the number of ballots for which votes have been called and tallied. The ballots to be counted are those in the piles for "Counted Ballots" and "Valid Write-Ins" (combine the two numbers for a total). When they agree on the number of ballots, they announce the number to the Recording Judges, who enter it at the top of the left sidebar of their Ballots Tally form.

ENTER TOTAL # BALLOTS COUNTED THIS BATCH

108

61 Ballots Tally form (example): Total number of ballots counted in the batch

Signatures on the Ballots Tally form

For each Group form (i.e., A, B, Q.A, etc.), the Recording Judges sign the back of their own and each other's Ballots Tally form.

A	BATCH # 1	BALLOTS TALLY ©2022-2023 Linda Rantz Prepared for Cause of America - Missouri	
		Signatures of Recording Judges When batch of ballots being tallied is complete, Recording Judges compare their tallies. The recording judges must agree on the final count and decide which sheet to submit as "official." The Recording Judges sign both tally sheets.	
	JUDGE AFFILIATION (CIRCLE ONE)	RECORDING JUDGE NAME PRINT:	
	REP DEM OTH	SIGN: 	
	RECORDING JUDGE NAME PRINT:		
REP DEM OTH	SIGN: 		
	RECORDING JUDGE NAME PRINT:		
REP DEM OTH	SIGN: 		

62 Ballots Tally form (example): the back of the form, signatures of Recording Judges

The only incomplete information on the Ballots Tally form is the Page Number and Row at the bottom of the left sidebar. That information will be completed in the next step, transferring the Row Total to the Batches Summary sheet.

IF OFFICIAL, COPY TOTALS TO BATCHES SUMMARY A THEN RECORD: PG #: ROW #:

63 Ballots Tally form (example): Batches Summary page and row number still blank

Correcting Mistakes on the Ballots Tally form

Mistakes on the Top Header, Left Column, or Bottom Totals Row

Use a blue ballpoint pen to cross out mistakes to information in either the top header, left column, or bottom Totals Row.

Initial near the crossed-out mistakes without making any marks inside the tally area (pg. 106 provides illustrations).

Information Left Blank on the Front or Back Page of the Ballots Tally form

Election Judges return to complete.

Election Judge(s) forget to Sign or Initial Ballots Tally form

Election Judges return to sign or initial.

Complete Batch by Writing Totals on Batches Summary

Follow the instructions in the next section to enter the batch totals on the Batches Summary sheet.

Batches Summary sheet

A		PAGE		HOLE PUNCH		COUNTY		TOWNSHIP		COUNTING LOCATION		ELECTION DATE		HOLE PUNCH		WHEN FINAL, REP JUDGE INITIAL		WHEN FINAL, DEM JUDGE INITIAL										
		1	1	BATCHES SUMMARY		Freedom		Liberty HS		Liberty HS		11/8/2022		11/8/2022		ZV		RF										
ROW #		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25		
1	ROW Total	708	70	28	6	4	0	74	15	9	0	58	43	6	0	97	5	0	85	21	0	74	36	0	22	24	31	
2	ROW Total	713	82	17	8	7	0	65	22	8	0	39	52	12	1	96	14	0	79	24	0	81	28	0	24	26	28	
3	ROW Total	699	64	30	3	3	1	93	14	6	0	41	36	7	0	98	7	0	68	32	0	62	41	0	31	35	27	
4	ROW Total	637	59	28	3	4	0	69	14	4	0	26	27	13	1	99	10	0	76	38	0	65	16	0	31	26	28	
5	ROW Total																											
6	ROW Total																											
7	ROW Total																											
8	ROW Total																											
9	ROW Total																											
10	ROW Total																											
11	ROW Total																											
12	ROW Total																											
13	ROW Total																											
14	ROW Total																											
15	ROW Total																											
16	ROW Total																											
17	ROW Total																											
18	ROW Total																											
COMPARE TOTALS		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25		
TOTAL	TOTAL	2757	2757	275	103	20	18	1	301	65	27	0	164	158	38	2	390	36	0	308	115	0	282	121	0	108	111	114

64 Batches Summary sheet - example of a completed sheet

Record Batch Row Total to the Batches Summary sheet

Using one of the Ballots Tally forms, match the Group (e.g., A, B, C, etc.) of the Ballots Tally form to the corresponding Batches Summary sheet. Recording Judges should work together on one group at a time to observe each other's work.

The image shows two forms side-by-side. The left form is titled 'BALLOTS TALLY' and the right form is titled 'BATCHES SUMMARY'. Both forms have a red circle around the letter 'A' in the top left corner, indicating they are for Group A.

Overlap the sheets, put the Ballots Tally on top of the Batches Summary, and copy the Row Total of the Ballots Tally form onto the Batches Summary.

The image shows the 'BALLOTS TALLY' form overlaid on the 'BATCHES SUMMARY' form. Red arrows point from the 'Row Total' row of the 'BALLOTS TALLY' form to the 'Row Total' row of the 'BATCHES SUMMARY' form, indicating the transfer of data.

65 Recording totals from Ballots Tally form onto the Batches Summary sheet

Page and Row Numbers Written on Ballots Tally form

At the bottom of the left sidebar of the Ballots Tally form, write the page and row numbers from the Batches Summary sheet where the totals were recorded.

The Ballots Tally form is placed behind the Batches Summary sheet in the Tally Book.

IF OFFICIAL,
COPY TOTALS TO
**BATCHES
SUMMARY**
A
THEN RECORD:
PG #:
1
Row #:
1

66 Ballots Tally form, enter the page and row number for Batches Summary sheet

Secure Ballots at the Counting Table

After the Ballots Tally form totals are transferred and the forms are completed, the batch of ballots and tally sheets should be secured.

Rejected Ballots

“Rejected” ballots are added to the envelope marked “rejected ballots,” which should remain on the Counting Table. Only one envelope is used for the entire day for rejected ballots. Ballots may be added to this envelope as batches are completed.

Valid Write-In Ballots

Take a “Valid Write-In Envelope” provided by the Clerk. Complete the information on the envelope’s label, which includes Counting, Counting Location, Election Date, Tally Date, Batch, etc.

Count the quantity of ballots from the batch in the Valid Write-in pile on the counting table. Enter the quantity on the label, place the ballots in the envelope, and close the envelope.

“Yes” for Tally Book Version of Ballots Tally form

The “Tally Book” version of the Ballots Tally form (marked “YES” in the left sidebar) will be placed in the Tally Book, in the corresponding section for its group, behind the Batches Summary sheet. For example, the Ballots Tally form for Group A goes in section “Group A” of the Tally book behind the Batches Summary Sheet for Group A.

“No” for Tally Book Version of Ballots Tally form

The versions of the Ballots Tally forms marked “NO” in the left sidebar will be placed on top of the envelopes of Counted Ballots and Write-in Ballots, secured as instructed by the Clerk (e.g., large binder clip), and held in the secure container or space designated for voted ballots.

67 Batches Summary (example) showing the reconciliation of Row Totals

Figure 1. The effect of the number of nodes on the number of nodes in the network.

68 Batches Summary - compare totals of left column and bottom row. Totals must match before proceeding to next step of process.

Finalize the Batches Summary sheets

Recording Judges Initial and Sign

When the Recording Judges agree on the totals, both will:

- Initial the front side of the sheet in the upper right corner, and,
- Sign the back of the sheet.

WHEN FINAL, REP JUDGE INITIAL: <i>LV</i>	WHEN FINAL, DEM JUDGE INITIAL: <i>RF</i>
--	--

69 Batches Summary (example): Election Judges initial top-right corner, front page

A	BATCHES SUMMARY © 2022-2023 Linda Rantz Prepared for Cause of America - Missouri	
	Signatures of Recording Judges	
	At the completion of each Ballots Tally, the totals are entered onto this Batches Summary. When counting of ballots is completed and all Ballots Tally sheets are recorded on this Summary, Recording Judges sign this Batches Summary sheet.	
	JUDGE AFFILIATION (CIRCLE ONE)	RECORDING JUDGE NAME PRINT:
	REP	<i>Lana Vengell</i>
	DEM	
OTH	RECORDING JUDGE SIGNATURE AFTER BATCH COMPLETED—SIGN WITH BLUE BALLPOINT PEN	
	SIGN: <i>Lana Vengell</i>	
REP	RECORDING JUDGE NAME PRINT:	
DEM	<i>Richmond Fields</i>	
OTH	RECORDING JUDGE SIGNATURE AFTER BATCH COMPLETED—SIGN WITH BLUE BALLPOINT PEN	
	SIGN: <i>Richmond Fields</i>	

70 Batches Summary (example): Recording Judges sign back of sheet when counting complete and totals entered

Any Unused Rows May Be Crossed Out

A		PAGE 1		HOLE PUNCH		COUNTING LOCATION		ELECTION DATE		HOLE PUNCH		WHEN FINAL REP JUDGE SIGN		WHEN FINAL DEM JUDGE SIGN													
		OF # PGS 1		BATCHES SUMMARY		COUNTING LOCATION		ELECTION DATE		HOLE PUNCH		WHEN FINAL REP JUDGE SIGN		WHEN FINAL DEM JUDGE SIGN													
		COUNTING LOCATION		ELECTION DATE		HOLE PUNCH		WHEN FINAL REP JUDGE SIGN		WHEN FINAL DEM JUDGE SIGN																	
		COUNTING LOCATION		ELECTION DATE		HOLE PUNCH		WHEN FINAL REP JUDGE SIGN		WHEN FINAL DEM JUDGE SIGN																	
		COUNTING LOCATION		ELECTION DATE		HOLE PUNCH		WHEN FINAL REP JUDGE SIGN		WHEN FINAL DEM JUDGE SIGN																	
ROW #	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25		
1	708	70	28	6	4	0	74	15	9	0	58	43	6	0	97	5	0	85	21	0	74	36	0	22	24	31	
2	713	82	17	8	7	0	65	22	8	0	39	52	12	1	96	14	0	79	24	0	81	28	0	24	26	28	
3	699	64	30	3	3	1	93	14	6	0	41	36	7	0	98	7	0	68	32	0	62	41	0	31	35	27	
4	637	59	28	3	4	0	69	14	4	0	26	27	13	1	99	10	0	76	38	0	65	16	0	31	26	28	
5	ROW Total																										
6	ROW Total																										
7	ROW Total																										
8	ROW Total																										
9	ROW Total																										
10	ROW Total																										
11	ROW Total																										
12	ROW Total																										
13	ROW Total																										
14	ROW Total																										
15	ROW Total																										
16	ROW Total																										
17	ROW Total																										
18	ROW Total																										
COMPARE TOTALS	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25		
TOTAL	2757	2757	275	103	20	18	1	301	65	27	0	164	158	38	2	390	36	0	308	115	0	282	121	0	108	111	114

71 Batches Summary (example): all batches recorded, any blank lines crossed out

Results of Polling Place worksheet

HOLE PUNCH		COUNTING LOCATION		ELECTION DATE		HOLE PUNCH		WHEN FINAL, REP JUDGE INITIAL:		WHEN FINAL, DEM JUDGE INITIAL:																
©2022-2023 Linda Rando Prepared for Cases of America MD 20220220		COUNTY Freedom	POLLING PLACE Liberty HS	Liberty HS Election Day		Nov 8, 22 Nov 8, 22																				
RESULTS of POLLING PLACE																										
GROUP		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
A	1	275	103	20	18	1	301	65	27	0	164	158	38	2	390	36	0	308	115	0	282	121	0	108	111	114
GROUP		26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50
B	1	4	209	99	75	12	209	217	0	404	0	418	0	379	4	401	6									
GROUP		51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75
C	NONE																									
GROUP		76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
D	NONE																									
GROUP		101	102	103	104	105	106	107	108	109	110	111	112	113	114	115	116	117	118	119	120	121	122	123	124	125
E	NONE																									
GROUP		126	127	128	129	130	131	132	133	134	135	136	137	138	139	140	141	142	143	144	145	146	147	148	149	150
F	NONE																									
GROUP		151	152	153	154	155	156	157	158	159	160	161	162	163	164	165	166	167	168	169	170	171	172	173	174	175
G	NONE																									
GROUP		176	177	178	179	180	181	182	183	184	185	186	187	188	189	190	191	192	193	194	195	196	197	198	199	200
H	NONE																									
GROUP		Q.1	Q.2	Q.3	Q.4	Q.5	Q.6	Q.7	Q.8	Q.9	Q.10	Q.11	Q.12	Q.13	Q.14	Q.15	Q.16	Q.17	Q.18	Q.19	Q.20	Q.21	Q.22	Q.23	Q.24	Q.25
Q.A	1	360	58	25	406	118	302	111	275	210	211	416	5	389	26	275	105	299	112	318	107	390	26			
GROUP		Q.26	Q.27	Q.28	Q.29	Q.30	Q.31	Q.32	Q.33	Q.34	Q.35	Q.36	Q.37	Q.38	Q.39	Q.40	Q.41	Q.42	Q.43	Q.44	Q.45	Q.46	Q.47	Q.48	Q.49	Q.50
Q.B	NONE																									

72 Results of Polling Place worksheet - example of completed worksheet

Using the Batches Summary sheet for each Group, match the Group (e.g., A, B, C, etc.) to the corresponding row on the Results of Polling Place report (both forms are in the Tally Book).⁸

[illegible]



Overlap the sheets, put the Batches Summary on top of the Results of Polling Place, align the Batches Summary Row Totals to the corresponding Group on the Results of Polling Place, and copy the Row Total from the Batches Summary to the Results.

⁸ Note: If there are multiple pages of Batches Summary sheets for each Group, the sum for each column must be calculated from the pages and then entered on the Results of Polling Place worksheet.

Finalize the Results of Polling Place Worksheet




Recording Judges Initial Front Page

When all totals have been entered on the Results of Polling Place worksheets, the Recording Judges initial in the upper right corner of the front page of the worksheet.

WHEN FINAL, REP JUDGE INITIAL: 	WHEN FINAL, DEM JUDGE INITIAL: 
--	--

Recording and Counting Judges sign Back Page

All four members of the Counting Team sign on the back page of the Results of Polling Place.

HOLE PUNCH		HOLE PUNCH		HOLE PUNCH	
RESULTS of POLLING PLACE					
©2022-2023 Linda Parks, Prepared for Cause of America - Missouri					
When the results from all Batches Summary sheets are finalized, totaled and entered on this Results page, Recording and Counting Judges sign this Results / Polling Place sheet.					
JUDGE AFFILIATION: (CIRCLE ONE)		SIGNATURES OF RECORDING JUDGES		JUDGE AFFILIATION: (CIRCLE ONE)	
REP	PRINT: Burt Jenkins	REP	PRINT: Richmond Fields	REP	PRINT: Simin Takava
DEM	SIGN: 	DEM	SIGN: 	DEM	SIGN: 
OTH		OTH		OTH	
REP	PRINT: Lana Vengell	REP	PRINT: Simin Takava	REP	PRINT: Simin Takava
DEM	SIGN: 	DEM	SIGN: 	DEM	SIGN: 
OTH		OTH		OTH	

74 Results of Polling Place (example): The back page is signed by all four judges on the Counting Team

Statement of Returns & Certification

COUNTY	POLLING PLACE	ELECTION	ELECTION DATE
FREEDOM	LIBERTY HS	GENERAL	NOV. 8, 2022

STATEMENT OF RETURNS - CANDIDATES

Statement of Returns - Candidates - We hereby certify that:

Row #	VOICES CAST	FOR CANDIDATE	FOR OFFICE
1	275	JAMES HERSON	United State Senator
2	103	ANDREW CARLSON	
3	20	MARGARET BILLINGTON	
4	10	WES REMISINGER	
5	1	Write-In	United State Representative District 3
6	301	HOLLY KESTREL	
7	65	CYNTHIA BRAZELL	
8	27	JOSEPH GARLAND	
9	0	Write-In	State Auditor
10	164	RACHEL ANDERSON	
11	190	PEDRO ARROYO	
12	30	BOB WESTERSON	
13	2	Write-In	State Rep. Dist. 025
14	340	LIAM GRELLS	
15	36	OLIVIA HUTTELS	
16	0	Write-In	
17	300	BRAD JENSEN	State Rep. Dist. 119
18	115	ELIAH PANGILLI	
19	0	Write-In	
20	282	HEATHER INGLES	
21	121	EMMA GEMKINS	Associate Circuit Judge
22	0	Write-In	
23	106	JORDAN DANIELS	
24	111	CHARLOTTE WILKINSON	
25	114	AMELIA FETTERMAN	Presiding Commissioner
26	4	Write-In	
27	209	BETHANY GILBERT	
28	04	JAMES MCKENZIE	
29	75	LUCAS CONSTELL	Clerk of the County Commission
30	12	Write-In	
31	204	RANDALL QUINCE	
32	217	AVA RINGER	
33	0	Write-In	Circuit Court Clerk
34	404	HAROLD HARRISON	
35	0	Write-In	
36	418	PRESTON WRIGHT	
37	0	Write-In	Recorder of Deeds
38	379	BLAKE JENKSTON	
39	4	Write-In	
40	401	JANET BECK	
41	6	Write-In	Treasurer
42			
43			
44			
45			Prosecuting Attorney
46			
47			
48			
49			Collector of Revenue
50			
51			
52			

Judge Initials: *AL PK ST*

TALLY BOOK ©2022-2023 HALL COUNTY, GEORGIA STATEMENT OF RETURNS - CANDIDATES - 1

75 Statement of Returns - Candidates; example of completed return

Copy Final Results to Statement of Returns

The Statement of Returns – Candidates and the Statement of Returns – Questions are in the Tally Book in the Poll Closing section.

The column numbers on the Results of Polling Place correspond to the Ballot ID numbers in the left column of the Statement of Returns.

Recording and Counting Judges copy the vote tallies from the Results of Polling Place to the corresponding Ballot ID on the Statement of Returns.

HOLE PUNCH

©2022-2023 Linda Rantz
Prepared for Cause of America MO 20221210

COUNTY
Freedom

POLLING PLACE
Liberty HS

RESULTS of POLLING PLACE

GROUP	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	
A # SUMMARY SHEETS	1	275	103	20	18	1	301	65	27	0	164	158
GROUP	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	
B # SUMMARY SHEETS	1	4	209	99	75	12	209	217	0	404	0	418

76 Results of Polling Place (example): screenshot of results written on the row for Group A

COUNTY	POLLING PLACE	ELECTION	ELECTION DATE
FREEDOM	LIBERTY HS	GENERAL	NOV. 8, 2022

STATEMENT OF RETURNS - CANDIDATES			
Statement of Returns – Candidates – We hereby certify that:			
BALLOT ID	VOTES CAST	FOR CANDIDATE:	FOR OFFICE OF:
1	275	JAMES HEIRSON	United State Senator
2	103	ANDREW CARLSON	
3	20	MARGARET BILLINGTON	
4	18	WES REMISINGER	
5	1	Write-in	United State Representative
6	301	HOLLY KESTREL	
7	65	CYNTHIA BRAZELL	

77 Statement of Returns - Candidates (example): screenshot showing totals copied from Results form

Sign the Certification of Statement of Returns

Four members of the counting team(s) sign the Certification of the Statement of Returns.

COUNTY	POLLING PLACE	ELECTION	ELECTION DATE
FREEDOM	LIBERTY HS	GENERAL	NOV. 8, 2022

CERTIFICATION OF STATEMENT OF RETURNS – CANDIDATES

We, the duly qualified and acting Judges of the polling place above-named, for the election above-named, held on the date above-named, in the county of Freedom, Missouri, do hereby certify that the foregoing pages of Statements of Returns for Candidates (initialed by us) and consisting of a total of 1 pages (excluding this certification), are a full and accurate return of all votes cast at this polling place for all candidates.

JUDGE
AFFILIATION
(CIRCLE ONE)

Signatures of Recording Judges

☒ REP ☐ DEM ☐ OTH	RECORDING JUDGE NAME PRINT: <u>Lana Vengell</u> RECORDING JUDGE SIGNATURE—SIGN WITH BLUE BALLPOINT PEN SIGN: <u>Lana Vengell</u>
☒ REP ☐ DEM ☐ OTH	RECORDING JUDGE NAME PRINT: <u>Burt Jenkins</u> RECORDING JUDGE SIGNATURE—SIGN WITH BLUE BALLPOINT PEN SIGN: <u>Burt Jenkins</u>

JUDGE
AFFILIATION
(CIRCLE ONE)

Signatures of Counting Judges

☐ REP ☒ DEM ☐ OTH	COUNTING JUDGE NAME PRINT: <u>Richmond Fields</u> COUNTING JUDGE SIGNATURE—SIGN WITH BLUE BALLPOINT PEN SIGN: <u>Richmond Fields</u>
☒ REP ☐ DEM ☐ OTH	COUNTING JUDGE NAME PRINT: <u>Simin Takava</u> COUNTING JUDGE SIGNATURE—SIGN WITH BLUE BALLPOINT PEN SIGN: <u>Simin Takava</u>

78 Statement of Returns (back page): example of Certification of Statement of Returns

Make a Duplicate Set of Statement of Returns and Certifications

Two copies of the Statement of Returns for Candidates and Questions and the Certifications signed by the Election Judges must be created. When ballots and other election items are returned to the Clerk, they are returned separately by Election Judges, each of whom will have a set of the Statement of Returns and Certifications.

Poll Closing Certification

COUNTY	POLLING PLACE	ELECTION	ELECTION DATE
FREEDOM	LIBERTY HS	GENERAL	NOV. 8, 2022

CERTIFICATION OF BALLOT COUNTS

After the poll has closed and the counting of votes cast is complete, the below-named Election Judges were present and certify as follows:

The number of ballots received at this polling place is 650

The number of identification certificates signed at this polling place is 432

The number of rejected ballots at this polling place is 4

The number of spoiled ballots at this polling place is 2

The number of ballots received at this polling place which were not cast at this election is 212

ELECTION JUDGE NAME (PRINT)	AUTHENTICATION [Circled Initials]	ELECTION JUDGE SIGNATURE
Claudia Buchanan	[Signature]	Claudia Buchanan
Ginger Sullivan	[Signature]	Ginger Sullivan
Richmond Fields	[Signature]	Richmond Fields
Andre Rees	[Signature]	Andre Rees
Betty Wishten	[Signature]	Betty Wishten
Simin Takava	[Signature]	Simin Takava
Harrison Besting	[Signature]	Harrison Besting
Lana Vegell	[Signature]	Lana Vaguell
	[Signature] NOV 08 2022	
	[Signature] NOV 08 2022	
	[Signature] NOV 08 2022	
	[Signature] NOV 08 2022	
	[Signature] NOV 08 2022	
	[Signature] NOV 08 2022	
	[Signature] NOV 08 2022	
	[Signature] NOV 08 2022	
	[Signature] NOV 08 2022	
	[Signature] NOV 08 2022	
	[Signature] NOV 08 2022	
	[Signature] NOV 08 2022	
	[Signature] NOV 08 2022	
	[Signature] NOV 08 2022	
	[Signature] NOV 08 2022	
	[Signature] NOV 08 2022	
	[Signature] NOV 08 2022	
	[Signature] NOV 08 2022	

(After all judges have signed, cross-out any unused name & signature rows. No additional judges necessary to sign if space runs out.)

TALLY BOOK
FD-222 (REVISED MAY 2016)
Please Print Name of Polling Place Official
CERTIFICATION OF BALLOT COUNTS

79 Certification of Ballot Count - example of completed certification

At 7 pm, or as soon as the final voter in line at 7 pm has cast their ballot, the polling place is considered closed.

Reconciling Ballot Quantities

The Counting Team determines the quantity of counted ballots (which includes Valid Write-in Ballots) and Rejected Ballots.

Certification of Ballot Counts

Working with the Supervisory Judges who determine the number of spoiled ballots and unused (not cast) ballots, they complete the top section of the Certification of Ballot Counts.

COUNTY	POLLING PLACE	ELECTION	ELECTION DATE
FREEDOM	LIBERTY HS	GENERAL	NOV. 8, 2022

CERTIFICATION OF BALLOT COUNTS

After the poll has closed and the counting of votes cast is complete, the below-named Election Judges were present and certify as follows:

The number of ballots received at this polling place is ;

The number of identification certificates signed at this polling place is ;

The number of rejected ballots at this polling place is ;

The number of spoiled ballots at this polling place is ;

The number of ballots received at this polling place which were not cast at this election is ;

80 Certification of Ballot Counts (example): ballot quantities entered


Signature of Election Judges at Closing of Polling Place

When all information has been entered into the Tally Book, all Election Judges present at the conclusion sign the Poll Closed Certification. There are spaces for 12 Election Judges, so if others are still present, they do not need to sign.

ELECTION JUDGE NAME (PRINT)	AFFILIATION (DEM • REP • OTH)	ELECTION JUDGE SIGNATURE
Claudia Buchanan	DEM	<i>Claudia Buchanan</i>
Ginger Sullivan	DEM	<i>Ginger Sullivan</i>
Richmond Fields	DEM	<i>Richmond Fields</i>
Andre Rees	DEM	<i>Andre Rees</i>
Betty Wishton	DEM	<i>Betty Wishton</i>
Simin Takava	DEM	<i>Simin Takava</i>
Harrison Besting	DEM	<i>Harrison Besting</i>
Lana Vegell	DEM	<i>Lana Vegell</i>
	DEM	
	DEM	
	DEM	
	DEM	

81 Certification of Ballot Counts (example): Election Judge signatures

Return Election Materials to the Clerk



Sort Ballots and Election Materials

Following the Clerk's instructions for returning ballots and other election materials by the Supervisory Judges, the Counting Team sorts as follows:

Group 1: Items to Return to Clerk

- All counted ballots (including Valid Write-In ballots) are organized as described on pg. 115.
- A duplicate set of Statement of Returns and Certifications as described on pg. 124.

Group 2: Items to Return to Clerk

- Tally Book (this contains copies of tally sheets, statements of returns, and certifications)

Group 3: Pack Supplies for Return to Clerk

- Repack any ballot boxes, the small table, and supplies.

Work with the Supervisory Judges to hand over Counting Team items.

[illegible]

Missouri statute 115.461 provides the requirements for a tally book and the information it must contain:

- Opening Certification of the number of ballots received at the polling place;
- Confirmation that the information on the Official Ballots is the same as the sample ballots;
- Closing Certification to include:
 - Number of ballots cast at the polling place
 - Number of identification certificates (voters)
 - Number of rejected ballots;
 - Number of spoiled ballots;
 - Number of ballots received but not cast
 - Signed by at least 4 Election Judges (2 DEM, 2 REP)

Also required are tally sheets for candidates and questions on the ballot and Statement of Returns for candidates and questions.

This section is being provided as a suggestion for how to put together a tally book for hand counting.

FORMS

Sample forms in this section, along with blank hand counting forms, can be downloaded from ReturntoHandCounting.com/Resources

Tally Book Sections

Tally Book Cover

Binder Cover: Tally Book

Note: Names used for persons in these samples are fictional and not intended to resemble any real person.

Polling Place:	
TALLY BOOK	
County:	
Election Date:	
Election:	

Reference: Missouri Statutes
115.461. Tally book, form of -- tally sheet, form of -- statements of returns, form of (paper ballots).
(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 12.035)
<https://revisor.mo.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.461>
115.459. Duties of judges after polls close (paper ballots).
(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 12.030)
<https://revisor.mo.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.459>

For any issues or questions, contact the Clerk:

Clerk Name
Clerk Phone Number

TALLY BOOK (REV 20230120) 1 ©2022-2023 LINDA RANTZ, PREPARED FOR CAUSE OF AMERICA MISSOURI

82 Tally Book: Cover Page with Clerk Contact Info

This cover sheet is intended for Tally Books that use a binder with a front cover pocket (see page 164 for example). If there is no front cover pocket, consider using this sheet as the first page inside the Tally Book because it includes contact information for the clerk.

Section: Polling Place Opening

Section Divider: Polling Place Opening

Note: Names used for persons in these samples are fictional. Any resemblance to actual persons is purely coincidental.

SECTION: POLLING PLACE OPENING

Includes:

Opening Certification & Election Judges Sign-In
Enter the number of ballots received at the polling place.
Election Judges present when the polling place is opened write their names, select their political party affiliation, sign, and initial.

Signatures of Additional Election Judges at Opening of Poll
If more Election Judges are present at the opening of the polling place than number of lines on the Opening Certification, then those additional judges enter their information on this sheet.

Election Judges Arriving After the Polling Place Opened
For Election Judges who start after the Polling Place opened, they enter their information on this sheet. (The reason is that these judges were not present when the number of ballots received at the Polling Place was certified.)

TALLY BOOK LAYOUT SAMPLE (REV 20250117) ©2022-2025 LINDA RAWITZ

83 Tally Book Sample: Section Divider - Polling Place Opening

It is recommended that sections of the Tally Book be divided with a cardstock-style divider (see page 164 for an example of a cost-effective idea for converting legal file folders into dividers). The purpose of paper section dividers is to have a list of the forms in each section.

Opening Certification & Election Judges Sign-In

COUNTY	POLLING PLACE	ELECTION	ELECTION DATE

REV 12/10/2022

OPENING CERTIFICATION & ELECTION JUDGES SIGN-IN

At opening of the polling place, the below-named Election Judges were sworn in as the law directs before beginning their duties.

We hereby certify that:

The number of ballots received at this polling place is

The information on the official ballots received at this polling place is the same as the information on the sample ballots received at this polling place.

ELECTION JUDGE NAME (PRINT)	AFFILIATION (CIRCLE ONE)	ELECTION JUDGE SIGNATURE	INITIALS
	REP DEM OTH		
	REP DEM OTH		
	REP DEM OTH		
	REP DEM OTH		
	REP DEM OTH		
	REP DEM OTH		
	REP DEM OTH		
	REP DEM OTH		
	REP DEM OTH		
	REP DEM OTH		
	REP DEM OTH		
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	REP DEM OTH		
	REP DEM OTH		
	REP DEM OTH		
	REP DEM OTH		
	REP DEM OTH		
	REP DEM OTH		
	REP DEM OTH		
	REP DEM OTH		
	REP DEM OTH		

After all judges have signed, cross out any unused name & signature rows. If more rows needed, attach an extra page.

☐ The Election Judges who have signed above represent ALL those who were present when the Polling Place was opened.
☐ An additional signature page for Election Judges is attached.

84 Tally Book: Opening Certification & Election Judges Sign-In

It is recommended to use this separate sign-in sheet for all election judges present at the opening of the polling place. This practice would provide essential information regarding which election judges were involved with the certification of ballots received at the polling place and other poll opening duties.

COUNTY	POLLING PLACE	ELECTION	ELECTION DATE

REV 12/10/2022

ADDITIONAL ELECTION JUDGES AT OPENING OF POLL

At opening of the polling place, the additional below-named Election Judges were sworn in as the law directs before beginning their duties.

ELECTION JUDGE NAME (PRINT)	AFFILIATION (CIRCLE ONE)	ELECTION JUDGE SIGNATURE	INITIALS
	REP DEM OTH		
	REP DEM OTH		
	REP DEM OTH		
	REP DEM OTH		
	REP DEM OTH		
	REP DEM OTH		
	REP DEM OTH		
	REP DEM OTH		
	REP DEM OTH		
	REP DEM OTH		
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	REP DEM OTH		
	REP DEM OTH		
	REP DEM OTH		
	REP DEM OTH		
	REP DEM OTH		
	REP DEM OTH		
	REP DEM OTH		
	REP DEM OTH		
	REP DEM OTH		
	REP DEM OTH		

☐ The Election Judges who have signed above represent those who were also present when the Polling Place was opened.

TALLY BOOK
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CERTIFICATION & SIGN-IN

This sign-in sheet is used if more election judges are in attendance when the poll is open than lines for sign-in on the Opening Certification & Election Judges Sign-In form (see page 133).

[illegible]

This form is not required by statute, but it is suggested that election judges who arrive after the poll opens sign in on a separate form. The reason is that if there are any post-election questions about circumstances at a polling place, the sign-in sheets will identify which election judges were present when the poll opened or after it opened.

Section: Polling Place Closing

Section Divider: Polling Place Closing

Note: Names used for persons in these samples are fictional. Any resemblance to actual persons is purely coincidental.

SECTION: POLLING PLACE CLOSING

Includes:

Certification of Ballot Counts

Election Judges count the number of ballots (quantities) and complete the certification form.

Results / Polling Place

After all ballots have been counted, the Ballots Tally row totals have been copied to the Batches Summary, and the totals of the Batches Summary are copied to this form.

Statement of Returns – Candidates

The form is pre-filled by the Clerk prior to Election Day with the name, office, and Ballot ID for each candidate appearing on ballots in the county (including write-in lines).

When hand counting is complete, the total votes cast for each candidate are recorded and the form is initialed.

Certification of Statement of Returns – Candidates

When the Statement of Returns for Candidates is completed and initialed, the Election Judges sign the Certification.

Statement of Returns – Questions

The form is pre-filled by the Clerk prior to Election Day with each question appearing on ballots in the county.

When hand counting is complete, the total votes cast for each question are recorded and the form is initialed.

Certification of Statement of Returns – Questions

The **last hand counting task** at the Polling Place for Election Judges is to sign the Statement of Returns Certification.

Where the form states, "consisting of a total of ____ pages", this is the combined page count of Statement of Returns for Candidates and Questions.

TALLY BOOK LAYOUT SAMPLE (REV 20250117)

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87 Tally Book: Section for Polling Place Closing procedures

It is recommended that sections of the Tally Book be divided with a cardstock-style divider (see page 164 for an example of a cost-effective idea for converting legal file folders into dividers). The purpose of paper section dividers is to have a list of the forms in each section.

Certification of Ballot Counts

COUNTY	POLLING PLACE	ELECTION	ELECTION DATE

CERTIFICATION OF BALLOT COUNTS

After the poll has closed and the counting of votes cast is complete, the below-named Election Judges were present and certify as follows:

The number of ballots received at this polling place is ;

The number of identification certificates signed at this polling place is ;

The number of rejected ballots at this polling place is ;

The number of spoiled ballots at this polling place is ;

The number of ballots received at this polling place which were not cast at this election is ;

ELECTION JUDGE NAME (PRINT)	AFFILIATION (CIRCLE ONE)	ELECTION JUDGE SIGNATURE
	REP DEM OTH	
	REP DEM OTH	
	REP DEM OTH	
	REP DEM OTH	
	REP DEM OTH	
	REP DEM OTH	
	REP DEM OTH	
	REP DEM OTH	
	REP DEM OTH	
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	REP DEM OTH	
	REP DEM OTH	
	REP DEM OTH	
	REP DEM OTH	
	REP DEM OTH	
	REP DEM OTH	
	REP DEM OTH	

After all judges have signed, cross out any unused name & signature rows. No additional judges necessary to sign if space runs out.

TALLY BOOK

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PREPARED FOR COURT OF AMERICA MISSOURI

CERTIFICATION - QUESTIONS

88 Tally Book: Certification of Ballot Counts

This form is used when the polling place is opened to record the number of blank ballots received before the poll opening. When the polling place is closed, per statute, the quantity of ballots is recorded. It is not required by statute that the election judges present when the poll is closed “sign out,” but it is recommended to assist with any post-election review.

Results of Polling Place worksheet (front page)

FRONT PAGE

82002-2001 1st Page
Prepared for County of Santa Clara
JAN 14 2008 10:00 AM

NOE
PUNCH

RESULTS of POLLING PLACE

GROUP	NOE PUNCH										COUNTING LOCATION										ELECTION DATE		JURY		WHEN FINAL REP		WHEN FINAL DEM																								
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	
GROUP A	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25																										
GROUP B	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50																										
GROUP C	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75																										
GROUP D	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100																										
GROUP E	101	102	103	104	105	106	107	108	109	110	111	112	113	114	115	116	117	118	119	120	121	122	123	124	125																										
GROUP F	126	127	128	129	130	131	132	133	134	135	136	137	138	139	140	141	142	143	144	145	146	147	148	149	150																										
GROUP G	151	152	153	154	155	156	157	158	159	160	161	162	163	164	165	166	167	168	169	170	171	172	173	174	175																										
GROUP H	176	177	178	179	180	181	182	183	184	185	186	187	188	189	190	191	192	193	194	195	196	197	198	199	200																										
GROUP Q.A	Q.1	Q.2	Q.3	Q.4	Q.5	Q.6	Q.7	Q.8	Q.9	Q.10	Q.11	Q.12	Q.13	Q.14	Q.15	Q.16	Q.17	Q.18	Q.19	Q.20	Q.21	Q.22	Q.23	Q.24	Q.25																										
GROUP Q.B	Q.26	Q.27	Q.28	Q.29	Q.30	Q.31	Q.32	Q.33	Q.34	Q.35	Q.36	Q.37	Q.38	Q.39	Q.40	Q.41	Q.42	Q.43	Q.44	Q.45	Q.46	Q.47	Q.48	Q.49	Q.50																										

89 RESULTS of Polling Place, front side showing totals of vote tallies

This form is the third step of the Ballots, Batches, Results process (see page 55). After all ballots have been counted and all totals recorded on the Batches Summary Sheets, the election results are recorded on this worksheet.

HOLE PUNCH

HOLE PUNCH

HOLE PUNCH

RESULTS of POLLING PLACE

©2022, 2023 Iowa State Prepared for State of Iowa - Missouri

When the results from all Batches Summary sheets are finalized, totaled and entered on this Results page, Recording and Counting Judges sign this Results / Polling Place sheet.

JUDGE AFFILIATION (CIRCLE ONE)

RECORDING JUDGE NAME

PRINT:

REP

DEM

OTH

SIGNATURE AFTER BATCH COMPLETED—SIGN WITH BLUE BALLPOINT PEN

SIGN:

JUDGE AFFILIATION (CIRCLE ONE)

RECORDING JUDGE NAME

PRINT:

REP

DEM

OTH

SIGNATURE AFTER BATCH COMPLETED—SIGN WITH BLUE BALLPOINT PEN

SIGN:

JUDGE AFFILIATION (CIRCLE ONE)

COUNTING JUDGE NAME

PRINT:

REP

DEM

OTH

SIGNATURE AFTER BATCH COMPLETED—SIGN WITH BLUE BALLPOINT PEN

SIGN:

JUDGE AFFILIATION (CIRCLE ONE)

COUNTING JUDGE NAME

PRINT:

REP

DEM

OTH

SIGNATURE AFTER BATCH COMPLETED—SIGN WITH BLUE BALLPOINT PEN

SIGN:

90 RESULTS of Polling Place, back side of the page for Election Judges signatures

The back page of the Results of Polling Place worksheet is for the signatures of the election judges. For protection against identity theft, no signatures of election judges are on the front page of any forms. The clerk can scan and post the election results without redacting signatures.

BACK
PAGE

Section: Polling Place Closing

139

Statement of Returns – Candidates (1 – 50) – 2 copies

COUNTY	POLLING PLACE	ELECTION	ELECTION DATE

STATEMENT OF RETURNS - CANDIDATES

Statement of Returns – Candidates – We hereby certify that:

BALLOT ID	VOTES CAST:	FOR CANDIDATE:	FOR OFFICE OF:
1			
2			
3			
4			
5			
6			
7			
8			
9			
10			
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49			
50			

Judge Initials: _____

TALLY BOOK
© 2022-2023 LINDA RANNEY
PREPARED FOR COURT OF AMERICA MISSOURI
STATEMENT OF RETURNS: CANDIDATES - 1

91 Statement of Returns - Candidates (Ballot ID 1-25)

Before the election, the Clerk completes the Statement of Returns for Candidates except the results column. The ID number assigned to the candidate and used on other forms is created from this form. When polls are closed, the candidate totals from the Results of Polling Place are entered on this form. A statement of returns is required by Missouri law. This version is an example of a form for hand counting.

Statement of Returns – Candidates (51 – 100) – 2 copies

COUNTY	POLLING PLACE	ELECTION	ELECTION DATE

Statement of Returns – Candidates – We hereby certify that:

Ballot ID	VOTES CAST:	FOR CANDIDATE:	FOR OFFICE OF:
51			
52			
53			
54			
55			
56			
57			
58			
59			
60			
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98			
99			
100			

Judge Initials: _____

TALLY BOOK
©2022-2023 LINCOLN RAINIER
PREPARED FOR CAUSE OF AMERICA-MISSOURI
STATEMENT OF RETURNS: CANDIDATES - 2

92 Statement of Returns - Candidates (Ballot ID 51-100), if needed

Each page of the Statement of Returns can accommodate 50 candidate names, including blanks for write-in candidates. Additional sheets of the Statement of Returns are created if more candidate line items are needed in an election.

Certification of Statement of Returns – Candidates – 2 copies

COUNTY	POLLING PLACE	ELECTION	ELECTION DATE

CERTIFICATION OF STATEMENT OF RETURNS – CANDIDATES

We, the duly qualified and acting Judges of the polling place above-named, for the election above-named, held on the date above-named, in the county of _____, Missouri, do hereby certify that the foregoing pages of Statements of Returns for Candidates (initialed by us) and consisting of a total of _____ pages (excluding this certification), are a full and accurate return of all votes cast at this polling place for all candidates.

JUDGE
AFFILIATION
(CIRCLE ONE)

Signatures of Recording Judges

JUDGE
AFFILIATION
(CIRCLE ONE)

Signatures of Counting Judges

REP DEM OTH	RECORDING JUDGE NAME PRINT:	REP DEM OTH	COUNTING JUDGE NAME PRINT:
	RECORDING JUDGE SIGNATURE—SIGN WITH BLUE BALLPOINT PEN SIGN:	COUNTING JUDGE SIGNATURE—SIGN WITH BLUE BALLPOINT PEN SIGN:	
REP DEM OTH	RECORDING JUDGE NAME PRINT:	REP DEM OTH	COUNTING JUDGE NAME PRINT:
	RECORDING JUDGE SIGNATURE—SIGN WITH BLUE BALLPOINT PEN SIGN:	COUNTING JUDGE SIGNATURE—SIGN WITH BLUE BALLPOINT PEN SIGN:	

TALLY BOOK

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PREPARED FOR CAUSE OF AMERICA-MISSOURI

CERTIFICATION - CANDIDATES

93 Certification of Statement of Returns for Candidates

The back page of the Statement of Returns is for the signatures of the election judges. For protection against identity theft, no signatures of election judges are on the front page of any forms. The clerk can scan and post the election results without redacting signatures.

Statement of Returns – Questions (Q.1 – Q.50) – 2 copies

COUNTY	POLLING PLACE	ELECTION	ELECTION DATE

STATEMENT OF RETURNS - QUESTIONS

Statement of Returns – Questions – We hereby certify that:

Ballot ID	VOTES CAST:	FOR OR AGAINST:	FOR QUESTION:
Q. 1		For (YES)	
Q. 2		Against (NO)	
Q. 3		For (YES)	
Q. 4		Against (NO)	
Q. 5		For (YES)	
Q. 6		Against (NO)	
Q. 7		For (YES)	
Q. 8		Against (NO)	
Q. 9		For (YES)	
Q. 10		Against (NO)	
Q. 11		For (YES)	
Q. 12		Against (NO)	
Q. 13		For (YES)	
Q. 14		Against (NO)	
Q. 15		For (YES)	
Q. 16		Against (NO)	
Q. 17		For (YES)	
Q. 18		Against (NO)	
Q. 19		For (YES)	
Q. 20		Against (NO)	
Q. 21		For (YES)	
Q. 22		Against (NO)	
Q. 23		For (YES)	
Q. 24		Against (NO)	
Q. 25		For (YES)	
Q. 26		Against (NO)	
Q. 27		For (YES)	
Q. 28		Against (NO)	
Q. 29		For (YES)	
Q. 30		Against (NO)	
Q. 31		For (YES)	
Q. 32		Against (NO)	
Q. 33		For (YES)	
Q. 34		Against (NO)	
Q. 35		For (YES)	
Q. 36		Against (NO)	
Q. 37		For (YES)	
Q. 38		Against (NO)	
Q. 39		For (YES)	
Q. 40		Against (NO)	
Q. 41		For (YES)	
Q. 42		Against (NO)	
Q. 43		For (YES)	
Q. 44		Against (NO)	
Q. 45		For (YES)	
Q. 46		Against (NO)	
Q. 47		For (YES)	
Q. 48		Against (NO)	
Q. 49		For (YES)	
Q. 50		Against (NO)	

Judges Initials: _____

TALLY BOOK
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PREPARED FOR COURT OF AMERICA MISSOURI
STATEMENT OF RETURNS: QUESTIONS - 1

94 Statement of Returns - Questions (Ballot ID Q.1 to Q.50)

The Statement of Returns for Questions completed by the Clerk, except the results column, before the election sets the ID number for questions and is preceded with a “Q.” When polls are closed, the Results of Polling Place) totals are entered on this form. A statement of returns is required by Missouri law. This version is an example of a form for hand counting. Additional sheets are created if more than 50 Question line items are needed in an election.

Certification of Returns – Questions – 2 copies

COUNTY	POLLING PLACE	ELECTION	ELECTION DATE

CERTIFICATION OF STATEMENT OF RETURNS – QUESTIONS

We, the duly qualified and acting Judges of the polling place above-named, for the election above-named, held on the date above-named, in the county of _____, Missouri, do hereby certify that the foregoing pages of Statements of Returns for Questions (initialed by us) and consisting of a total of _____ pages (excluding this certification), are a full and accurate return of all votes cast at this polling place for and against all questions.

JUDGE
AFFILIATION
(CIRCLE ONE)

Signatures of Recording Judges

RECORDING JUDGE NAME PRINT: RECORDING JUDGE SIGNATURE—SIGN WITH BLUE BALLPOINT PEN SIGN:	
REP DEM OTH	

JUDGE
AFFILIATION
(CIRCLE ONE)

Signatures of Counting Judges

COUNTING JUDGE NAME PRINT: COUNTING JUDGE SIGNATURE—SIGN WITH BLUE BALLPOINT PEN SIGN:	
REP DEM OTH	

RECORDING JUDGE NAME PRINT: RECORDING JUDGE SIGNATURE—SIGN WITH BLUE BALLPOINT PEN SIGN:	
REP DEM OTH	

COUNTING JUDGE NAME PRINT: COUNTING JUDGE SIGNATURE—SIGN WITH BLUE BALLPOINT PEN SIGN:	
REP DEM OTH	

Ver 20221210

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PREPARED FOR CAUSE OF AMERICA-MISSOURI
CERTIFICATION - QUESTIONS

95 Certification of Statement of Returns for Questions

The back page of the Statement of Returns is for the signatures of the election judges. For protection against identity theft, no signatures of election judges are on the front page of any forms. The clerk can scan and post the election results without redacting signatures.

Section: Group A

Section Divider: Group A

Note: Names used for persons in these samples are fictional. Any resemblance to actual persons is purely coincidental.

SECTION: GROUP A

Includes:

Batches Summary for Group A

Each Batches Summary sheet can record 18 batches. Based on Clerk's expectations, as many copies of this form as needed (plus some extra) should be printed, hole-punched, and placed in the Tally Book.

After the totals from a Ballots Tally form are entered on the Batches Summary, the Recording Election Judges initial the front and sign the back of the Ballots Tally. The "official" version of the Ballots Tally is then placed behind the Batches Summary sheet.

Note: The "unofficial" version of the Ballots Tally form is binder-clipped to the ballots that were tallied and placed in the secure holding place for counted ballots.

TALLY BOOK LAYOUT SAMPLE (REV 20250117) ©2022-2025 LINDA RABITZ

96 Tally Book: Section Divider - Group A for Candidates; this group covers Ballot IDs 1-25

Group A is shown here as an example. It will include the Batches Summary Sheet for candidates with IDs 1 through 25. Repeat this section for other candidate groups, such as Group B, Group C, etc.

FRONT
PAGE

97 Batches Summary - Group A for Candidates (front page with row totals)

146

Batches Summary sheet – Group A (back page)

NOLE
PUNCH

NOLE
PUNCH

NOLE
PUNCH

A

BATCHES SUMMARY

© 2022-2023 Local Board Prepared for the County of Arapahoe, Colorado

JUDGE
AFFILIATION
(CIRCLE ONE)

Signatures of Recording Judges	
At the completion of each Ballots Tally, the totals are entered onto this Batches Summary. When counting of ballots is completed and all Ballots Tally sheets are recorded on this Summary, Recording Judges sign this Batches Summary sheet.	
RECORDING JUDGE NAME	PRINT:
REP DEM OTH	RECORDING JUDGE SIGNATURE AFTER MATCH COMPLETED – SIGN WITH BLUE BALLPOINT PEN SIGN:
RECORDING JUDGE NAME	
PRINT:	
REP DEM OTH	RECORDING JUDGE SIGNATURE AFTER MATCH COMPLETED – SIGN WITH BLUE BALLPOINT PEN SIGN:

BACK
PAGE

98 Batches Summary - Group A for Candidates (back page for Election Judge signatures)

The back page of the Batches Summary sheets is for the signatures of the election judges. For protection against identity theft, no signatures of election judges are on the front page of any forms. The clerk can scan and post the election results without redacting signatures.

FRONT
PAGE

99 Ballots Tally - Group A for Candidates (front page for tallying ballots)

Tally Book Layout

Ballots Tally form – Group A (back page)

NOE
PAGE

BALLOTS TALLY

NOE
PAGE

NOE
PAGE

NOE
PAGE

A

BATCH #

JUDGE AFFILIATION (CIRCLE ONE)	Signatures of Recording Judges When batch of ballots being tallied is complete, Recording Judges compare their tallies. The recording judges must agree on the final count and decide which sheet to submit as "official." The Recording Judges sign both tally sheets.
DEM	RECORDING JUDGE NAME PRINT:
REP	RECORDING JUDGE SIGNATURE AFTER BATCH COMPLETED—SIGN WITH BLUE BALLPOINT PEN SIGN:
OTH	RECORDING JUDGE NAME PRINT:
DEM	RECORDING JUDGE SIGNATURE AFTER BATCH COMPLETED—SIGN WITH BLUE BALLPOINT PEN SIGN:
REP	
OTH	

BACK
PAGE

100 Ballots Tally - Group A for Candidates (back page for Election Judge signatures)

The back page of the Ballots Tally form is for the signatures of the election judges. For protection against identity theft, no signatures of election judges are on the front page of any forms. The clerk can scan and post the election results without redacting signatures.

Other Group sections for Candidates on the Ballot

Every “group” of candidates is 25 line-items on a ballot (including write-ins). Each line is identified with a unique Ballot ID.

For example, if there are over 50 line-items but less than 75, create sections in the Tally Book for Group B and Group C.

- Group A is 1 to 25
- Group B is 26 to 50
- Group C is 51 to 75
- And so on, for as many as needed.

Section: Group Q.A

Section Divider: Group Q.A

Note: Names used for persons in these samples are fictional. Any resemblance to actual persons is purely coincidental.

SECTION: GROUP Q.A

Includes:

Batches Summary for Group Q.A

Each Batches Summary sheet can record 18 batches. Based on Clerk's expectations, as many copies of this form as needed (plus some extra) should be printed, hole-punched, and placed in the Tally Book.

After the totals from a Ballots Tally form are entered on the Batches Summary, the Recording Election Judges initial the front and sign the back of the Ballots Tally. The "official" version of the Ballots Tally is then placed behind the Batches Summary sheet.

Note: The "unofficial" version of the Ballots Tally form is binder-clipped to the ballots that were tallied and placed in the secure holding place for counted ballots.

TALLY BOOK LAYOUT SAMPLE (REV 20250117)

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101 Tally Book: Section Divider - Group Q.A for Questions this group covers Ballot IDs Q.1 to Q.25

Group Q.A is shown here as an example. It will include the Batches Summary Sheet for questions with IDs Q.1 through Q.25. Repeat this section for other Question groups, such as Group Q.B, Group Q.C, etc.

FRONT
PAGE

102 Batches Summary - Group Q.A for Questions (front page with row totals)

152

JUDGE
PRINT
JUDGE
PRINT

Q.A BATES SUMMARY

© 2022-2023 Universal Prepared by Eugene A. Bennett, Missouri

JUDGE Affirmation (CIRCLE ONE)		Signatures of Recording Judges		
	At the completion of each Ballots Tally, the totals are entered onto this Batches Summary. When counting of ballots is completed and all Ballots Tally sheets are recorded on this Summary, Recording Judges sign this Batches Summary sheet.			
		RECORDING JUDGES SIGNATURE AFTER MATCH COMPLETED— SIGN WITH BLUE BALLPOINT PEN		
		SIGN:		
		RECORDING JUDGES NAME		
		PRINT:		
		RECORDING JUDGES SIGNATURE AFTER MATCH COMPLETED— SIGN WITH BLUE BALLPOINT PEN		
		SIGN:		
		RECORDING JUDGES NAME		
		PRINT:		
		RECORDING JUDGES SIGNATURE AFTER MATCH COMPLETED— SIGN WITH BLUE BALLPOINT PEN		
		SIGN:		

REP	
DEM	
OTH	

REP	
DEM	
OTH	

BACK
PAGE

The back page of the Batches Summary sheets is for the signatures of the election judges. For protection against identity theft, no signatures of election judges are on the front page of any forms. The clerk can scan and post the election results without redacting signatures.

FRONT
PAGE

104 Ballots Tally - Group Q.A for Questions (front page for tallying ballots)

Tally Book Layout

[illegible]

**BACK
PAGE**

The back page of the Ballots Tally form is for the signatures of the election judges. For protection against identity theft, no signatures of election judges are on the front page of any forms. The clerk can scan and post the election results without redacting signatures.

Other Group Sections for Additional Questions

Every “group” of questions is 25 line items on a ballot. Each line is identified with a unique Ballot ID.

For example, if there are more than 25 line items but less than 50, create an additional section in the Tally Book for Group Q.B.

- Group Q.A is Q.1 to Q.25
- Group Q.B is Q.26 to Q.50
- And so on, for as many as needed.

Section: Challengers & Watchers

Section Divider: Challengers & Watchers

Note: Names used for persons in these samples are fictional. Any resemblance to actual persons is purely coincidental.

SECTION: CHALLENGERS & WATCHERS

Includes:

Sign in sheets for Watchers & Challengers

TALLY BOOK LAYOUT SAMPLE (REV 20250117)

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106 Section Divider for Challengers & Watchers

This section is suggested for collecting information for Challengers and Watchers.

Challengers & Watchers Check-In

[illegible]

107 Challengers & Watchers – List kept by Election Judges, signed by Election Judges

Challengers and Watchers must take and sign an oath⁹ but are not required to “sign in.” This form is suggested for Election Judges who witness the oath to complete.

⁹ Oath: Watchers and Challengers: RsMO 115.109 [Perma.cc/WA3V-5AM9](https://perma.cc/WA3V-5AM9)

Section: Oaths

Section Divider: Oaths

Note: Names used for persons in these samples are fictional. Any resemblance to actual persons is purely coincidental.

SECTION: OATHS

Oaths

Oath of Election Judges

(L 1977 H.B. 101 § 3.030)
https://revisor.mo.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115_091

I solemnly swear that I will impartially discharge the duties of judge according to law, to the best of my ability and that I will not disclose how any voter has voted unless I am required to do so as a witness in a proper judicial proceeding. I also affirm that I will not allow any person to vote who is not entitled to vote and that I will make no statement nor give any information of any kind tending in any way to show the state of the count prior to the close of the polls on election day.

Oath of Challengers and Watchers

(L 1977 H.B. 101 § 4.015)
https://revisor.mo.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115_109

I do solemnly swear that I will make no statement nor give any information of any kind tending in any way to show the state of the count prior to the close of the polls on election day.

Oath for HS students, and those supervising HS Students

(L 1994 S.B. 632, A.L. 2014 H.B. 1136)
https://revisor.mo.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115_104

I solemnly swear or affirm that I will impartially discharge the duties of a Missouri youth election participant by following to the best of my ability the instructions of any election judge, election authority, or teacher of my school. I also swear or affirm that I will not disclose how any voter has voted unless I am told to do so by an election judge, election authority, or a court of law in a proper judicial proceeding. I also swear or affirm that I will make no statement nor give any information of any kind tending in any way to show the state of the count of votes prior to the close of the polls on election day, nor will I make any statement during the conduct of my duties which tends to show my preferences for any issue or candidate involved in the election.

TALLY BOOK LAYOUT SAMPLE (REV 20250117) ©2022-2025 LINDA RAWTZ

108 Section Divider for Oaths (for quick reference)

This section divider suggests gathering the different oaths into a single place. This should make it easier for election judges at the polling place to locate oaths and oath forms quickly.

Oaths of Election Judges and other

Oaths

Oath of Election Judges

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 3.030)
<https://revisor.mo.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.091>

I solemnly swear that I will impartially discharge the duties of judge according to law, to the best of my ability and that I will not disclose how any voter has voted unless I am required to do so as a witness in a proper judicial proceeding. I also affirm that I will not allow any person to vote who is not entitled to vote and that I will make no statement nor give any information of any kind tending in any way to show the state of the count prior to the close of the polls on election day.

Oath of Challengers and Watchers

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 4.015)
<https://revisor.mo.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.109>

I do solemnly swear that I will make no statement nor give any information of any kind tending in any way to show the state of the count prior to the close of the polls on election day.

Oath for HS students, and those supervising HS Students

(L. 1994 S.B. 632, A.L. 2014 H.B. 1136)
<https://revisor.mo.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.104>

I solemnly swear or affirm that I will impartially discharge the duties of a Missouri youth election participant by following to the best of my ability the instructions of any election judge, election authority, or teacher of my school. I also swear or affirm that I will not disclose how any voter has voted unless I am told to do so by an election judge, election authority, or a court of law in a proper judicial proceeding. I also swear or affirm that I will make no statement nor give any information of any kind tending in any way to show the state of the count of votes prior to the close of the polls on election day, nor will I make any statement during the conduct of my duties which tends to show my preferences for any issue or candidate involved in the election.

109 Oaths that are taken at the polling place

This page is a suggestion for having oaths in an easy-to-find location. This section should contain blank copies of oaths that the appropriate persons can sign.

Section: Sample Ballots

Section Divider: Sample Ballots

Note: Names used for persons in these samples are fictional. Any resemblance to actual persons is purely coincidental.

SECTION:
SAMPLE BALLOT(S)

Includes:

Copy of all ballot versions that will be used at the polling place.
Election Judges are to compare the sample ballots to the Statement of Returns to ensure candidate and question identification numbers match.

TALLY BOOK LAYOUT SAMPLE (REV 20250117) ©2022-2025 LINDA RAWITZ

110 Tally Book Section Divider: Sample Ballots

It is suggested that this section contain sample copies of all ballots which will be used at the polling place. Before beginning hand counting, election judges should review the ballots to check for irregularities.

Sample Ballot: Front Page (Candidates)

FRONT
PAGE

MOCK BALLOT GENERAL ELECTION FREEDOM COUNTY		JUDGES' INITIALS	
INSTRUCTIONS TO VOTERS → Use ink to mark the ballot. No pencils. → Indicate your preference by making a "distinguishing mark." For example: ☐ ☒ ☐ ☐ → Write-in: To vote for a valid write-in candidate, indicate your preference with a distinguishing mark and write the person's name on the line provided. → Questions on the ballot: If you are in favor of the submitted question, mark "YES". If you are opposed to a submitted question, mark "NO". → Mistakes: If you spoil your ballot, return it to the election judge to receive a new ballot. → Numbers in Left Columns: Small numbers in left column are assigned numerically and used when ballots are tallied. REPUBLICAN (REP) DEMOCRAT (DEM) LIBERTARIAN (LIB) CONSTITUTION (CST)		STATE REP. DIST. 025 Vote For One 31 ☐ LIAM GRELLS REP 32 ☐ OLIVIA HUTTELS DEM 33 ☐ _____ WRITE IN	
FOR UNITED STATES SENATOR Vote For One 1 ☐ JAMES HEIRSON REP 2 ☐ ANDREW CARLSON DEM 3 ☐ MARGARET BILLINGTON LIB 4 ☐ WES REMISINGER CST 5 ☐ _____ WRITE IN		FOR STATE REP. DISTRICT 119 Vote For One 34 ☐ BRAD JENSEN REP 35 ☐ ELIJAH PANCILLI LIB 36 ☐ _____ WRITE IN	
FOR UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE DISTRICT 3 Vote For One 6 ☐ HOLLY KESTREL REP 7 ☐ CYNTHIA BRAZELL DEM 8 ☐ JOSEPH GARLAND LIB 9 ☐ _____ WRITE IN		FOR ASSOCIATE CIRCUIT JUDGE Vote For One 37 ☐ HEATHER INGLES REP 38 ☐ EMMA GENKINS DEM 39 ☐ _____ WRITE IN	
FOR STATE AUDITOR Vote For One 10 ☐ RACHEL ANDERSON REP 11 ☐ PEDRO ARROYO DEM 12 ☐ BOB WESTERSON LIB 13 ☐ _____ WRITE IN		FOR PRESIDING COMMISSIONER Vote For One 40 ☐ JORDAN DANIELS REP 41 ☐ CHARLOTTE WILKINSON DEM 42 ☐ AMELIA FETTERMAN LIB 43 ☐ _____ WRITE IN	
		FOR CLERK OF THE COUNTY COMMISSION Vote For One 44 ☐ BETHANY GILBERT REP 45 ☐ JAMES MCKENZIE DEM 46 ☐ LUCAS CONSTELL CST 47 ☐ _____ WRITE IN	
		FOR CIRCUIT COURT CLERK Vote For One 48 ☐ RANDALL QUINCE REP 49 ☐ AVA RINCER DEM 50 ☐ _____ WRITE IN	
		FOR RECORDER OF DEEDS Vote For One 51 ☐ HAROLD HARRISON DEM 52 ☐ _____ WRITE IN	
		FOR TREASURER Vote For One 53 ☐ PRESTON WRIGHT REP 54 ☐ _____ WRITE IN	
		FOR PROSECUTING ATTORNEY Vote For One 55 ☐ BLAKE JENSTON REP 56 ☐ _____ WRITE IN	
		FOR COLLECTOR OF REVENUE Vote For One 57 ☐ JANET BECK REP 58 ☐ _____ WRITE IN	
Test Version 20221207v1		TURN BALLOT OVER	

111 Sample of Ballot Layout - Front Side (Candidates)

This is a sample of the mock ballot used in hand count training (front side).

Sample Ballot: Back Page (Questions)

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT NO. 1 Proposed by the 101st General Assembly (First Regular Session) HCS HJR 35 Do you want to amend the Missouri Constitution to: • Allow • Allow State governmental entities estimate 151 ☐ YES 152 ☐ NO If you are in favor of the question, place an X in the box opposite 'YES'. If you are opposed to the question, place an X in the box opposite 'NO'.	CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT NO. 4 Proposed by the 101st General Assembly (Second Regular Session) SS2 SJR 38 Shall the Missouri Constitution be amended to authorize State and local entities estimate 155 ☐ YES 156 ☐ NO If you are in favor of the question, place an X in the box opposite 'YES'. If you are opposed to the question, place an X in the box opposite 'NO'.	OFFICIAL JUDICIAL BALLOT Submitting to the voters whether the Judges named below, whose terms expire December 31, 2022, shall be retained in office for new terms VOTE ON EACH JUDGE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT JUDGES Shall Judge MADELAINE WRIGHT of the Missouri Supreme Court be retained in office? 111 ☐ YES 112 ☐ NO If you are in favor of the question, place an X in the box opposite 'YES'. If you are opposed to the question, place an X in the box opposite 'NO'. Shall Judge VINCENT STANGER of the Missouri Supreme Court be retained in office? 113 ☐ YES 114 ☐ NO If you are in favor of the question, place an X in the box opposite 'YES'. If you are opposed to the question, place an X in the box opposite 'NO'.
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT NO. #3 Proposed by Initiative Petition Do you want to amend the Missouri Constitution to: • Remove ... • Require ... • Allow ... • Establish ... • Issue ... • Impose ... State governmental entities 153 ☐ YES 154 ☐ NO If you are in favor of the question, place an X in the box opposite 'YES'. If you are opposed to the question, place an X in the box opposite 'NO'.	CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT NO. 5 Proposed by the 101st General Assembly (Second Regular Session) HJR 116 Shall the Missouri National Guard State governmental entities estimate 157 ☐ YES 158 ☐ NO If you are in favor of the question, place an X in the box opposite 'YES'. If you are opposed to the question, place an X in the box opposite 'NO'.	MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS JUDGES, EASTERN DISTRICT Shall Judge BRADLEY WILSON of the Eastern District Court of Appeals be retained in office? 115 ☐ YES 116 ☐ NO If you are in favor of the question, place an X in the box opposite 'YES'. If you are opposed to the question, place an X in the box opposite 'NO'. Shall Judge WILLIAM JACKSON, JR of the Eastern District Court of Appeals be retained in office? 117 ☐ YES 118 ☐ NO If you are in favor of the question, place an X in the box opposite 'YES'. If you are opposed to the question, place an X in the box opposite 'NO'. Shall Judge COOPER JAMESON CHARTS of the Eastern District Court of Appeals be retained in office? 119 ☐ YES 120 ☐ NO If you are in favor of the question, place an X in the box opposite 'YES'. If you are opposed to the question, place an X in the box opposite 'NO'. Shall Judge BENITA GOODSON JAVIER of the Eastern District Court of Appeals be retained in office? 121 ☐ YES 122 ☐ NO If you are in favor of the question, place an X in the box opposite 'YES'. If you are opposed to the question, place an X in the box opposite 'NO'.

Test Version 20221207v1

TURN BALLOT OVER

**BACK
PAGE**

112 Sample of Ballot Layout - Back Side (Questions)

This is a sample of the mock ballot used in hand count training (front side).

Shopping List

Each Polling Place has its own Tally Book, forms, and list of supplies specific to the Counting Team. These items are inexpensive (compared to the cost of election voting equipment), and most are easily purchased from office supply stores. Links provided with costs were current as of August 2025. Purchasing in bulk would likely reduce costs. Some supplies are one-time purchases and only replaced or replenished when damaged or depleted.

Legal-size Binder

Used for Tally Book (one per polling place) and 2 for Recording Judges on each counting team at the polling place. Recommend 1" D-ring style with overview pocket on the cover (see pg. 81).

\$17 each



113 QR Code:
Legal-size Binder

Small Steel Non-Stuffable Ballot Box

Each polling place has at least 1 ballot box for voters to cast ballots, and each counting team has 1 ballot box (see pgs. 88 and 104).

\$104 each



115 QR Code:
Steel Ballot Box

Legal-size Paper

20 lb. paper works well for the hand-count forms, even with Sharpie bleed-through if used with Dividers (on the left).

\$13 per ream (500 sheets)



116 QR Code:
Legal-size Paper

Legal-size Dividers (from file folders)

Used in Recording Judge binders between Ballots Tally Sheets. Prevents Sharpie bleed-through. Cut file folders on the fold to make 2 dividers from each folder, then 3-hole punch.

\$46 per box, 100/box (will make 200 dividers)



114 QR Code:
Legal-size File
Folders

Retractable **Blue** Ballpoint Pen

Retractable saves the hassle of having caps missing or in the way. Recommend no black ink pens (see pg. 102).

\$13 per pack, 18 pens/pack



117 QR Code:
Blue Ball Point Pens

Felt-tip markers Sharpie™ style, assorted colors

Used for tallying votes. I recommend a “fine tip” or rounded point, not a chisel. It is also recommended to use colors other than regular blue, black, green, or red (see pg. 102).

\$22 per pack, 24/pack



118 QR Code:
Color Markers

Removable Arrow Flags

For identifying valid write-in candidates (see pg. 100).

\$4 per pack, 100/pack



119 QR Code:
Arrow Flags

Mechanical Pencils

These are used only by Recording Judges to track mistakes when tallying votes (see pg. 107). Recommend mechanical pencils to eliminate sharpening. Also, I recommend pencils with white clean erasers.

\$17 per pack, 40 pencils/pack



120 QR Code:
Mechanical Pencils

MarkerLock

Convenient holder to keep markers organized. Caps stay in the holder so they do not get lost or in the way.

\$10 each



121 QR Code:
MarkerLock from
MyStore.com

10” x 15” Envelopes

Used to separate and seal counted, write-in, and rejected ballots that will be returned to the Clerk (see pg. 115).

\$44 per box, 100/box



122 QR Code:
10x15 Envelopes

Ballot Box Security Seals

Security seals for the ballot boxes (see pg. 88). This style can easily be removed by election judges without scissors or tools when ballot counting begins.

\$32 per pack, 100/pack




123 QR Code:
Security Seals

Color Cardstock paper

Sheets of cardstock are cut in half lengthwise to make a “bookmark” (see pg. 107). Recording Judges use these as a ruler/guide to locate columns to mark votes.

\$13 per pack, 80 sheets/pack (makes 160)



124 QR Code:
Color Cardstock

Calculator, Solar or Battery

A calculator with basic functions is all that is needed to calculate election results. Calculators should not have connectivity abilities (see pg. 93).

\$12



125 QR Code:
Calculator

Repositionable Tabs for Binder Dividers

The Recording Judge binders have dividers between the Ballots Tally forms. Repositionable tabs make it easier to ‘flip’ between the forms.

\$6 per pack, 30/pack



126 QR Code:
Repositionable Tabs

Sheet Magnifier

A sheet magnifier or magnifying glass helps election judges view marks on ballots and determine voter intent.

\$12



127 QR Code:
Sheet Magnifier

Quick-folding Utility Table

It is suggested that a small utility table be placed between the counting judges to hold the ballot box (see pg. 90).

\$14



128 QR Code:
Folding Utility Table

For assistance in estimating supplies and forms, use the Forms and Supplies Estimator (see page 299).

7: TERMINOLOGY & ABBREVIATIONS

Throughout this eManual, the terminology used will match, as much as possible, the definitions and terms in Missouri's statutes (state laws). Some of the most quoted statutes for election laws, specifically hand counting, are provided for convenience in the Resource Section of this eManual. Jump to page 217 for statutes.

Remember that terminology used by the state and county officials might vary slightly but is likely to be similar or easy to cross-reference.

What I Mean When I Say ...



Voting Machines

“Voting Machines” is used in this eManual and on the companion website to mean any electronic voting equipment, computerized voting equipment, tabulators, scanners, or other mechanical devices used by election officials during elections.

This can be a very emotional and even controversial issue for some people, especially engineers and those in the computer science fields. There is strong opposition to the use of a generic term such as “voting machines” when there are more specific and correct terms for the different types or pieces of equipment.

But this eManual is not intended as an authoritative document about “voting machines.” Its focus is a hand count process. So “voting machines” is used to generically refer to all equipment used in elections with sincere apologies to anyone who experiences a ‘nails on chalkboard’ feeling each time it is used.

Abbreviations

¶ is the symbol for paragraph

In some of the references to statutes, we use the ¶ symbol. This symbol is an abbreviation for “paragraph.”

REP is the abbreviation for Republican

The Republican Party is considered a “major political party” in Missouri according to statute because its candidates received the highest number of votes in the last general election. (see [115.013 ¶14](#) on pg. 219),

Also, because the Republican candidate for Governor in the last gubernatorial election received the highest number of votes, Republican candidates are placed in the first position on the ballot. (see [115.239 ¶1](#) on pg. 224)

DEM is the abbreviation for Democrat

The Democrat Party is considered a “major political party” in Missouri according to statute because its candidates received the 2nd highest number of votes in the last general election. (see [115.013 ¶14](#) on pg. 219),

OTH is the abbreviation for other (non-major) political parties

“Established political party” are parties other than the “major political parties” and their candidates in certain elections polled more than 2%. Read the statute (see [115.013 ¶11](#) on pg. 218) for a detailed description.

Clerks and Election Authorities

Missouri has 114 counties but 116 voting jurisdictions (Kansas City and St. Louis City are the additional jurisdictions). Rather than try to be specific in this eManual by referring to types of jurisdictions, we will use “County” to mean any voting jurisdiction.

“County” will mean any voting jurisdiction

Each voting jurisdiction has its own “election authority,” which is responsible for registering voters and conducting elections in the jurisdiction. (see [115.043](#) on pg. 219)

Of the 116, nine jurisdictions have directors or boards of election. That means in 107 counties, the **County Clerk is the Election Authority**. (see [115.015](#) on pg. 219)

“Clerk” will mean all Election Authorities

Because the overwhelming number of counties have a County Clerk as their Election Authority, we will use “**Clerk**” to refer to all election authorities, regardless of whether it is a clerk, board, or director.

Poll Workers and Election Judges

“**Poll Worker**” is a common title used in Missouri and around the country for anyone who works at polling places on election day. However, the title “Poll Worker” does not appear when searching the Revisor website (source of Missouri statutes). The title used in Missouri is “**Election Judge**.”

“Election Judge” will also mean Poll Worker

All references in this eManual to persons the Clerk assigns to work on the election will be “Election Judge.”

Locations

Counting Location

The hand counting of ballots takes place at the location where voters cast their ballots. (see [115.013 ¶5](#) on pg. 218)

Simplify: Precincts, Voting Districts, and Polling Places are all referred to as “Polling Place”

Voters are assigned to **precincts**, depending on their residential address. (see [115.013 ¶22](#) on pg. 218)

In many counties, the precinct has one polling place. It is also possible for a precinct to have multiple polling places or several precincts combined into polling places or **voting districts**. (see [115.013 ¶¶21 and 28](#) on pg. 218)

Ballot Items

Election-related statutes are very specific when they address items on the ballot.

Race

An election contest for political office.

Candidate

A person who is running for political office.

Relative with the 2nd Degree by Consanguinity or Affinity

A spouse, parent, child, grandparent, brother, sister, grandchild, mother-in-law, father-in-law, daughter-in-law, or son-in-law. (see [115.013 ¶2. \(25\)](#) on pg. 218)

Question

Any measure on the ballot that can be voted “YES” or “NO.” (see [115.013 ¶24](#) on pg. 218)

Voter Intent

On the ballot cast by a voter, the voter's intent is determined by a distinguishing mark in or adjacent to the name of the candidate or issue preference, or the name of the candidate or issue preference is circled. (see [115.456 ¶2](#) on pg. 228) The topic of voter intent is covered in more detail on pages 98 and 255.

Paper Ballots

Ballots in Missouri are paper ballots. (see [115.013 ¶3](#) on pg. 218)

Ballots

Spoiled Ballot

A “**spoiled ballot**” is a ballot accidentally spoiled by the voter, who takes it to a Receiving Judge and has it replaced. (see [115.447 ¶2. \(3\)](#) on pg. 226)

Defective Ballot

When ballots are hand-counted, a “**defective ballot**” would be called an “**overvote**” in that the votes cast for a candidate or question exceeded what was allowed by law. The statute does not state that the entire ballot is **rejected**. (see [115.447 ¶2. \(1\)](#) on pg. 226)

Rejected Ballot

A “**rejected ballot**” is a ballot for which no votes are counted for any candidate or questions because: (see [115.447 ¶2. \(2\)](#) on pg. 141)

- the initials of proper Election Judges are missing;
- the number of votes for all races and on all questions exceed the number authorized by law; or,
- because the ballot was voted with unlawful assistance.

A ballot cannot be rejected because it has fewer marks on it than authorized by law. (see [115.453 ¶3](#) on pg. 227)

8: RESOURCES

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
Information is power.

Sharing the information empowers others.

Keep sharing. Empower everyone.

Linda Rantz

FAQs



What's the benefit of returning to hand counting?

Save time, save money, results on election day, better election security, and more transparency for The People.

Who decides in Missouri whether voting machines are used or if we hand count ballots?

There are state laws and regulations to be followed. Still, the statutes indicate that each county's "election authority" is responsible for conducting elections and may adopt, experiment with, or abandon voting machines. The election authority in almost all counties is the County Clerk. In other voting jurisdictions, it is a Board of Elections or Directors.

There is no fraud in Missouri. Why should we worry about voting machines?

Start by reading the quotes in Democrats Warn About Voting Machine Vulnerabilities on page 47. Be sure to watch the video.

The testing done on the machines matches election results every time.

Read about Logic & Accuracy and Risk-Limiting Audits on page 49. Computer experts have been complaining about the validity of these tests for decades.

My Clerk said our voting machines do not connect to the internet. Are you saying they are connected?

I suggest jumping to "Our Voting Equipment Does Not Connect to the Internet" on page 31. Understanding "connectivity" rather than the traditional 'plugging into the internet' will be helpful.

Do electronic poll pads connect to the internet?

Poll pads have connectivity and are allowed to connect to the internet under state law. It depends on the county whether your Clerk opts to have them connected.

No one already scheduled as an Election Judge wants to stay late to count ballots.

No one should have to stay longer, extended hours. The counting team can be a different team of Election Judges and can be scheduled according to how many ballots are anticipated to be cast at the polling place.

It is already too much work for a clerk to find enough election judges. How do you expect them to find counting judges?

First, using voting machines is a huge time drain for Clerks. Read "Giving Time Back to the Clerk" on page 34 for a list of 27 statutes related to voting machines with which the Clerk must comply.

Also, in the Resource Section, read about "Deputies Appointed by Clerk to Assist in Elections" on page 185 and the ability to "Involve High School Students in Elections" on page 182).

Finally, the political parties are responsible for submitting lists of names to the Clerk of persons to be Election Judges. We need to get the political parties in counties not fulfilling this responsibility to start taking this off the Clerk's shoulders. (see "Have We Abdicated Our Election Duties to Clerks?" on page 179)

I have been told that hand counting will mean days or weeks before election results are available.

It would depend on the hand-counting system. What is presented in this eManual follows the process detailed in Missouri's statutes. Ballot counting will be completed at the polling place on election day. We cover this in "Missouri Laws Make It Possible for Election Day Results," on page 43.

Counties or voting places have too many voters to hand count ballots on election day.

Indeed, there is a tendency to consolidate voting locations into fewer locations and larger centers. We prefer keeping polling places local. Understanding the average number of ballots cast at a polling location will assist with understanding how same-day results can be obtained with hand counting. See "How Long Does It Take to Count All Votes on a Ballot?" on page 275.

Do election judges doing this for years have to learn a new system?

Most of what the current Election Judges are doing will only change where it overlaps the duties of the Counting Team.

There is an *Election Judge Workbook Addendum* that walks through the detailed steps of the Counting Team. An experienced Election Judge will likely recognize the tasks that overlap. (see page 73)

How is a voter's experience going to change when casting a ballot?

When a voter marks a ballot that goes into a voting machine, there can be stress and anxiety about properly filling in the little oval. And then, there's 'Sharpie-gate' to worry about.¹⁰

Hand counting ballots makes it easier for voters because they don't have to worry about how a machine reads their ballot. Human beings will be counting the ballot and simply need to see voter intent: like an X, a check, or some marking in the box, next to the box, or even circling the name of a candidate.

The Code of State Regulations (CSR) provides rules for interpreting voter intent. See page 218.

"The ballots are still locked up for weeks to be able to triple-check if needed."

Someone took to social media and told one of our team members that we don't need to worry about machine errors because "the ballots are still locked up for weeks to be able to triple-check if needed."

That's wishful thinking. We want transparency and the ability to review election data, but the interpretation of a particular statute blocks us. See "Show Me" Election Results on page 51.

Assistance for Illiterate, Blind, or Other Physical Disability

If a county uses hand counting, do they still have to use voting machines for accessibility?

For this question, we contacted Col. Shawn Smith (USAF Ret.) for assistance, as he has spent time researching the topic. Here is Col. Smith's reply:

"52 U.S. Code § 21081(a)(3) requires an accessible voting system IF the jurisdiction uses a VOTING SYSTEM in an election for Federal office. For example, IF a state, county, or township uses a voting system (defined under (b)), then it must also have an accessible voting system. If the jurisdiction does not use a mechanical, electromechanical, or electronic voting system, then there is no Federal law which requires the use of an accessible voting system."

"So, how do individuals with disabilities vote? It's under 52 USC 10508: Any voter who requires assistance to vote by reason of blindness, disability, or inability to read or write may be given assistance by a person of the voter's choice, other than the voter's employer or agent of that employer or officer or agent of the voter's union."

See Missouri Statute 115.445, which confirms how a voter may be assisted if they declare they need assistance.

Submitting FAQs

Questions may be submitted using the companion website:
ReturntoHandCounting.com/FAQs



129 QR Code:
52 USC 21081




130 QR Code:
52 USC 10508



131 QR Code:
Statute 115.445

¹⁰ Sharpie is a trademark of Sanford, LP and is registered in the United States and other countries.

Become an Election Judge



Have We Abdicated Our Election Duties to Clerks?

Who is supposed to do the work of running elections? The Clerk is charged with “conducting” the election, but who is supposed to work at the polls or on certifications or verifications?

I have heard voting referred to as our ‘sacred right.’

Well, then, I would say working on elections is our civic duty.

In the numerous statutes covering election law, there is almost always a requirement for the Clerk to have at least two Election Judges, one from each major political party, to assist or observe the election activity.

Who “Picks” the Election Judges?

The law clearly states that the Clerk “designates” or “assigns” the Election Judges. The Clerk has other authority over the Election Judges.

However, statute [115.087](#), for counties without a Board of Elections (see pg. 221), states that each county's major political party committees are to submit a list of Election Judges to serve in the county's elections. So, what better way to ensure that Republican Election Judges are Republicans and Democrat Election Judges are Democrats than to have their political parties submit their names? If the political parties do not provide the names of Election Judges, the responsibility goes back to the Clerk.

Unfortunately, several Clerks have told me they do not get lists from the political committees. So, over many years, Clerks have just “assumed” the responsibility of recruiting citizens to serve as Election Judges. After all, in the long run, the Clerk must ensure they have enough Election Judges from both major political parties for each election (see [115.081](#) pg. 220).

The Clerk may compile a list of persons who volunteer to be Election Judges and do not claim any political affiliation or represent other established political parties. However, the Clerk must still meet the minimum DEMs and REPs for each election.

Signing Up as an Election Judge

Contact your county political party (for Missourians), county clerk, or the Secretary of State's office to inquire about serving as an election judge.

Election Judges – Qualifications

Read statute [115.085](#) (see pg. 221), recently updated and effective January 1, 2025, for specifics on qualifications to be an Election Judge, but here is a quick summary:

- Registered voter in Missouri
- Person of good repute
- Able to speak, read, and write the English language
- No consanguinity (has to do with a relative who is running in the election)
- Cannot hold other elective public offices, except committeeman or committeewoman

Best Skills for Counting Team Judges

The process for hand-counting ballots is straightforward. It is much like Bingo, whether calling the numbers or marking your card.

But as simple as it is, I have seen several people who learn it and participate in a mock count realize that they might not be the best match for specific tasks. For example, the Counting Judges look at small numbers/letters, determine voter intent, check the validity of write-in votes, and call the votes cast while continuously interacting with their counterpart.

The Recording Judges are marking their tally sheets, but switching or flipping sheets of paper, locating the correct column, and ‘dabbing’ the small oval takes concentration. Then, when the batch is complete, these judges pull out a calculator and start doing some math work.

Volunteer to Hand Count in Counties Other Than Your Own

Missourians have been allowed to serve as Election Judges in counties other than where they reside since 2002. In 2003, The election law bill (HB 1878) passed in 2022 and signed by the Governor on August 28, 2022, removed the requirement to obtain the permission of your Clerk before being able to serve as an Election Judge in another county. (see [115.081](#) on pg. 220)


This law means that, even if you live in a county that has not returned to hand counting, you can volunteer to help at another county that is hand counting. Reach out to the hand-counting county Clerk and learn how to sign up.

Growing a Workforce of Trained Hand Counting Election Judges

I believe, and others have told me they agree, that one of the best ways to show support for a Clerk’s consideration to return to hand counting is by having a trained “workforce” of hand-counting judges. It is crucial to have commitments from as many qualified voters as possible who are willing to work in elections, whether it is their county, an adjacent county, or a county requiring some travel.

Read more about hand count training in “Registered Voters Need to Do More Than Vote” on page 267.

High School Participants



Involve High School Students in Elections

I think the most untapped source of election workers is high school students.

Did you know that State law allows high school students to assist in elections? (see [115.104](#) on pg. 222) The title given to high school students working on elections is “Missouri Youth Election Participant.”

Tasks for Students on Election Day

Paragraph 5 of the statute says that the students may:

- assist in the administration of the polling place;
- assist in the counting of the votes;
- assist with administrative duties of any Clerk or Election Judge; and/or,
- perform any other election-day-related duty.

Any Number of Students May be Assigned to a Polling Place

The school’s “chief administrative officer” submits a list to the Clerk of student nominees to work on election day. It is up to the Clerk whether having students is beneficial or could disrupt the election process.

Suppose the Clerk decides to use student participants, according to ¶4 of the statute. In that case, they may “appoint any number of participants for each polling place or place where **votes are to be counted** in the jurisdiction” (*emphasis added*).

Are High School Students Selected Based on Political Party Affiliation?

A student may already have personal views about political parties, but the statute does not mention political party affiliation for students.

I guess that because they are not yet registered voters, they are not considered to have a party affiliation.

The high school program allows a Clerk to bring in as much extra help as possible on election day by involving high school students.

Nominating High School Students as Participants

High school students who want to be Youth Election Participants must be full-time students in grades 10, 11, or 12 and at least 15 but not yet 18 years old.

Schools are essential in preparing and nominating students to participate in elections. The statute (§7) suggests that schools offer a “course of instruction in the democratic electoral process” focusing on State election laws.

The “opinion of the chief administrative officer” of the high school is the basis for whether students would benefit from being involved in the election process. The chief administrative officer “shall” establish academic and behavioral standards of student qualifications, which must minimally include:

- Have demonstrated age-appropriate academic ability and demeanor;
- Be a person of good repute who can speak, read, and write the English language; and
- Not be related within the 2nd degree by consanguinity or affinity.

“Growing” the Next Generation of Election Workers

Nothing in statute [115.104](#) appears to preclude the chief administrative officer from coordinating with organizations within the school or the local community to promote election participation. Junior Achievement, Future Farmers of America, Future Business Leaders of America, scout troops, church youth groups, and school clubs are all possibilities to reach out to students and work towards growing the next generation of election workers.

It must begin by ‘opening the doors’ of election work to these young people and allowing them to experience the responsibility of working on elections and the benefit of managing safe and secure elections.

Train the young in the way they should go;
even when old, they will not swerve from it.

Proverbs 22:6

Election Deputies



Deputies Appointed by Clerk to Assist in Elections

Another source of help and assistance for clerks is the ability to appoint deputies. There are several statutes allowing for the appointment of deputies to assist with voter registration and other tasks, but Statute [115.053](#) speaks specifically to polling places and election day. (see 115.053 pg. 219)

Understandably, on election day, the Clerk will want to stay at “command central” unless something critical arises. But if a Clerk has ever uttered, “I can only be in one place at a time,” then the Clerk should consider training and appointing Election Deputies.

The deputies are an extension of the Clerk, covering anything from delivering supplies to ensuring election processes are followed at the polling places.

Deputies from Both REP and DEM parties

If the Clerk decides to appoint deputies to assist with the election, there must be an equal number from both “major political parties,” which means DEM and REP. The deputy must also be a registered voter of the county (or voting jurisdiction) and cannot be a candidate. (Read the statute for other eligibility specifics.)


Duties Performed by Election Deputies

Election Deputies **are not** the same as Election Judges. The Clerk appoints them to assist with carrying out the Clerk’s duties for the election.

¶3 of the statute lists what a deputy’s duties may include:

- Investigate facts/conditions relating to the residence or voting rights of any person
- Be at any polling place to:
 - witness and report to the Clerk any failure of duty, fraud, or irregularity
 - instruct Election Judges
 - supervise voting procedures
 - perform any other lawful function prescribed by the Clerk.

Watchers & Challengers



Watchers & Challengers are Essential to Election Security

Being new to Missouri, I had to ask how often voters saw Watchers or Challengers at their polling place. It surprised me that many people do not know what these roles are, and one person told me they are not needed in Missouri because this State always votes ‘red.’

The importance of the work of Watchers and Challengers is not whether the election results are ‘red,’ or ‘blue,’ or other, but that the election was **fair and secure**.

Differences between Watchers and Challengers

This section is **not** intended to be a tutorial or complete description of the roles of Watchers and Challengers. It is essential to read the statutes on your own.

This eManual is focused on hand-counting ballots, so we will be looking at the duties of Watchers and Challengers as they interact with the hand-counting process.

Both positions are filled by the Chair of the county political committees submitting names to the Clerk, and both are authorized to be at the polling place on Election Day. Both must meet the same qualifications as Election Judges, except that Challengers and Watchers must be registered voters in the county (voting jurisdiction) in which they are designated to serve.

There are some significant differences between the two roles.

Challengers

Only a Challenger may make a challenge when they believe “the election laws of this state have been or will be violated.” I would suggest someone who wants to serve as a Challenger be familiar with Missouri election laws.

Before the polls close, Challengers may give out the names of those who have voted. I strongly suggest anyone serving as a Challenger understands this part of the statute before releasing names.

Challengers may be at the polling place until all ballots are cast on election day. This statute does not explicitly state that Challengers may stay in the polling place until the hand counting of ballots is completed (which is stated for Watchers), so it is a good question for the Clerk or Secretary of State.

Challengers may also be present at the location where absentee ballots are counted.



132 QR Code:
Statute 115.105

Watchers

According to Statute [115.107](#), the role of Watcher is “to observe the counting of the votes.” (see 115.107 pg. 223) So, while a Challenger may be at the polling place, which is also the Counting Location, and may be observing the counting process, the Watcher’s role is to observe the counting of ballots.

Watchers may “present any complaint of irregularity or law violation to the Election Judges, or to the election authority if not satisfied with the decision of the Election Judges.”

A Watcher **may not** give out names of anyone who has or has not voted.

Watchers may be at the polling place until counting is completed, including all closing certification forms, the equipment and supplies packed, and election materials returned to the Clerk.

A watcher may also remain present at each location where absentee ballots are counted and may remain present while such ballots are being prepared for counting and counting.

All persons selected as watchers shall have the same qualifications required by section 115.085 for Election Judges, except that Watchers shall be registered voters in the jurisdiction of the election authority for which the watcher is designated as a watcher.

Encourage Campaigns and Political Parties to Assign these Roles

I believe that the best candidates for the roles of Watchers and Challengers are those who have served in the past as Election Judges or election authorities. And the more human eyes we can put on the election process, the more transparent, safe, and secure ... in my opinion.

Political parties and campaigns for candidates and initiatives all have the right to assign Watchers and Challengers. I hope they will actively pursue this course.

Political Parties



County and City Committees for Political Parties

In a search of the Revisor website,¹¹ I found no results for *democrat*, *libertarian*, *republican*, or any other party name in our Missouri statutes.¹² There are, however, references to *major*, *established*, and *new* political parties. These are defined in statute [115.013](#) (see pg. 218).

A major political party is defined as the two political parties that received the highest number of votes at the last general election. For Missouri, these are the Democrat and Republican parties. In this eManual, there will be times that, rather than writing out “major political party,” I simply reduce it to DEM and REP.¹³

WHY ARE POLITICAL PARTIES EVEN MENTIONED IN STATUTES?

Political Fairness

The results yield many statutes using the search term “political parties” or “political party” in Revisor. In most of them, political fairness appears to be one reason for referring to political parties in statutes. For example:

- Statute 178.632 determines how members are appointed to the Board of Regents of State Technical College of Missouri. Of the seven Regents, there must be at least three from each of the two major political parties.
- Statute 210.154 determines how members are appointed to the task force on the prevention of infant abuse and neglect. The two State Senate and State House members must be from different political parties.

DO THE POLITICAL PARTIES HAVE RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER MISSOURI LAW?

Yes. Let’s look first at the most obvious.

Party Principles

Statute 115.625 lists these authorized tasks for state committees:

The state committee of any established political party may, except as otherwise provided by law, call a convention of delegates to be apportioned, chosen or elected in such manner as it may prescribe for the purpose of nominating presidential electors, electing delegates to national conventions, electing members of national committees adopting or making declarations of party principles on national questions, and to do and perform any other act not inconsistent with the law.

The committees may adopt a constitution, bylaws, or both (Statute 115.627). In these documents, the committees can expand their mission beyond what is written in statute, and they can do so as long as it stays within the law.

ARE THE CONVENTION AND ELECTORS THE MOST IMPORTANT TASKS FOR POLITICAL COMMITTEES?

Not in my opinion. If we do not have honest and fair elections, candidates for any office from either party may be “selected” rather than elected. I believe this was known to past legislatures (going back decades or longer) considering the statutes that authorize forming committees for political parties.

¹¹ see *How to Look Up Missouri Statutes*, pg. 228

¹² except for a statute about a memorial highway (Statute 227.370)

¹³ see 115.239 regarding placement of party candidates on ballot and how determined

Committees for Political Parties are Established Under Election Code

Title IX of the Missouri Statutes is called *Suffrage and Elections*. There are 41 sections in the statutes, so why are political parties included in Title IX rather than the “County, Township, and Political Subdivision Government” or “Cities, Towns, and Villages” sections?

I firmly believe that political parties are established in the election statutes, and most of their duties are outlined in those codes because, more than anything, the committees for the parties should be working to ensure that elections are run impartially and fairly. That means Democrats and Republicans must actively be working to staff the elections.

DON'T THE CLERKS HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE ELECTIONS?

Clerks have the ultimate responsibility to ensure that elections are conducted according to law by virtue of the office they hold. That includes making sure that there are election judges from both major political parties. In about 109 of our 114 counties, the responsibility to find the election judges defaults to the Clerks because the county political committees are not recruiting, vetting, and submitting names of election judges to represent their party.

See page 179 for the question: Have We Abdicated Our Election Duties to Clerks?

Political Parties are Key to Ensuring Impartiality

In addition to leaving the Clerk responsible for election judges, many counties are either unaware of or do not see the importance of appointing Watchers and Challengers (see pg. 187). Those positions are not created because of distrust of the Clerks or anyone else. Instead, they help to ensure the impartiality of the election.

County committees owe it to their party's voters to have ‘eyes on’ the election. Did something go wrong? Does someone have a complaint? If the county committee for that political party did not have Election Judges, Watchers, and Challengers, the finger-pointing should focus on the committee.


Statutes that Establish the Committees of the Political Parties

- 115.603 Committees each established party shall maintain.
- 115.607 County or city committee eligibility, selection of.
- 115.609 County or city committee members (for St Louis City and County).
- 115.615 County Committee to meet and organize, when.

Some Duties of the Political Parties

- 115.087 Election Judges, names submitted by county committee by December Tenth of same year county committeemen are elected (in counties with clerks).
- 115.089 Board has the authority to appoint election judges. The Board “may” ask the county committee for a list of persons qualified and “may” select from the list (in counties with Board of Elections).
- 115.105 Challengers, submitted to Clerk four business days before the election.

Other Hand Counting Methods



Mike Lindell's National Grassroots Organization

Cause of America, Mike Lindell's grassroots organization, is helping coordinate with state teams working on hand-counting processes. No single method will work in every state, county, or parish, so it will be helpful to election authorities to be able to "mix & match" parts of different processes.

Col. Shawn Smith: Precinct Hand Count Procedures

Purpose

"The purpose of this guide is to provide a framework and guidelines for U.S. counties and equivalent local jurisdictions, such as parishes, to conduct the hand-count of paper ballots in their elections, as an alternative to precinct- or centralized machine-counting of paper ballots using computerized optical scanners or any other technology or procedure which is not in control of and 100% transparent to citizens."



133 QR Code:
Precinct Hand Count
Procedures

Principles

- Local vs. Centralized
- Perfect Transparency
- Perfect Chain of Custody
- Zero Trust
- Simple Ballots, More Frequent Elections

Louisiana: Linear Hand Count Method ("Cajun Clothesline")

Referred to as the "Cajun Clothesline," the Louisiana team, led by Randy Russ and John Scanlan, developed a linear counting approach. Three videos provide more information about the process (links in the QR codes).



Introduction to Linear Ballot Counting System: The Cajun Clothesline

During one of the most divisive periods in American history, Abraham Lincoln knew by mid-night on election day November 6, 1860 that he had been elected President. Hand-marked and counted paper ballot

rumble.com

Based on unique features in Louisiana's election law/system:

1. Voter ID required
2. Manual poll books with signatures required
3. Limited mail-in absentee ballots (9.7% of total votes)
4. Small precincts - 3,100+ precincts across 64 parishes (counties), averaging 1,200 registered voters each
5. Average voter turnout is about 50% (75% in the last presidential election)
6. Average hand count requirement is about 600 ballots per precinct



134 QR Code:
Linear Process: Intro

Results from 2nd pilot hand-count test conducted on October 19, 2022:



135 QR Code:
Ballot Inventory
Control & Results
Reporting


1. Ballot style was an actual ballot from St Charles Parish 2020 General Election with twelve federal, state, and local races.
2. A baseball pitch count sheet was adapted for counters to record voter intent for each race.
3. A training session and practice runs were held.
4. Speed: 100 ballots were counted in 40 minutes with first-time counters. The hand-count process would require about 4 hours with 10 volunteer hand count commissioners for an average parish precinct with an average turnout.
5. Accuracy: A one-vote discrepancy was reported between the two counters on each of the three races, resulting in an accuracy rate of 99.75%. These discrepancies were not material to the race's outcome, and no recount was conducted.

Transparency:

The entire process was filmed. We envision hand-count commissioners signing the official results tabulation sheets, scanning them into digital records, and posting them online. All commissioners must be registered voters in the precinct. We believe a jury duty-type system may be adaptable to identify and select qualified hand-count commissioners. We believe that citizen service in administering elections at the precinct-level is the key to restoring trust in our election process.



136 QR Code:
Pilot Linear Hand
Count System



Two industrial engineers and a CPA were directly involved in this pilot. We also had representatives from Missouri and Florida participate. The team debriefed afterward and provided recommendations to improve the process's speed, accuracy, and transparency. We are incorporating these ideas into a 3rd pilot.

Texas: Echo 65 Hand Count Method

The Texas Constitution states: "In all Elections By the People..." Texans researched the Election Code and found that Chapter 65 has a complete, legal method to count and 'tally' paper ballots – going back to 1879!"

Hand Count Method Approved by Texas Secretary of State



137 QR Code:
Texas Hand Counts

"Numerous trials of hand count methods were researched and tested. Week after week, with a dedicated team, a modified Texas Election Code Chapter 65 Hand Count method called the Echo 65 Method was devised and approved by the Texas SOS."

"Patriots of Gillespie County, Texas" successfully hand counted the 2024 primary election. "This unique self-correcting method and tally sheet allow for hand counters to be in a constant state of reconciliation, thus catching tally errors in real-time, resulting in exceptional accuracy and transparency."



Newsroom



"Stolen Elections Never Happened"

The Disputed Elections

Talking about 2020? Maybe. Someone will inevitably label the speaker as an "election denier." Why? Can't a person inquire about or challenge election results? Some will say, "no," because "that election fraud never happens." Except for some of the following examples?

1876 Hayes v. Tilden

"Disputed Presidential Election of 1876" The election between Rutherford B. Hayes (R) and Samuel Tilden (D) was highly contested and decided by **one vote**. The electoral votes of Florida, Louisiana, and South Carolina were in question, and the dispute continued into March of the following year when Hayes was declared the winner. (UVA Miller Center, *Disputed Election of 1876*, [Perma.cc/P6P5-3X2U](https://perma.cc/P6P5-3X2U), also book link on page 214)

1948 Lyndon Johnson: Tapes Detail Stolen Election

Audio recordings from 1977 of interviews of a former Texas voting official by an AP reporter prove that "fraudulent votes were added in alphabetical order, with the names coming from people who hadn't voted in the election," giving LBJ the win in the 1948 senate race. (SeattleTimes.com, *'Windows into History': Tapes Detail LBJ's Stolen Election*, [Perma.cc/F5QG-UQCA](https://perma.cc/F5QG-UQCA))

1960 Nixon v. Kennedy

A 2017 article begins with this quote: "It was 56 years ago today that John F. Kennedy was elected President of the United States in a bitter contest against the incumbent Vice President, Richard Nixon. It was one of the closest elections in American history, and **some people still doubt its outcome**." Renowned newscaster John Chancellor recalled in a 1990 interview that NBC relied on "**new computer technology to decide the winner**." [*emphasis added*] (ConstitutionCenter.org, *The Drama Behind President Kennedy's 1960 Election Win*, [Perma.cc/28Y8-8MU4](https://perma.cc/28Y8-8MU4))

2000 Bush v. Gore

The year 2000 became known as the "hanging chads" election. Republican George W. Bush was declared the winner by the Courts. Democrats called it a "stolen" election. Rep. Maxine Waters officially object to the "fraudulent 25 Florida electoral votes." Outgoing President Bill Clinton stated that the only way [*Republicans*] could win the election was to stop the voting in Florida," and former U.S. Rep Corrine Brown said that George Bush was "selected, ... not elected."

2004 Bush v. Kerry

In the 2004 Presidential election, Democrats made accusations of "election irregularities" in the State of Ohio. U.S. Rep. Nancy Pelosi pointed to "constantly shifting vote tallies in Ohio and malfunctioning electronic machines which may not have had paper receipts have led to additional loss of confidence by the public." Democrats objected to the counting of the electoral votes from Ohio.

2016 Trump v. Clinton

Democrats declared the 2016 election to be "illegitimate" due to Russian interference, which has since been proven to be false. Some Democrats called it "illegitimate" and a stolen election. In Congress, some went so far as to object to electoral votes from states during the certification of the Electoral College.

The three preceding topics are transcribed from clips from [2000 to 2022 Video Compilation](#), linked on page 197.

So, Apparently, Disputed and Fraudulent Elections Do Happen

Based on the preceding references, it seems disputed elections can be discussed in Congress. The great divide is how much information fails to get through the “filters” and to the people. This Newsroom section provides articles and videos that might have received less bandwidth in the mainstream media spectrum.

1988, Oct. 30 – Counting Votes

The New Yorker, article by Ronnie Dugger

A look at the move from hand counting to computer counting ballots. Did computer counting resolve issues of fraud or errors, or did it bring about “fraud of a much more dangerous, centralized kind?” “At one point, we had tabulation errors in twenty-eight percent of the systems tested, and nobody cared.” “Should citizens delegate the job of vote-counting to technicians? Most people do not know enough about computers to be able to tell what is happening during computerized vote-counting ...”



138 QR Code:
Counting Votes

1996, Nov. – Pandora’s Black Box: Did It Really Count Your Vote?

*Editor: Philip M. O’Halloran, R E L E V A N C E - November 1996 - Vol. III- No. V,
Introduction by Jackie Patru*

Notice that this article was written in 1996. Excerpts: “Think about it... every precinct in every county in every state using the same computers and counting systems leaving absolutely no trail to check the accuracy or honesty of the results. How easily, then, it would be for the programmers – from a single source – to ensure that the outcomes of all elections would favor those who are ‘approved’ by the proponents of World Government.”



139 QR Code:
Pandora’s Black Box

“To install computerized voting across the nation would cost billions. By comparison, a return to paper ballots dropped into boxes (clear plastic to avoid false bottoms, etc.) would amount to peanuts. How Simple.” (see also “Pandora’s Black Box” on pg. 27)

2000 to 2022 – Video Compilation of Democrats Denying Election Results

“Had Ohio, in 2004, gone to Democrat John Kerry, he would have become president. President George W. Bush carried it 51% to 49%, a margin of about 100,000 votes. But Jan. 6 Committee Chairman Bennie Thompson, D-Miss., on Jan. 6, 2005, joined 30 other House Democrats and Democratic Sen. Barbara Boxer, D-Calif., in refusing to certify Ohio’s presidential election results, claiming “voter suppression” in addition to arguing, also with no basis in fact, that the Diebold voting machines were manipulated to re-elect Bush.”



140 QR Code:
Video Compilation

2018 to 2020 –Video: Democrats Say It Is Easy to Hack Voting Machines

Rumble, Kanekoa The Great

A two-minute video of prominent Democrat senators and representatives on voting machines that are hackable.

Senator Ron Wyden (D-Oregon): “Both sides seem to agree that no votes were changed in the 2016 election, and I said, the experts I talked to say that, until you have a forensic analysis of a vote, until you go in there and scrub the whole system, you can’t really say that.”



141 QR Code:
Democrats Say Easy
to Hack

Tags: election fraud, voting machines-hack, democrat



142 QR Code:
2004 Testimony

2004 and 2022 – Clint Curtis, Democrat Whistleblower Exposes the Truth About How He Created the Machine Algorithm 51-49

Whistleblower Clint Curtis' 2004 Congressional Testimony. Curtis was a programmer in 2000 for a company hired to develop a touchscreen voting machine and show how it could alter elections by ensuring results are always 51% to 49%.

At the 2022 *Moment of Truth Summit*, Mike Lindell interviewed Curtis about the stunning YouTube video of the 2004 testimony. Curtis stated, "who's going to be stupid enough to use a machine where you don't see the source code and it's gonna tell you who won?" (see also "51-49, Would You Believe a Whistleblower?" on pg. 27)

Tags: algorithm, source code, voting machines-hack, Clint Curtis, Mike Lindell, whistleblower



143 QR Code:
Curtis Interview

2018, Oct 13 – The Tech Giants, The US, And the Chinese Spy Chips That Never Were... Or Were They?

The Guardian, by John Naughton

Based on a Bloomberg story, "*The Big Hack: How China Used a Tiny Chip to Infiltrate US Companies*," there are allegations that Chinese spies created electronic backdoors into computer servers of major U.S. companies. Is it true? The Bloomberg reporters stand by their story. The Guardian reporter commented:

"Likewise, the intelligence agencies might be reluctant to draw too much public attention to supply-chain interference, given that they all do it."

Tags: cybersecurity, hack, chain of custody



144 QR Code:
Alleged Hack of U.S.
Companies by China

2019, Aug. 8 – Critical U.S. Election Systems Have Been Left Exposed Online Despite Official Denials

MOTHERBOARD Tech by VICE, Written by Kim Zetter

Despite the insistence by voting machine vendors that their equipment does not connect to the internet, investigators have found a connection. The machines might have been online for years.

Excerpt: Senator Ron Wyden (D-Oregon) said the findings are "yet another damning indictment of the profiteering election vendors, who care more about the bottom line than protecting our democracy." It's also an indictment, he said, "of the notion that important cybersecurity decisions should be left entirely to county election offices, many of whom do not employ a single cybersecurity specialist."

Tags: voting machines-online, voting machines-vendors, cybersecurity



145 QR Code:
2019 Systems
Exposed

2019, Dec. 10 – Warren, Klobuchar, Wyden, and Pocan Investigate Vulnerabilities and Shortcomings of Election Technology Industry with Ties to Private Equity

U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass) and others

Excerpt from Sen. Warren publication:

“Election security experts have noted for years that our nation's election systems and infrastructure are under serious threat, but voting machines reportedly continue to fail and breakdown across the country, as vendors fail to innovate, improve, and protect voting systems, putting U.S. elections at avoidable and increased risk.

The three vendors – Election Systems & Software, Dominion Voting Systems, and Hart-InterCivic – collectively distribute voting machines and software that facilitate voting for over 90% of all eligible voters in the United States. Private equity firms reportedly own or control each of these vendors, which ‘have long skimped on security in favor of convenience,’ leaving voting systems across the country “prone to security problems.

These vendors make little to no information publicly available on how much money they dedicate to research and development, or to maintenance of their voting systems and technology. They also share little or no information regarding annual profits or executive compensation for their owners.”



146 QR Code:
Warren Investigation



147 QR Code:
Warren PDF
Download

Tags: voting machines-vendors, private equity, Dominion, Hart-InterCivic, ES&S, voting machines-vulnerabilities

2020, Jan. 10 – ‘Online and Vulnerable’: Experts Find Nearly Three Dozen U.S. Voting Systems Connected to the Internet

NBC News, By Kevin Monahan, Cynthia McFadden, and Didi Martinez

In 2017, DHS assured the public that voting machines “are not connected to the internet.” NBC News reports that this was an overstatement based on investigations done by cybersecurity experts.

Tags: DHS, cybersecurity, voting machines-internet, voting machines-online, voting machines-vulnerabilities



148 QR Code:
Online &
Vulnerable

2020, Feb. 6 – Election Security: DHS Plans Are Urgently Needed to Address Identified Challenges Before the 2020 Election

GAO (US Government Accountability Office) GAO-20-267

“Election primaries begin in February. However, CISA has not yet completed its strategic and operations plans to help state and local officials safeguard the 2020 elections or documented how it will address prior challenges. We made three recommendations, including that DHS urgently finalize its plans.”

Tags: 2020 election, DHS, GAO, CISA



149 QR Code:
DHS Plans



150 QR Code:
CISA Secure Election

2020, Nov. 12 – Joint Statement from Elections Infrastructure Government Coordinating Council & The Election Infrastructure Sector Coordinating Executive Committees

CISA (Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Agency) Original Release Date: Nov. 12, 2020

[“The November 3rd election was the most secure in American history.” \(CISA\)](#)

A mere 9 days after the highly questioned November 3, 2020, Presidential Election, CISA issued a joint statement with the GCC touting that election as “the most secure in American history.” It is a stunning statement, given that two years later, in the November 8, 2022, election, counties like those in Arizona could not even count all the ballots in 9 days, never mind “touting” it as ‘secure.’ Jump to June 3, 2022 (pg. 202), for the CISA follow-up statement after an investigation was finally conducted (9 vulnerabilities were found in Dominion Voting Systems).

Tags: 2020 election, CISA, GCC



151 QR Code:
Texas Dominion

2020, Nov. 19 – Texas Rejected Use of Dominion Voting System Software Due to Efficiency Issues

The Texan, by Brad Johnson

After a review of Dominion Voting Systems' product, Texas officials were concerned and rejected using them.

Tags: voting machines-risks, Dominion, Texas



152 QR Code:
“Dominion Connected to Internet”

2020, Nov. 30 – Cyber Security Expert: Dominion Was Connected to the Internet on Election Day, Communicated Overseas

American Greatness, by Debra Heine

In a contradiction to CISA officials, speakers at a public hearing stated that voting systems were connected to the internet and that “white hat hackers” were able to detect communications between the voting systems and overseas servers.

Tags: 2020 election, Dominion, cybersecurity, voting machines-internet



153 QR Code:
10 Absolutes

2021, Jan. 3 – Ten Absolute Truths About the 2020 Election and Election Fraud That Every American Should Understand

Center for Security Policy, by Kevin Freeman

From the “*Battle of Athens*” to the 1948 Senate race of Lyndon Johnson to current elections, election fraud is real and not a conspiracy.

Tags: Battle of Athens, 2020 election, election fraud, Lyndon Johnson



154 QR Code:
China Hack
Supermicro

2021, Feb. 12 – Years Later, Bloomberg Doubles Down on Disputed Supermicro Supply Chain Hack Story

Data Center Dynamics, by Sebastian Moss

A follow-up report on the 2018 claim that Apple and Amazon discovered equipment and software tampered with by Chinese operatives. See “2018, Oct 13 – The Tech Giants, The US, And the Chinese Spy Chips That Never Were... Or Were They?” on page 198

Tags: cybersecurity, chain of custody, Supermicro, Bloomberg

2021, Aug. 5 – Joplin: City Computer Shutdown Was Ransomware Attack

AP News

The City of Joplin, Missouri, paid \$320,000 to an unknown person for a ransomware attack that had shut down the city's computer system. Does this mean hackers can violate municipal systems but not election systems?

Tags: ransomware, Missouri



155 QR Code:
Joplin
Ransomware
Attack

2022, Apr. 1 – EAC Issues Report on Tennessee Voting System Anomaly

U.S. Election Assistance Commission News

In a municipal election in Tennessee (Oct. 2021), an Election Judge noticed that the number of ballots cast did not match the number reported by the voting equipment. A hand recount verified that the total of 98 ballots cast reported by the machine was, in fact, 330 ballots cast. QR codes link to the EAC news article and the PDF download of the report.

Tags: Tennessee error, Dominion, EAC, election judge, voting machines-anomalies



156 QR Code:
PDF report TN anomaly



157 QR Code:
TN Anomaly

2022, Apr. 7 – Video: Election Judges Catch Voting Problems in Cole County

ABC17 News, Marina Dias, Reporter

Election Judges notice that voting equipment is double-counting votes in **Cole County, Missouri**. "The machines were pre-tested prior to the election and ran perfectly, and Kormsmeier said it's concerning to know that the machine ran fine earlier but failed on Election Day."

Tags: Unisyn, voting machines-problems, voting machines-malfunction, election judge, Cole County, Missouri



158 QR Code:
Cole County MO

2022, Apr. 28 – St. Charles County Investigating Potential Voter Fraud After April Election

KMOV4 CBS, by Alexis Zotos

Republican and Democrat Election Judges at a polling place in St. Charles County, Missouri, during the April 2022 election, discover an error with the electronic poll pads.

Tags: election judge, Knowink, electronic poll pads, St Charles County, Missouri



159 QR Code:
St Charles County

2022, May 4 – Missouri Elections Are Impossible to Validate

Missouri Canvassers

Following nearly 5 months of canvassing by grassroots volunteers who knocked on roughly 5,000 doors, the Missouri Canvassers released their initial canvassing report. The six primary issues called out that make Missouri elections impossible to validate are: 1) There is no "final" list of everyone who voted in any Missouri election; 2) Missouri voter rolls are inflated; 3) Votes were counted for 'phantoms,' and 'lost' for actual voters; 4) Voting equipment can connect to the internet; 5) Scientific and non-partisan investigations have uncovered election fraud; and, 6) Missouri residents have lost control of their elections.

Tags: voter registration, voter rolls, canvassing, voting machines-internet, Missouri



160 QR Code:
MO Canvassers



161 QR Code:
EAC MO Anomaly

2022, May 20 – EAC Approves Measure to Address Missouri Voting Machine Anomaly

U.S. Election Assistance Commission News

During Missouri’s Municipal Election on April 5, 2022, an “anomaly” occurred during the poll closing functions of the voting equipment in Cole County, Missouri, and six other Missouri counties.

Tags: voting machines-anomalies, Unisyn, EAC, Cole County, Missouri



162 QR Code:
CISA Advisory

2022, Jun. 3 – CISA Advisory: Vulnerabilities Affecting Dominion Voting Systems ImageCast X

Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency; ICS Advisory (ICSA-22-154-01)

J. Alex Halderman, University of Michigan, and Drew Springall, Auburn University, reported nine critical vulnerabilities in certain Dominion voting equipment. The advisory provides CISA recommendations that election officials should take to “further enhance defensive measures to reduce the risk of exploitation of these vulnerabilities.”

Tags: CISA, Dominion, voting machines-vulnerabilities, cybersecurity, J Alex Halderman



163 QR Code:
Otero County NM

2022, Jun. 10 – Video: Otero County, New Mexico Votes to Remove Dominion Voting Systems

Rumble Tinafor22

“The Otero County Commission had a long day of discussions and reports today and then they landed upon the issues with the 2020 Election. They voted to eliminate voting machines in the county.”

Tags: Dominion, Otero County, New Mexico



164 QR Code:
Chaotic Primary

2022, Jun. 22 – ‘Wild Ride’ – Michelle Long Spears Wins Runoff Following Chaotic Primary Election

decatrish.com, by Dan Whisenhunt

A candidate for a county commission seat in Georgia was reported as coming in last place of three candidates. In reviewing precinct voting reports, her own precinct showed her as having zero votes, even though both she and her husband voted for her. A hand recount proved that some votes cast for her were not counted. The result was that she won 1st place in her race.

Tags: recount, race overturned, voting machines-malfunction, election results, Georgia



165 QR Code:
Cole County Poll Pad

2022, Jul. 15 – Clerk: Problem with Voting Equipment Fixed

News Tribune, Jeff Haldiman, Reporter

The Clerk in Cole County, Missouri, finds a potential major problem for the upcoming August Primary Election due to a “programming error” with the electronic poll pads.

Tags: Cole County, Missouri, Knowink, electronic poll-pad

2022, Jul. 19 – Maryland, Election Voting Machines Not Working – No Results Expected Tonight

The Gateway Pundit, Joe Hoft

ABC7 News, Brad Bell, Twitter Feed

Precincts in Maryland are not opening on time due to voting machines not being ready.

Tags: voting machine-malfunction, poll opening failure, election results delayed, Maryland



166 QR Code:
MD Polls Trouble
(Brad7News)



167 QR Code:
MD Polls Trouble
(TGP)

2022, Jul. 20 – Rockford Area Election Glitch Affected 20K Ballots. Here's What Happened

Rockford Register Star, by Jim Hagerty

In Winnebago County, Illinois, Election Judges notice that results for referendums do not appear correct. The clerk reviews and confirms that there appears to be an issue, as the referendums all passed by 90% or higher. It is interesting how similar this is to a Wyoming issue. See 2024, Dec. 3 – ‘This is a human error’: Carbon County Clerk Gwynn Bartlett Explains Weston County Election Controversy on page 260.

Tags: voting machines-glitch, election judge, recount, ballot printing, Winnebago County, Illinois



168 QR Code:
Rockford Glitch

2022, Jul. 29 – Dominion Voting Machines FAIL Testing for Colorado Secretary of State Recount – Major Discrepancy Reported with Logic and Accuracy Testing

The Gateway Pundit, by Brian Lupo

In El Paso County, Colorado, 60% of ballots being run for a Logic & Accuracy check are kicked out by Dominion voting for adjudication.

Tags: Dominion, logic and accuracy test, voting machines-failure, El Paso County, Colorado



169 QR Code:
Dominion Fails

2022, Aug. 8 – Cherokee County, Kansas Audit Found Errors in Voter Count Program

KSNF Joplin, by Brooklynn Norris

In the primary election in Kansas (August 2022), a post-audit of election results revealed that thumb drives used to tabulate votes had improperly switched votes for a particular candidate.

Tags: vote switch, audit, voting machines-malfunction, Cherokee County, Kansas



170 QR Code:
Cherokee County

2022, Aug. 22-23 – The Moment of Truth Summit

Presented by Mike Lindell

A gathering of election integrity activists from across the United States. Two 12-hour days featured presentations by each state and experts in fields related to election integrity. These have been saved into short segments so you can scroll through the library of speakers and listen to what interests you.

Tags: Mike Lindell, Moment of Truth Summit



171 QR Code:
Truth Summit



172 QR Code:
Shawn Smith

2022, Aug. 23 – “Enemy Inside the Wire” Ret. Col. Shawn Smith Speaks at *The Moment of Truth Summit*

Presentation by Shawn Smith

What is the “enemy inside the wire?” Col. Smith addresses the threat to our elections, specifically from cybercrime and hacking.

Tags: logic and accuracy test, voting machines-vulnerabilities, Moment of Truth Summit, Shawn Smith



173 QR Code:
Colorado Utility

2022, Sep. 2 – Colorado Utility Company Locks 22,000 Thermostats, In 90 Degree Weather Due To 'Energy Emergency'

FOX Business, by Andrew Miller

Although not specifically about elections, this story highlights the ease with which companies can access electronic devices in your home (like a thermostat) without your understanding of how it is done. (see also “Can Thermostats Not Trust Coloradans?” on pg. 16)

Tags: SMART, thermostat, Colorado



174 QR Code:
Smart Meters Spy

2022, Sep. 9 – Smart Meters – The Household Device That Spies on You 24/7

Dr. Joseph Mercola via Children's Health Defense

“The data from smart meters reveal far more than you might think — and could even be used against you to control your individual energy use or, one day, to help ensure “net zero” compliance.” “Many people have embraced the convenience of wireless devices in their homes, but these devices come at a price — your privacy and your health.”

Tags: SMART, thermostat, surveillance, energy, wireless devices



175 QR Code:
Forensic Expert

2022, Sep. 20 – Forensic Expert: If You Can't Trust Voting Machines, Don't Use 'em

American Family News, by Chad Groening, Jody Brown

Dr. Walter Daugherity gives the bottom line: “voting machines are not trustworthy,”

Tags: cybersecurity, Dominion, voting machines-vulnerabilities, Walter Daugherity



176 QR Code:
PA Sues Dominion

2022, Sep. 22 – Pennsylvania County Sues Dominion Voting Systems Over 'Severe Anomalies' In 2020 Election

The Desert News

Pennsylvania officials allege they found severe issues with voting data after the 2020 election and filed a lawsuit against Dominion voting systems.

Tags: 2020 election, Dominion, voting machines-anomalies, Pennsylvania



178 QR Code:
Dominion Error
Substack



177 QR Code:
Dominion Error
Rumble

2022, Oct. 4 –Dominion 'Error Code' Uncovered in 97% of Georgia Counties

Kanekoa The Great

Open records requests reveal 64 of 66 Georgia counties have the same unsolved 'Tennessee Error' that caused seven scanners to miscount hundreds of ballots. Links are to Kanekoa Substack and a video on the Kanekoa Rumble channel.

Tags: Dominion, Tennessee error, EAC, CISA, Kanekoa The Great, Georgia, Tennessee

2022, Oct. 6 – Video: Machine Vulnerabilities Part 2 – Colonel Smith

South Carolina Safe Elections

Colonel Shawn Smith presents shocking information on vulnerabilities in Election Management systems across America and addresses poll tapes, tabulators, and audits.

Tags: voting machines-vulnerabilities, cybersecurity, Shawn Smith



179 QR Code:
Machine
Vulnerabilities

2022, Oct. 7 – America First Legal Sues 14 Federal Agencies for Refusing to Disclose the Biden Regime’s Takeover of Election Administration

American Greatness, by Debra Heine

An executive order signed by Joe Biden called for 600 federal agencies to make plans for how they could “expand access to voter registration and election information.”

Tags: mail-in ballots, voter registration



180 QR Code:
AFL Sues Agencies

2022, Oct. 12 – Video: Tripp County South Dakota Votes 5-0 To Hand-Count Midterm Election

Rumble, Matthew Monfore

A county in South Dakota votes to return to hand-counting ballots. See *the follow-up story on Nov. 3, 2022*, by Keloland.com

Tags: paper ballots, hand-count, Tripp County, South Dakota



181 QR Code:
SD County

2022, Oct. 14 – Election Integrity Experts Identify Privacy Flaw Affecting All ICP/ICE Dominion Voting Systems Across 21 States. And No, It Won't Be Patched Before the Mid Terms.

The National Pulse, by Raheem J. Kassam

J. Alex Halderman previously reported vulnerabilities in Dominion voting systems (see Jun. 3, 2022, CISA Advisory, pg. 202) and issued another report about a “serious privacy flaw” affecting certain Dominion ballot scanners.

Tags: election integrity, Dominion, CISA, voting machines-vulnerabilities, Halderman, J. Alex



182 QR Code:
Privacy Flaw

2022, Oct. 14 – The Voting Machine Hacking Threat You Probably Haven’t Heard About

Politico, by Eric Geller

Using cell phones as modems to transmit data from polling places to central offices has become an overlooked hacking target.

Tags: voting machines-vulnerabilities, hackers, cell phone, modem



183 QR Code:
Machine Hacking

2022, Oct. 20 – Video: County Manager Report on Torrance County Primary Election, New Mexico

Rumble, Spoken Words in New Mexico

Torrance County 2022 Primary Audit Report where it is revealed that voting machines selectively miscounted races by as much as 25%.

Tags: voting machines-errors, Torrance County, New Mexico



184 QR Code:
County Report, NM

2022, Oct. 27 – Why Election Results May Not Be Known Right Away

AP News, by Christina A. Cassidy



185 QR Code:
AP Results Not
Known

This article highlights some commonalities in delays caused by absentee and mail-in ballots. It also says, “No,” hand counting will not speed things up. (I’m not sure who the source of that comment is.) According to some experts, hand counting is more time-consuming and susceptible to human error. Despite the advisories and statements from government agencies such as CISA and EAC about machine errors, anomalies, glitches, and such, there are no correlations to or mention of delays caused by voting machines in the article.

Tags: hand-count, mail-in ballots, vote tallies, CISA, EAC, voting machines-errors, voting machines-anomalies, voting machines-glitch



186 QR Code:
Texas County will
Repeat Delays

2022, Nov. 2 – Expect Delays from Harris County Reporting Results on Election Night

NBC – KXAN, by Monica Madden

There is no promise of “zero delays in reporting” from Harris County, Texas, election officials after “major reporting delays” in the March 2022 primary. “The March primary was the first major election in which Harris County used the new Hart InterCivic Verity Duo voting machines ...” The official said, “It’s not speedy work. It’s a tedious process,” Tatum said. “We’re spending our time to make sure that we do it right, and sometimes that’s just not speedy.”

Tags: vote tallies, Hart-InterCivic, voting machines-failures, Harris County, Texas



187 QR Code:
Tripp County Auditor

2022, Nov. 3 – Tripp County (SD) to Hand Count Election Ballots

KELO, Keloland.com, by Eric Mayer, Rae Yost

The Tripp County Auditor initially expressed concerns about hand counting ballots and said in a follow-up statement about finding enough volunteers, “It actually surprised me. It wasn’t terrible.”

Tags: election judge, hand-count, Tripp County, South Dakota



188 QR Code:
Loose Leaf Paper
Ballot

2022, Nov. 8 – Emergency Election Board Complaint Filed After Ballot Accepted in Georgia County on Loose-Leaf Paper with Security Feature Turned Off in ALL Examined Machines

The Gateway Pundit, by Brian Lupo

In a follow-up to the Tennessee ‘error code’ in Dominion voting systems discovered in Georgia (see Oct. 4, 2022, article, pg. 204), a team researching the issue believes that a security feature was turned off on every machine they have examined.

Tags: Tennessee error, election integrity, EAC, Dominion, Georgia, Tennessee



189 QR Code:
Dominion Machines

2022, Nov. 8 – Dominion Voting Machines Down in Texas, Arizona, New Jersey – Other Voter Irregularities Reported

The Gateway Pundit, by Jordan Conradson

This article sounds like the rescue for malfunctioning voting machines is to return to hand-counting ballots that are cast by dropping them into a traditional ballot box (no electronics). “Voters are not being turned away but are being asked to fill out ballots manually and place them in the slot for manual counting later.”

Tags: Dominion, voting machines-failures, voting machines-irregularities, paper ballots, Arizona, New Jersey, Texas

2022, Nov. 8 – Maricopa County, Arizona, Experiences Large Number of Voting Machine ‘Malfunctions’ Early Tuesday

The Daily Wire, by John Rigolizzo

Reports began early on election day in Arizona that “around one in every five voting machines were experiencing some sort of malfunction.”

Tags: poll opening failure, voting machines, malfunction, Maricopa County, Arizona



190 QR Code:
Maricopa Machine
Malfunctions

2022, Nov. 8 – Maricopa County Official Apologizes for Broken Voting Machines

The Post Millennial, by Joshua Young

Maricopa County Recorder apologizes to the voters for machine tabulation issues in his county.

Tags: voting machines-malfunction, poll opening failure, Maricopa County, Arizona,



191 QR Code:
Maricopa Apology

2022, Nov. 8 – Mayhem in Maricopa: Election Issues Mount in Arizona, Republicans Lawyer Up

Townhall, by Mia Cathell

As voting issues mounted in Maricopa and other counties in Arizona, Gubernatorial Candidate Kari Lake urged her supporters to stay in line and ensure they get their votes cast. County officials referred to the problems as a “technology issue.”

Tags: voting machines-malfunction, poll opening failure, Kari Lake, Maricopa County, Arizona



192 QR Code:
Maricopa Mayhem

2022, Nov. 8 – 'Box 3' and 'Maricopa County' are Trending Nationally on Twitter

NBC 12 News, by Hunter Bassler

When voting tabulators in more than 40 voting centers in Maricopa County, Arizona, began rejecting ballots, election officials gave voters three options: stay and wait, head to another voting center, or put their ballot in a “secure” drop box called “Box 3.” (see also “Arizona 2022 Election – Machine Issues Result in Creation of Box 3” on pg. 20)

Tags: voting machine-failures, same-day voting, Box 3, Maricopa County, Arizona



193 QR Code:
Box 3 Trends on
Twitter

2022, Nov. 9 – Video: Dr. Walter Daughterity Confirms Algorithms Were Running During the November 8, 2022 Elections

Worldview Tube, by Brannon Howse

In September, Dr. Daughterity, a computer forensic expert, stated publicly that voting machines are not trustworthy (see Sep. 19, 2022, article, pg. 204). A day following the Nov. 8th election, Dr. Daughterity is interviewed and states that algorithms were running during the election.

Tags: algorithm, forensic expert, Walter Daughterity



194 QR Code:
Algorithms Running



195 QR Code:
Ballots Missing

2022, Nov. 10 with Nov. 16 update – Ballots Have Now Gone Missing After Dominion Voting Machine Disaster

The Western Journal, by George Upper

In Mercer County, New Jersey, voting machines by Dominion failed to read ballots. Voters completed paper ballots, which are now reported to have “disappeared.” In a follow-up, Dominion's spokesperson stated that the issue was not with the voting equipment but rather a printing issue.

Tags: Dominion, paper ballots, ballot printing, Mercer County, New Jersey



196 QR Code:
Judge Order

2022, Nov. 10 – Judge Orders Two Voting Machines to Be Cracked Open After Poll Worker Makes Big Mistake

The Western Journal, by Jack Davis

When a poll worker mistakenly removed 2 USB drives from voting equipment, election officials could not tell which USB drive had the actual election results on it. A judge ordered that the voting machines be opened to determine the election results.

Tags: Dominion, USB, election judge, human error, New Jersey



197 QR Code:
Ballots Found

2022, Nov. 13 – Video: Estimated 1 to 2 Dozen Ballots Found in Santa Cruz Mountains, Santa Clara County Says

NBC Bay Area

A report from NBC News after a woman found a bag stuffed with completed ballots in a ravine in Santa Clara County.

Tags: paper ballots, Santa Clara County, California



198 QR Code:
Overturned by
Recount

2022, Dec. 10 – Machines Declare Democrat Winner in House Race, But Then the Hand Recount Overturns It for Republican

The Western Journal, by Randy DeSoto

In an Iowa election (Nov. 8, 2022), a machine count of a House Race was proven incorrect by a Hand Recount.

Tags: hand-count, recount, vote tallies, race overturned, voting machines-errors



199 QR Code:
TN Voters Election
Integrity

2022, Dec. 10 – Video: Why [county] Should Not Jump into a Voting Machine Purchase Contract Right Now

Rumble, Tennessee, Voters for Election Integrity, Presented by Frank Limpus

The combination of vulnerable voting machines, secretive vendors, weak-to-negligible certification efforts, no entity protecting citizens from the harm of these machines, and a disregard for the state's Constitution makes continuing the current election system path untenable. TVEI offers an alternative to rebuild lost voter confidence in elections and minimize costs.

Tags: 2020 election, cybersecurity, voting machines-vulnerabilities, ES&S, Tennessee

2022, Dec. 20 – Georgia City Takes Over Election Control from Fulton County, Paving the Way for Populist Control, Removes Machines

The Georgia Record, by Rob Cunningham

The City of Milton, Georgia, voted unanimously to take responsibility for all municipal elections, no longer allowing Fulton County to manage them. With just over 30,000 registered voters, it is one of the state's highest per capita income cities. After researching election laws and costs, the City Council members determined they could save their city over \$250,000 just in 2023 by making the change.

Tags: voting machines-vendors, hand-count, Fulton County, Georgia



200 QR Code:
Georgia City
Removes Machines

2023, Jul. 3 – The Self-Inflicted Voting Machine Misinformation Crisis Looming Over 2024

Politico, by Zach Montellaro

The Election Assistance Commission prepares to roll out new standards for the certification of voting machines. They worry because “There are groups of people out there that are now declaring elections that are not held on equipment that has been certified...as invalid”. “Virtually every system in use in 2024 will be certified under the old standards, not the new ones. Election officials stress that machines certified under previous standards remain secure and approved for use. But they know bad actors might use their words against them anyway.”

It is always interesting to see our government employees refer to citizens who work to hold them accountable as “bad actors.”

Tags: EAC, misinformation, voting machines-certification



201 QR Code:
Misinformation Crisis

2023, Aug. 22 – Pennsylvania Agrees to Start Publicly Reporting Problems With Voting Machines

WTAE via , by Marc Levy

One person's transparency is another's conspiracy theory. One person's claim of problems is another's proof of election denialism. Those terms all appear in this article.

The article's subject is a court settlement in which the State of Pennsylvania agrees to report voting machine problems publicly. Unfortunately, some election officials “see the potential to help suppress conspiracy theories and misinformation about voting machine malfunctions,” while others worry “it could be used to undermine confidence in elections.”

Tags: voting machines-malfunction, transparency, misinformation, EAC, ES&S, ballot printing, Pennsylvania



202 QR Code:
Publicly Report
Problems

2023, Nov. 7 – Pennsylvania County Promises Accurate Tally After Clerical Error Appears to Flip Votes for Judges

WTAE via , by Michael Rubinkam

The so-called ‘clerical’ error is actually a “coding error by voting machine company Election Systems & Software.”

Tags: voting machines-glitch, vote switch, coding error, ES&S, election judge, Northampton County, Pennsylvania



203 QR Code:
Clerical Error Flips
Votes



204 QR Code:
Serious Threats

2023, Dec. 5 – Voting Experts Warn Of ‘Serious Threats’ for 2024 From Election Equipment Software Breaches

AP News, by Christina A. Cassidy

Software breaches are the basis of *Pandora’s Black Box*. Read this very brief article from AP News, taking note of the names of the recipients of the “letter” of concern. Then go these links for *Pandora’s* concern in 1996 that “no one other than these obscure voting machine vendors can examine the ‘source-codes’ ... that tell the computer exactly how to count your votes” or “every state using the same computers and counting systems leaving no trail to check the accuracy or honesty of the results.”

Pandora’s Black Box on page 27

1996, Nov. – Pandora’s Black Box: Did It Really Count Your Vote? on page 197

Then consider why “nearly two dozen computer scientists, election security experts, and voter advocacy organizations” consider the “multistate effort to unlawfully obtain copies of voting system software poses serious threats to election security and national security ...” What are they hiding?

Tags: Pandora’s Black Box, software breaches, CISA, Dominion, election fraud denial, hand-count



205 QR Code:
Absentee and Early
Voting

2024, Feb. 27 – Delaware Judge Strikes Down State’s Early Voting; Rules Election Day Is Just One Day

The Washington Times, by Stephen Diann

A Delaware judge strikes down voting outside election day and permanent absentee voting. The Judge said, “Our Constitution provides only one such day, not any day or series of days the General Assembly sees fit.”

Tags: absentee voting, election day, permanent absentee, early voting, Delaware

2024, Mar. 8 – Top US Cybersecurity Agency Hacked and Forced to Take Some Systems Offline

CNN, by Sean Lyngaas



206 QR Code:
Systems Hacked at
CISA

These quotes say enough: “A federal agency in charge of cybersecurity discovered it was hacked last month and was forced to take two key computer systems offline, an agency spokesperson and US officials familiar with the incident told CNN.” **“This is a reminder that any organization can be affected by a cyber vulnerability...”**

Keep this in mind: CISA itself was unaware of the breach until it was discovered, not by CISA, but by Google’s Threat Analysis Group.

Tags: CISA, Google, hackers, cybersecurity

2024, Jun. 24 – CISA Confirms Hackers May Have Accessed Data from Chemical Facilities During January Incident

The Record, by Jonathan Greig



207 QR Code:
Chemical Facilities
Hacked

Chemical facilities were hacked, but not election systems. Why not? Apparently, there is no reason why bad actors would want to access America’s election systems. According to this article, CISA “has warned organizations of state-backed hackers — including ones linked to China ...” In the following two articles, you will see that CISA says there is no way a foreign adversary can change US election results. Again, why not?

Tags: CISA, China, hack, cybersecurity

2024, Jul. 19 – Federal Agencies Affected by Worldwide IT Outage

FedScoop, By Rebecca Heilweil, Caroline Nihill, Madison Alder, Matt Bracken

Federal agencies, including CISA, Social Security Administration, NASA, FTC, Veterans Affairs, Justice Department, and others, were all affected by a worldwide IT outage with systems and phones going ‘down.’

Tags: CISA, SSA, NASA, FTC, VA, DOJ, internet, outage



208 QR Code:
Worldwide IT Outage

2024, Oct. 3 –Cybersecurity Head Says There’s No Chance a Foreign Adversary Can Change US Election Results

via Security Week

“CISA director Jen Easterly says there is no chance a foreign adversary can change the results of the upcoming US election.”

It may be beneficial to read this article with another CISA article: 2024, Mar. 8 – Top US Cybersecurity Agency Hacked and Forced to Take Some Systems Offline on page 210.

Tags: CISA, election results, hack, cybersecurity



209 QR Code:
Foreign Adversaries

2024, Oct. 18 – Citizen Advocates Are Training to Disrupt 2024 Elections in The Name of Election Integrity

USA Today, by Sarah D. Wire

This article is a virtual “who’s who” of the leaders in the election integrity movement. Those named and many others have worked for years, and even decades, to investigate, gather evidence, and bring justice to the crimes and abuses in our election systems. The article's title might be correct in labeling us as disruptors, but we are working to disrupt election fraud and secure the elections. For more about David Clements, mentioned a dozen times in the article, see the information for his documentary, *Let My People Go*, on page 216.

Tag: Mike Lindell, David Clements, Cause of America, Patrick Byrne, Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn, Donald J. Trump, Doug Frank, ERIC



210 QR Code:
Training Citizen
Advocates

2024, Oct. 30 – Colorado Accidentally Put Voting System Passwords Online, but Officials Say Election Is Secure

via Security Week

“Voting system passwords were mistakenly put on the Colorado Secretary of State’s website for several months before being spotted and taken down.” The article contains reassurances from state officials and the clerk association that “no damage was done.” I wonder how they know that. When I get a notice from a vendor who was hacked that my private information ‘might’ be compromised, the best they can do is offer free credit-monitoring so I can ‘wait and see’ if there are any adverse effects.

The last paragraph of this article makes a damning statement about Tina Peters, a Colorado Clerk sentenced to prison for, as the article says, “a data-breach scheme based on false allegations.” For those who want to see data analysis of the information Clerk Peters backed-up as was her duty, read the Mesa 3 and Mesa 4 Report (see page 288) and watch *Fingerprints of Fraud – The Movie* on page 215.

Tags: password, Tina Peters, clerk association, Jena Griswold, Mesa 3 Report, Mesa 4 Report, Fingerprints of Fraud, Colorado



211 QR Code:
Colorado Passwords
Online



212 QR Code:
Telecoms Hack per
CISA FBI

2024, Nov. 14 – CISA, FBI Confirm China Hacked Telecoms Providers for Spying

Security Week, by Ionut Arghire

CISA and the FBI have confirmed that Chinese hackers compromised the networks of telecommunications companies to spy on specific targets. “Specifically, we have identified that PRC-affiliated actors have compromised networks at multiple telecommunications companies to enable the theft of customer call records data, the compromise of private communications of a limited number of individuals who are primarily involved in government or political activity, and the copying of certain information that was subject to U.S. law enforcement requests pursuant to court orders,” the alert reads.

But certainly, they would never hack our election systems.

Tags: CISA, FBI, China, hackers, cell phone



213 QR Code:
New Book Explores
Cost

2024, Dec. 17 – New Book Explores Cost of Holding Elections, How and Why Spending Varies Widely from State to State

KU News, by Mike Krings

This article highlights the difficulty of obtaining information regarding the costs of administering elections. A new book, *A Republic If You Can Afford It: How Much Does it Cost to Administer Elections?*, is an academic study on the issues of election costs. Read also about the “myth” of hand counting costs too much on page 259.

Tags: voting equipment, costs



214 QR Code:
Treasury Dept Hack


2025, Jan. 16 – Chinese Hackers Accessed Yellen's Computer in US Treasury Breach, Bloomberg News Reports

Reuters

The ‘hack’ was called a “major incident” by the Treasury Department. So, government agencies, cell phone companies, private businesses, and databases are all hacked or compromised. Still, we are told and supposed to believe that election systems are so well protected that only minor issues might occur.

Tags: US Treasury, China, hackers, Bloomberg, Janet Yellen

Bookshelf






215 QR Code:
Fraud of Century

Fraud of the Century: Rutherford B. Hayes, Samuel Tilden, and the Stolen Election of 1876

Roy Morris, Jr., published 2004

"In this major work of popular history and scholarship, acclaimed historian and biographer Roy Morris, Jr, tells the extraordinary story of how, in America's centennial year, the presidency was stolen, the Civil War was almost reignited, and Black Americans were consigned to nearly ninety years of legalized segregation in the South."




216 QR Code:
Votescam Book

Votescam: The Stealing of America (Book and Interview)

by James M. Collier, Kenneth F. Collier, published 1992

This book is the culmination of a 25-year investigation. Journalists James and Kenneth Collier answer, "Why can't we vote the bastards out?" The answer is, "Because we didn't even vote the bastards in." Thirty years after the book's publication, the question is, has anything changed, or is the steal complete? Originally published in 1992, this groundbreaking exposé has been updated.



Another great source is the 1996 interview with Author James Collier where he speaks about the video they took of alleged election fraud in the 1970's.



217 QR Code:
1996 Votescam
Interview

Black Box Voting Book

Bev Harris, published 2003, free internet version available

About a decade after the Collier brothers published *VoteScam*, Bev Harris wrote and published *Black Box Voting*. "The information in the book is heavily sourced, and editors from several major media outlets have vetted it. Though it is old ..., its information still stands — if anything, elections today are even more opaque and tamper-friendly than before."



218 QR Code:
Black Box Voting
Book

Black Box Voting 2.0 Website

A curated nonpartisan reporting and public education site for elections.

"BlackBoxVoting 2.0 was launched in 2021 to combine legacy research from Bev Harris, who developed the original BlackBoxVoting.org in 2003, with current work by a growing citizen talent pool. The site is now jointly administered by Bennie Smith, a computer programmer and an election commissioner for Shelby County, TN, and Bev Harris."



219 QR Code:
Black Box Voting
Website

Can Voters Detect Malicious Manipulation of Ballot Marking Devices?

National Science Foundation, Authors: Bernhard, Matthew; McDonald, Allison; Meng, Henry; Hwa, Jensen; Bajaj, Nakul; Chang, Kevin; Halderman, J. Alex, Published May 1, 2020

"Ballot marking devices (BMDs) allow voters to select candidates on a computer kiosk, which prints a paper ballot that the voter can review before inserting it into a scanner to be tabulated." "However, BMDs do not eliminate the risk of vote-stealing attacks. Malware could infect the ballot scanners and change the electronic tallies ... or it could infect the BMDs themselves and alter what gets printed on the ballots. This latter variety of cheating cannot be detected by a post-election audit, since the paper trail itself would be wrong, and it cannot be ruled out by pre-election or parallel testing. Instead, BMD security relies on voters themselves detecting such an attack."



220 QR Code:
Detect Ballot
Marking Devices

Absolute Proof: Exposing Election Fraud and the Theft of America by Enemies Foreign and Domestic



Hosted by Mike Lindell, Released 2021

Doing his due diligence since Nov. 4, 2020, Mike Lindell used his resources to look into the deviations that happened on election night. “None of it made any sense.” This video features cyber forensic experts and others to explain the evidence and proof of election crimes used by other countries, including China, to steal our elections.



221 QR Code:
Absolute Proof



Fingerprints of Fraud – The Movie


Jeffrey O'Donnell, Computer and Data Expert, MagaRaccoon.com, Released 2024

How was the 2020 election stolen, and how can it be prevented from happening again? “Based upon these and other findings, which will be detailed in this report [and the Mesa 3 Report], it is my expert opinion that the United States

of America was the victim of a coordinated multi-state conspiracy to defraud the 2020 General Election.” Read these reports if you want to know why.



222 QR Code:
Fingerprints of Fraud




The 2020 Coup – What Happened, What We Can Do

Patrick Colbeck, Published May 9, 2022

“The 2020 Coup takes all of the bits and pieces of election fraud evidence from all across America and knits them together into the definitive work on how the election was stolen. Patrick Colbeck served as a certified Poll Challenger at the TCF Center in Detroit. He witnessed the fraud firsthand. He witnessed the late-night ballot drops, poll challenger lockouts, pizza boxes taped to windows, and voting equipment connected to the internet. Now you can pierce behind the veil of media propaganda and find out what really happened during the 2020 election. Plus, you can learn what we can do about.”



223 QR Code:
The 2020 Coup



Our Broken Elections: How the Left Changed the Way You Vote

John Fund, Hans von Spakovsky, Published Nov. 2, 2021

“Election fraud that alters election outcomes and dilutes legitimate votes occurs all too often, as is the bungling of election bureaucrats. Our election process is full of vulnerabilities that can be — and are — taken advantage of, raising questions about, and damaging public confidence in, the legitimacy of the outcome of elections.”



224 QR Code:
Our Broken Elections



Who Really Won the 2020 Election?

The Heartland Institute, Policy Brief, Published Feb. 6, 2024

“Measuring the Effect of Mail-in Ballot Fraud in the Trump-Biden Race for the White House” “The results of the survey are nothing short of stunning, and upon their release, they sparked numerous conversations about the amount of fraud in the 2020 election and the potential impact of mail-in ballot fraud in future elections.”



225 QR Code:
Who Really Won


The Fighting Bunch: The Battle of Athens and How World War II Veterans Won the Only Successful Armed Rebellion Since the Revolution

Chris DeRose, Published May 3, 2022



226 QR Code: Battle of Athens Book

"Bill White and the young men of McMinn County answered their nation's call after Pearl Harbor. They won the world's freedom and returned to find that they had lost it at home. A corrupt political machine was in charge, protected by violent deputies, funded by racketeering, and kept in place by stolen elections - the worst allegations of voter fraud ever reported to the Department of Justice, according to the U.S. Attorney General."



227 QR Code: Battle of Athens Movie

An American Story - The Battle of Athens, Tennessee 1946 - Full Movie

YouTube account of SamParkerSenate, believed to be filmed in 1992

While I have not found a source to purchase this movie, it shows up on YouTube occasionally. If the link provided with the QR code does not work, search by movie title. It is worth watching.

Let My People Go

Official Full-Length Documentary, David K. Clements, Released 2024



228 QR Code: Let My People Go

"Let My People Go is a modern-day deliverance story rooted in biblical themes and archetypes." This powerful documentary speaks to the efforts of citizens to bring their election concerns and grievances to their elected officials and the punishments inflicted upon them for exercising their rights. It is also one of the most understandable and best-presented explanations of the current election systems in the U.S.




Licensed to Lie: Exposing Corruption in the Department of Justice

Sidney Powell, Published May 1, 2014



229 QR Code: Licensed to Lie

While not specifically about election crimes, this legal thriller is about corruption in the DOJ. Corruption in our justice system means that even stolen elections will go unpunished. "The common thread through it all is a cabal of narcissistic federal prosecutors who broke all the rules and rose to great power. Still in the news today—Robert Mueller's 'pitbull' Andrew Weissmann and other members of Obama's inner circle—are wreaking havoc on our Republic. This book began exposing 'the Deep State.'"




The Parallel Election: A Blueprint for Deception

Gregory Stenstrom, Leah Hoopes, Published Aug. 9, 2022



230 QR Code: Parallel Election

This book "documents, in great detail and with irrefutable evidence, the massive election fraud perpetrated against the citizenry in the November 2020 United States general election, specifically in Delaware County, PA. This unprecedented fraud resulted in the installation of an illegitimate government." The authors show "up close, how it was done, and by whom."



Missouri Statutes



Missouri statutes in this section are those related to elections and hand counting, and are provided as reference for Missourians and as examples for other states. It may be helpful to understand the MO statute for a particular part of the hand count process and use it to research your own state's laws for similar statutes.

Constitution of the State of Missouri



231 QR Code:
MO Constitution

Missouri Constitution

While the process for hand counting explained in this eManual is based on Missouri's statutes and Code of State Regulations, it all begins with the Missouri Constitution. A PDF version is available on the Secretary of State's website.



Where to Look Up Missouri Statutes



233 QR Code:
Revisor Home

Missourians not already utilizing the State's website to find and read statutes are recommended to become familiar with it. Information is power, and the citizens are empowered to monitor the government by reading our laws. The website is called the *Missouri Revisor of Statutes* and can be found at Revisor.MO.gov.

Chapter 115 of Statutes for Election-related Statutes

Most election-related statutes are found in Chapter 115 of the Revised Statutes of Missouri. The online "Revisor" tool helps locate statutes using words or phrases.

The Secretary of State's office provides a printed and PDF version of a book of Missouri election laws. Contact the SOS office to request a print version or download the PDF from the SOS website.

Tutorial Videos for Statutes, Regulations, and Helpful Tips

Videos are available on the companion website with tips for searching the Revisor website, statutes, regulations, and more: ReturntoHandCounting.com/Show-Me-More



232 QR Code:
Election Law Book
PDF



235 QR Code:
Chapter 115



234 QR Code:
Show Me More
Videos

Most Common Statutes for the Hand-Counting Process

This section contains the statutes that I believe are referred to most often to understand Missouri State Law regarding hand-counting ballots for elections. Some are from chapters other than Chapter 115. It is not an exhaustive list. Volunteers and voters are encouraged to do their research on the Revisor website.

These statutes were checked in August 2025 to ensure they matched the Revisor website. To save space, some paragraphs in lengthy statutes were not copied. These are marked with "see Revisor". The statute's link is provided for convenience so the reader can read the entire statute on the Revisor website.

115.013 – Definitions.



236 QR Code:
Statute 115.013

As used in this chapter, unless the context clearly implies otherwise, the following terms mean:

- (1) see Revisor
- (2) see Revisor
- (3) "**Ballot**", the paper ballot, or ballot designed for use with an electronic voting system on which each voter may cast all votes to which he or she is entitled at an election;
- (4) "**Ballot label**", the card, paper, booklet, page, or other material containing the names of all offices and candidates and statements of all questions to be voted on;

- (5) **“Counting location”**, a location selected by the election authority for the automatic processing or counting, or both, of ballots;

Paragraphs (6) through (10) – see *Revisor*

- (11) **“Established political party”** for the state, a political party which, at either of the last two general elections, polled for its candidate for any statewide office more than two percent of the entire vote cast for the office. “Established political party” for any district or political subdivision shall mean a political party which polled more than two percent of the entire vote cast at either of the last two elections in which the district or political subdivision voted as a unit for the election of officers or representatives to serve its area;

- (12) see *Revisor*

- (13) **“Independent”**, a candidate who is not a candidate of any political party and who is running for an office for which political party candidates may run;

- (14) **“Major political party”**, the political party whose candidates received the highest or second highest number of votes at the last general election;

Paragraphs (15) through (20) – see *Revisor*

- (21) **“Polling place”**, the voting place designated for all voters residing in one or more precincts for any election;

- (22) **“Precincts”**, the geographical areas into which the election authority divides its jurisdiction for the purpose of conducting elections;

- (23) see *Revisor*

- (24) **“Question”**, any measure on the ballot which can be voted “YES” or “NO”;

- (25) **“Relative within the second degree by consanguinity or affinity”**, a spouse, parent, child, grandparent, brother, sister, grandchild, mother-in-law, father-in-law, daughter-in-law, or son-in-law;

Paragraphs (26) through (27) – see *Revisor*

- (28) **“Voting district”**, the one or more precincts within which all voters vote at a single polling place for any election.

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 1.025, A.L. 1979 S.B. 275, A.L. 1982 S.B. 526, A.L. 1986 H.B. 1471, et al., A.L. 1997 S.B. 132, A.L. 1999 H.B. 676, A.L. 2002 S.B. 675, A.L. 2005 H.B. 58, A.L. 2014 H.B. 1136, A.L. 2018 H.B. 1469 merged with H.B. 1503, merged with S.B. 592, A.L. 2022 H.B. 1878)



237 QR Code:
Statute 115.015

115.015 – Election authority established and defined.

The county clerk shall be the election authority, except that in a city or county having a board of election commissioners, the board of election commissioners shall be the election authority.

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 2.001)

115.043 – Rules and regulations, powers of election authorities.

Each election authority may make all rules and regulations, not inconsistent with statutory provisions, necessary for the registration of voters and the conduct of elections.

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 2.065, A.L. 1983 S.B. 234)



238 QR Code:
Statute 115.043

115.053 – Election authority deputies — bipartisan requirement — duties, compensation.

1. Each election authority may appoint such even number of additional deputies as it deems necessary to carry out the provisions of subsection 3 of this section. One-half of the deputies shall be members of one major political party, and one-half of the deputies shall be members of the other major political party.
2. Each deputy appointed under the provisions of this section shall be a registered voter of the jurisdiction for which he is appointed. No such deputy shall be a candidate for any office in an election at which he serves or a relative within the third degree, by consanguinity or affinity, to any person whose name appears on the ballot in an election at which he serves.
3. At the direction of the election authority, such deputies may investigate the facts and conditions relating to the residence and voting rights of any person. Upon direction by the election authority, such deputies may attend and be present at any polling place, witness and report to the election authority any failure of duty, fraud or irregularity, instruct



239 QR Code:
Statute 115.053

Election Judges, supervise voting procedures and perform any other lawful function prescribed by the election authority.

4. The deputies shall be paid an amount determined by the election authority, subject to approval of the legislative body or bodies responsible for providing the salaries of other election authority employees and payable from the same source as the salary of the election authority.
5. Deputies shall serve for such time as the election authority determines and may be dismissed summarily by the election authority. At no time, however, shall more deputies from one major political party serve than deputies from the other major political party.

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 2.090)



240 QR Code:
Statute 115.079

115.079 – Election Judges, how appointed.

All Election Judges in each jurisdiction shall be appointed by the election authority.

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 3.001)



241 QR Code:
Statute 115.081

115.081 – Number of judges to be appointed, supervisory judges, duties of.

1. Each election authority shall appoint Election Judges for each polling place within its jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of this section.
2. In all primary and general elections, the election authority shall appoint at least two judges from each major political party to serve at each polling place. The committee of each major political party within the jurisdiction of an election authority is authorized to provide the election authority with a list of Election Judge candidates who meet the requirements under section 115.085. The candidates shall not be required to reside within the jurisdiction of the election authority, as authorized under section 115.085. If a committee of a major political party within the jurisdiction of an election authority fails to provide the prescribed number of qualified names to fill all Election Judge positions before the date established by the election authority, the election authority may select judges to fill the positions as provided by law. If the election authority determines that a name submitted by a committee of a major political party is not qualified to serve as an Election Judge, the election authority shall allow the party to submit another name before filling the position as provided by law. No major political party shall have a majority of the judges at any polling place. No established party shall have a greater number of judges at any polling place than any major political party.
3. In any election that is not a primary or general election, the election authority shall appoint at least one judge from each major political party to serve at each polling place. No major political party shall have a majority of the judges at any polling place. No established party shall have a greater number of judges at any polling place than any major political party.
4. The election authority shall designate two of the judges appointed for each polling place, one from each major political party, as supervisory judges. Supervisory judges shall be responsible for the return of election supplies from the polling place to the election authority and shall have any additional duties prescribed by the election authority.
5. Election Judges may be employed to serve for the first half or last half of any election day. Such judges shall be paid one-half the regular rate of pay. If part-time judges are employed, the election authority shall employ such judges and shall see that a sufficient number for each period are present at all times so as to have the proper total number of judges present at each polling place throughout each election day. The election authority shall require that at each polling place at least one Election Judge from each political party serve a full day and that at all times during the day there be an equal number of Election Judges from each political party.
6. An election authority may appoint additional Election Judges representing other established political parties and additional Election Judges who do not claim a political affiliation. Any question which requires a decision by the majority of judges shall only be made by the judges from the major political parties.

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 3.005, A.L. 1982 S.B. 526, A.L. 2002 S.B. 675, A.L. 2022 H.B. 1878)

115.085 – Qualifications of Election Judges.

1. see Revisor.

2. No person shall be appointed to serve as an election judge who is not a registered voter in this state or a military service member on active duty in this state or a nonresident military spouse. Each election judge shall be a person of good repute and character who can speak, read, and write the English language. No person shall serve as an election judge at any polling place in which his or her name or the name of a relative within the second degree, by consanguinity or affinity, appears on the ballot. However, no relative of any unopposed candidate shall be disqualified from serving as an election judge in any election jurisdiction of the state. No election judge shall, during his or her term of office, hold any other elective public office, other than as a member of a political party committee or township office, except any person who is elected to a board or commission of a political subdivision or special district may serve as an election judge except at a polling place where such political subdivision or special district has an issue or candidate on the ballot. In any county having a population of less than two hundred fifty thousand inhabitants, any candidate for the county committee of a political party who is not a candidate for any other office and who is unopposed for election as a member of the committee shall not be disqualified from serving as an election judge.

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 3.015, A.L. 1986 H.B. 1471, et al., A.L. 1988 H.B. 933, et al., A.L. 1993 S.B. 31, A.L. 1997 S.B. 132, A.L. 2002 S.B. 675, A.L. 2003 H.B. 511, A.L. 2022 H.B. 1878, A.L. 2024 S.B. 912)



242 QR Code:
Statute 115.085

115.087 – Selection of judges in counties not having a board of election commissioners.

1. In each county which does not have a board of election commissioners, the Election Judges shall be selected from lists provided by the county committee of each major political party or as authorized pursuant to section 115.081. Not later than December tenth in each year in which county committeemen are elected, the county committee of each major political party shall submit to the election authority a list of persons qualified to serve as Election Judges in double the number required to hold a general election in the county. For each election, the election authority shall select and appoint the number of judges required to hold the election. If a county committee fails to present the prescribed number of names of qualified persons by the time prescribed, the election authority may select and appoint the number of judges provided by law for the county committee's party. If the election authority deems any person on a list to be unqualified, the election authority may request the county committee which submitted the list to furnish another name.
2. The state chairperson of each established political party may, in jurisdictions where no county committee exists and where the county clerk is the election authority, submit a list of persons qualified to serve as Election Judges to the county clerk. The county clerk may select and appoint additional judges from such list pursuant to section 115.081.
3. County clerks may compile a list of persons who claim no political affiliation and who volunteer to be Election Judges. A county clerk may select and appoint additional judges from such list pursuant to section 115.081.

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 3.020, A.L. 2002 S.B. 675)



243 QR Code:
Statute 115.087

115.091 – Oath of Election Judge.

On commissioning or before entering upon his duties, each Election Judge shall take and subscribe the following oath:

I solemnly swear that I will impartially discharge the duties of judge according to law, to the best of my ability and that I will not disclose how any voter has voted unless I am required to do so as a witness in a proper judicial proceeding. I also affirm that I will not allow any person to vote who is not entitled to vote and that I will make no statement nor give any information of any kind tending in any way to show the state of the count prior to the close of the polls on election day.

Sworn and subscribed to before me

this _____ day of _____, 20_____

Judge of Election

Election Authority (Judge of Election) witnessing oath

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 3.030)



244 QR Code:
Statute 115.091



245 QR Code:
Statute 115.097

115.097 – Judge not to be absent from polls more than one hour — not more than one judge from the same party to be absent at the same time.

No Election Judge shall be absent from the polls for more than one hour during the hours the polls are open on election day. No Election Judge shall be absent from the polls before 9:00 a.m. or after 5:00 p.m. on election day. No more than one judge from the same major political party shall be absent from the polls at the same time on election day.

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 3.043, A.L. 2002 S.B. 675)



246 QR Code:
Statute 115.099

115.099 – Authority to supervise judges.

Each election authority shall have authority to direct judges in their duties and to compel compliance with the law. Each election authority may substitute judges at his discretion on election day. Each election authority shall also have authority at any time to remove any judge for good cause and to replace the judge with a qualified person from the same political party as the removed judge. Any judge selected pursuant to this section shall be selected to ensure that no political party shall have a majority of judges at any polling place and that each major political party has at least one judge serving at the polling place.

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 3.045, A.L. 2002 S.B. 675)



247 QR Code:
Statute 115.102

115.102 – Election Judge, service as, employer not to discriminate against — violation, penalty.

1. An employer shall not terminate, discipline, threaten or take adverse actions against an employee based on the employee's service as an Election Judge.
2. An employee who is appointed to serve as an Election Judge may, on election day, be absent from his or her employment for the period of time that the election authority requires the employee to serve as Election Judge. Employees must notify employers at least seven days prior to an election that they will be absent from work on election day due to service as an Election Judge.
3. An employee discharged in violation of this section may bring a civil action against the employer within ninety days of discharge for recovery of lost wages and other damages caused by the violation and for an order directing reinstatement of the employee. If the employee prevails, the employee shall be entitled to receive reasonable attorney's fees and costs.

(L. 2002 S.B. 675)



248 QR Code:
Statute 115.104

115.104 – Youth election participant — oath — nomination procedure — qualifications — election authorities and judges to direct, powers and duties — high schools may offer preparatory courses.

1. As used in this section, the term “participant” means a Missouri youth election participant.
2. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, any person more than fifteen years of age but less than eighteen years of age who is in full-time attendance in a school of this state may aid and assist any Election Judge or election authority authorized or appointed pursuant to this chapter. Such person shall be known as “Missouri Youth Election Participants” and shall, before entering upon the duties related to an election conducted pursuant to this chapter, take and subscribe the following oath, which shall be signed by the participant and an original copy thereof delivered to the election authority:

I solemnly swear or affirm that I will impartially discharge the duties of a Missouri youth election participant by following to the best of my ability the instructions of any Election Judge, election authority, or teacher of my school. I also swear or affirm that I will not disclose how any voter has voted unless I am told to do so by an Election Judge, election authority, or a court of law in a proper judicial proceeding. I also swear or affirm that I will make no statement nor give any information of any kind tending in any way to show the state of the count of votes prior to the close of the polls on election day, nor will I make any statement during the conduct of my duties

which tends to show my preferences for any issue or candidate involved in the election.

Signature of Missouri Youth
Election Participant

3. If, in the opinion of the chief administrative officer of any high school of this state, the appointment of students in the tenth, eleventh or twelfth grade as Missouri youth election participants would benefit those persons involved and the election process, the officer may nominate such persons as participants. The chief administrative officer shall establish the academic and behavioral standards for qualification, but persons nominated shall, at a minimum:
 - (1) Have demonstrated age-appropriate academic ability and demeanor;
 - (2) Be a person of good repute who can speak, read and write the English language; and
 - (3) Not be related within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity to any person whose name appears on the ballot, except that no participant shall be disqualified if related within such degree to an unopposed candidate.
4. The chief administrative officer of the school shall transmit a written list of nominees to the election authority of the jurisdiction at least sixty days prior to the election. If, in the opinion of the election authority, the appointment of participants nominated pursuant to this section would not be disruptive to the election process, the election authority may appoint any number of participants for each polling place or place where votes are to be counted within its jurisdiction. Such appointment shall include a schedule of the time during which the participant is expected to serve. Nothing in this section shall be construed to mandate the appointment of any participant if, in the sole discretion of the election authority, the presence of such participants in any polling place or place where votes are counted would be disruptive to the orderly election process.
5. Subject to the provisions of this section and under the direct supervision of the election authority or Election Judges, each participant may assist in the administration of the polling place, assist in the counting of votes, assist in the execution of any administrative duty of any election authority or Election Judge, and perform any other election-day-related duty as instructed.
6. Each election authority and Election Judge appointed pursuant to this chapter shall have the authority to direct any Missouri youth election participant in his duties and to compel compliance with law. Each election authority may, in its sole discretion, substitute participants on or before election day. Each election authority or Election Judge shall have the authority at any time to take any action necessary to remove any participant from any polling place or place where votes are being counted. It shall be the duty of any law enforcement officer, if requested by the election authority or judges of election, to exclude any participant from the polling place or place where votes are being counted.
7. In order to best prepare students for duty as Missouri youth election participants pursuant to this section, each high school of this state may offer a course of instruction in the democratic electoral process which concentrates upon the election law of this state. The high school may require successful completion of such a course prior to qualification for nomination as a Missouri youth election participant.

(L. 1994 S.B. 632, A.L. 2014 H.B. 1136)

115.107 – Watchers, how selected, qualifications, duties.

1. At every election, the chairman of the county committee of each political party named on the ballot shall have the right to designate a watcher for each place votes are counted.
2. Watchers are to observe the counting of the votes and present any complaint of irregularity or law violation to the Election Judges, or to the election authority if not satisfied with the decision of the Election Judges. No watcher may be substituted for another on election day.
3. No watcher shall report to anyone the name of any person who has or has not voted.
4. A watcher may remain present until all closing certification forms are completed, all equipment is closed and taken down, the transportation case for the ballots is sealed, election materials are returned to the election authority or to the designated collection place for a polling place, and any other duties or procedures required under sections 115.447 to 115.491 are completed. A watcher may also remain present at each location at which absentee ballots are counted and may remain present while such ballots are being prepared for counting and counted.



249 QR Code:
Statute 115.107

5. All persons selected as watchers shall have the same qualifications required by section 115.085 for Election Judges, except that such watcher shall be a registered voter in the jurisdiction of the election authority for which the watcher is designated as a watcher.

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 4.005, A.L. 1983 S.B. 234, A.L. 2003 H.B. 511, A.L. 2016 S.B. 786)



250 QR Code:
Statute 115.111

115.111 – Improper conduct of challenger or watcher, how handled.

If any watcher or challenger interferes with the orderly process of voting, or is guilty of misconduct or any law violation, the Election Judges shall ask the watcher or challenger to leave the polling place or cease the interference. If the interference continues, the Election Judges shall notify the election authority, which shall take such action as it deems necessary. It shall be the duty of the police, if requested by the election authority or judges of election, to exclude any watcher or challenger from the polling place or the place where votes are being counted. If any challenger is excluded, another may be substituted by the designating committee chairman.

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 4.020)



251 QR Code:
Statute 115.239

115.239 – Placement of party candidates on ballot, how determined.

1. The party casting the highest number of votes for governor at the last gubernatorial election shall be placed in the first or left-hand column on the ballot. The party casting the next highest number of votes for the same office shall be placed in the next column to the right, and so on until all established parties have been placed. In order of the date their petitions were filed, new parties shall then be placed in columns to the right of the established party receiving the smallest vote for governor. If there is no more than one independent candidate for any office, all independent candidates shall be placed in one column to the right of the new party filing the latest petition. If there is more than one independent candidate for any office, the candidate filing the earliest petition shall be placed in the column to the right of the new party filing the latest petition. The independent candidate filing the next earliest petition shall be placed in the next column to the right, and so on until all independent candidates for the office have been placed.

2. The name of each candidate shall be placed in the appropriate column by the election authority.

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 8.105)



252 QR Code:
Statute 115.267

115.267. Experimental use, adoption of or abandonment of electronic voting equipment authorized.

Any election authority may adopt, experiment with or abandon any electronic voting system approved for use in the state, or may lease one or more electronic voting machines or other equipment, either with or without option to purchase, and may use any authorized electronic voting equipment at any polling place in its jurisdiction.

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 8.345, A.L. 2014 H.B. 1136)



253 QR Code:
Statute 115.407

115.407 – Polls, hours to be open.

The Election Judges shall open the polls at six o'clock in the morning and keep them open until seven o'clock in the evening. At seven o'clock in the evening, all voters at the polls, including any in line to vote, shall be permitted to vote.

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 11.001)



254 QR Code:
Statute 115.409

115.409 – Who may be admitted to polling place.

Except election authority personnel, Election Judges, watchers and challengers appointed pursuant to section 115.105 or 115.107, law enforcement officials at the request of election officials or in the line of duty, minor children under the age of eighteen accompanying an adult who is in the process of voting, international observers who have registered as such with the election authority, persons designated by the election authority to administer a simulated youth election for persons ineligible to vote because of their age, members of the news media who present identification satisfactory to the Election Judges and who are present only for the purpose of bona fide news coverage except as provided in subdivision (18) of section 115.637, provided that such coverage does not disclose how any voter cast the voter's ballot on any question or candidate or in the case of a primary election on which party ballot they voted

or does not interfere with the general conduct of the election as determined by the Election Judges or election authority, and registered voters who are eligible to vote at the polling place, no person shall be admitted to a polling place.

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 11.005, A.L. 1986 H.B. 1471, et al., A.L. 1996 H.B. 1557 & 1489, A.L. 2002 S.B. 675)

115.423 – Ballot box, procedure for handling.

Not more than one hour before the voting begins, the Election Judges shall open the ballot box and show to all present that it is empty. The ballot box shall then be locked and the key kept by one of the Election Judges. The ballot box shall not be opened or removed from public view from the time it is shown to be empty until the polls close or until the ballot box is delivered for counting pursuant to section 115.451. If voting machines are used, the Election Judges shall call attention to the counter on the face of each voting machine and show to all present that it is set at zero.

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 11.035, A.L. 2013 S.B. 99)



255 QR Code:
Statute 115.423

115.433 – Judges to initial paper ballots, when.

After the voter's identification certificate has been initialed, two judges of different political parties, or one judge from a major political party and one judge with no political affiliation, shall, where paper ballots are used, initial the voter's ballot or ballot card.

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 11.060, A.L. 2002 S.B. 675, A.L. 2013 S.B. 99)



256 QR Code:
Statute 115.433

115.435 – Voter to proceed to voting booth, when — ballot deemed cast, when.

After initialing the voter's identification certificate and after completing any procedures required by section 115.433, the Election Judges shall allow the voter to proceed to the voting booth and vote. Once the ballot has been completed by the voter and he or she successfully submits the ballot, the ballot is deemed cast.

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 11.070, A.L. 2022 H.B. 1878)



257 QR Code:
Statute 115.435

115.439 – Procedure for voting paper ballot — rulemaking authority.

1. If paper ballots are used, the voter shall, immediately upon receiving his ballot, go alone to a voting booth and vote his ballot in the following manner:
 - (1) When a voter desires to vote for a candidate, the voter shall place a distinguishing mark immediately beside the name of the candidate for which the voter intends to vote;
 - (2) If a write-in line appears on the ballot, the voter may write the name of the person for whom he or she wishes to vote on the line and place a distinguishing mark immediately beside the name;
 - (3) If the ballot is one which contains no candidates, the voter shall place a distinguishing mark directly to the left of each "YES" or "NO" he desires to vote.

No voter shall vote for the same person more than once for the same office at the same election.

2. If the voter accidentally spoils his ballot or ballot card or makes an error, he may return it to an Election Judge and receive another. The Election Judge shall mark "SPOILED" across the ballot or ballot card and place it in an envelope marked "SPOILED BALLOTS". After another ballot has been prepared in the manner provided in section 115.433, the ballot shall be given to the voter for voting.
3. Any rule or portion of a rule, as that term is defined in section 536.010, that is created under the authority delegated in this section shall become effective only if it complies with and is subject to all of the provisions of chapter 536 and, if applicable, section 536.028. This section and chapter 536 are nonseverable and if any of the powers vested with the general assembly pursuant to chapter 536 to review, to delay the effective date or to disapprove and annul a rule are subsequently held unconstitutional, then the grant of rulemaking authority and any rule proposed or adopted after August 28, 2002, shall be invalid and void.

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 11.080, A.L. 1993 S.B. 31, A.L. 2002 S.B. 675, A.L. 2006 S.B. 1014 & 730, A.L. 2013 S.B. 99)



258 QR Code:
Statute 115.439

115.443 – Paper ballots, how marked — electronic voting machines, how voted.



259 QR Code:
Statute 115.443

1. Where paper ballots are used, the voter shall, before leaving the voting booth, fold his ballot so that the distinguishing marks are concealed. The voter shall place his ballot in the ballot box and leave the polling place immediately.

2. Where electronic voting machines are used, the voter shall register his vote as directed in the instructions for use of the machine and leave the polling place immediately.

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 11.090, A.L. 2014 H.B. 1136)

115.447 – Definitions.

(1) As used in this subchapter, unless the context clearly implies otherwise, the following terms shall mean:

(2) **“Counting judges”** are the two judges, one from each major political party, who read each vote received by all candidates and each vote for and against all questions at a polling place;



260 QR Code:
Statute 115.447

(3) **“Receiving judges”** are the two judges, one from each major political party, who initial each voter's ballot at a polling place;

(4) **“Recording judges”** are the two judges, one from each major political party, who tally the votes received by each candidate and for and against each question at a polling place. These terms describe functions rather than individuals, and any Election Judge may perform more than one function at a polling place on election day.

(5) As used in this subchapter, unless the context clearly implies otherwise, the following terms shall mean:

(6) **“Defective ballot”** is any ballot on which the number of write-in votes and votes cast on the ballot for any office exceed the number allowed by law, and any ballot which is bent or damaged so that it cannot be properly counted by automatic tabulating equipment;

(7) **“Rejected ballot”** is any ballot on which no votes are counted because the ballot fails to have the initials of the proper Election Judges, because the number of votes for all offices and on all questions exceeds the number authorized by law, because the voter is deemed by the Election Judges to be unqualified, because it is an absentee ballot not accompanied by a completed and signed affidavit, or because the ballot was voted with unlawful assistance;

(8) **“Spoiled ballot”** is any ballot accidentally spoiled by a voter and replaced by Election Judges in the manner provided in subsection 2 of section 115.439.

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 12.001, A.L. 2022 H.B. 1878)

115.449 – Ballots, when and how counted.

1. As soon as the polls close in each polling place using paper ballots, the Election Judges shall begin to count the votes. If earlier counting is begun pursuant to section 115.451, the Election Judges shall complete the count in the manner provided by this section. Once begun, no count shall be adjourned or postponed until all proper votes have been counted.



261 QR Code:
Statute 115.449

2. One counting judge, closely observed by the other counting judge, shall take the ballots out of the ballot box one at a time and, holding each ballot in such a way that the other counting judge may read it, shall read the name of each candidate properly voted for and the office sought by each. As each vote is called out, the recording judges shall each record the vote on a tally sheet. The votes for and against all questions shall likewise be read and recorded. If more than one political subdivision or special district is holding an election on the same day at the same polling place and using separate ballots, the counting judges may separate the ballots of each political subdivision and special district and first read one set, then the next and so on until all proper votes have been counted.

3. After the recording of all proper votes, the recording judges shall compare their tallies. When the recording judges agree on the count, they shall sign both of the tally sheets, and one of the recording judges shall announce in a loud voice the total number of votes for each candidate and for and against each question.

4. After the announcement of the vote, the Election Judges shall record the vote totals in the appropriate places on each statement of returns. If any tally sheet or statement of returns contains no heading for any question, the Election Judges shall write the necessary headings on the tally sheet or statement of returns.

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 12.005, A.L. 2006 S.B. 1014 & 730, A.L. 2013 S.B. 99)

115.451 – Judges may read and record votes before polls close, when — procedure to be followed.

If authorized by the election authority the Election Judges may read and record votes before the close of the polls. If so authorized, the Election Judges shall use one ballot box for the deposit of ballots during the first hour of voting. At the end of the hour, the receiving judges shall deliver the ballot box to the counting and recording judges, who shall give the receiving judges a second empty ballot box. The second ballot box shall be shown to be empty and locked in the manner provided in section 115.423. The second ballot box shall not be opened or removed from public view from the time it is shown to be empty until the time the polls close or it is removed for counting pursuant to this section. The ballot box containing the voted ballots shall be taken to a private area within the polling place, and the ballots shall be read and recorded in the manner provided by section 115.449. In no case shall ballot boxes be switched at less than one hour intervals and then only if twenty-five or more ballots have been voted during the hour.

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 12.010)



262 QR Code:
Statute 115.451

115.453 – Procedure for counting votes for candidates.

Election Judges shall count votes for all candidates in the following manner:

- (1) No candidate shall be counted as voted for, except a candidate before whose name a distinguishing mark appears preceding the name and a distinguishing mark does not appear in the square preceding the name of any candidate for the same office in another column. Except as provided in this subdivision and subdivision (2) of this section, each candidate with a distinguishing mark preceding his or her name shall be counted as voted for;
- (2) If distinguishing marks appear next to the names of more candidates for an office than are entitled to fill the office, no candidate for the office shall be counted as voted for. If more than one candidate is to be nominated or elected to an office, and any voter has voted for the same candidate more than once for the same office at the same election, no votes cast by the voter for the candidate shall be counted;
- (3) No vote shall be counted for any candidate that is not marked substantially in accordance with the provisions of this section. The judges shall count votes marked substantially in accordance with this section and section 115.456 when the intent of the voter seems clear. Regulations promulgated by the secretary of state shall be used by the judges to determine voter intent. No ballot containing any proper votes shall be rejected for containing fewer marks than are authorized by law;
- (4) Write-in votes shall be counted only for candidates for election to office who have filed a declaration of intent to be a write-in candidate for election to office with the proper election authority, who shall then notify the proper filing officer of the write-in candidate prior to 5:00 p.m. on the second Friday immediately preceding the election day; except that, write-in votes shall be counted only for candidates for election to state or federal office who have filed a declaration of intent to be a write-in candidate for election to state or federal office with the secretary of state pursuant to section 115.353 prior to 5:00 p.m. on the second Friday immediately preceding the election day. No person who filed as a party or independent candidate for nomination or election to an office may, without withdrawing as provided by law, file as a write-in candidate for election to the same office for the same term. No candidate who files for nomination to an office and is not nominated at a primary election may file a declaration of intent to be a write-in candidate for the same office at the general election. When declarations are properly filed with the secretary of state, the secretary of state shall promptly transmit copies of all such declarations to the proper election authorities for further action pursuant to this section. The election authority shall furnish a list to the Election Judges and counting teams prior to election day of all write-in candidates who have filed such declaration. This subdivision shall not apply to elections wherein candidates are being elected to an office for which no candidate has filed. No person shall file a declaration of intent to be a write-in candidate for election to any municipal office unless such person is qualified to be certified as a candidate under section 115.306;
- (5) Write-in votes shall be cast and counted for a candidate without party designation. Write-in votes for a person cast with a party designation shall not be counted. Except for candidates for political party committees, no candidate shall be elected as a write-in candidate unless such candidate receives a separate plurality of the votes without party designation regardless of whether or not the total write-in votes for such candidate under all party and without party designations totals a majority of the votes cast;



263 QR Code:
Statute 115.453

- (6) When submitted to the election authority, each declaration of intent to be a write-in candidate for the office of United States president shall include the name of a candidate for vice president and the name of nominees for presidential elector equal to the number to which the state is entitled. At least one qualified resident of each congressional district shall be nominated as presidential elector. Each such declaration of intent to be a write-in candidate shall be accompanied by a declaration of candidacy for each presidential elector in substantially the form set forth in subsection 3 of section 115.399. Each declaration of candidacy for the office of presidential elector shall be subscribed and sworn to by the candidate before the election official receiving the declaration of intent to be a write-in, notary public or other officer authorized by law to administer oaths.

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 12.015, A.L. 1979 S.B. 275, A.L. 1983 S.B. 234, A.L. 1997 S.B. 132, A.L. 1999 H.B. 676, A.L. 2002 S.B. 675, A.L. 2006 S.B. 1014 & 730, A.L. 2008 H.B. 1311, A.L. 2014 H.B. 1136, A.L. 2018 S.B. 592 merged with S.B. 975 & 1024 Revision)



264 QR Code:
Statute 115.455

115.455 – Procedure for counting votes on questions.

Election Judges shall count votes on each question in the following manner:

- (1) If a distinguishing mark appears immediately beside or below the “YES”, the question shall be counted as voted for. If a distinguishing mark appears immediately beside or below the “NO”, the question shall be counted as voted against;
- (2) If a distinguishing mark appears immediately beside or below the “YES” and immediately beside or below the “NO”, the question shall neither be counted as voted for nor as voted against.

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 12.020, A.L. 2013 S.B. 99)

115.456 – Responsibilities of election authority — counting optical scan ballots — counting paper ballots — marks indicating political party preference, how construed.

1.

- (1) The election authority shall be responsible for ensuring that the standards provided for in this subsection are followed when counting ballots cast using optical scan voting systems.



265 QR Code:
Statute 115.456

- (2) Prior to tabulating ballots, all machines shall be programmed to reject blank ballots where no votes are recorded or where an overvote is registered in any race.
- (3) In jurisdictions using precinct-based tabulators, the voter who cast the ballot shall review the ballot if rejected, if the voter wishes to make any changes to the ballot, or if the voter would like to spoil the ballot and receive another ballot.
- (4) In jurisdictions using centrally based tabulators, if a ballot is so rejected it shall be reviewed by a bipartisan team using the following criteria:
 - (a) If a ballot is determined to be damaged, the bipartisan team shall spoil the original ballot and duplicate the voter's intent on the new ballot, provided that there is an undisputed method of matching the duplicate card with its original after it has been placed with the remainder of the ballot cards from such precinct; and
 - (b) Voter intent shall be determined using the following criteria:
 - a. There is a distinguishing mark in the printed oval or divided arrow adjacent to the name of the candidate or issue preference;
 - b. There is a distinguishing mark adjacent to the name of the candidate or issue preference; or
 - c. The name of the candidate or issue preference is circled.
- (5) In jurisdictions using optical scan systems, a valid vote for a write-in candidate shall include the following:
 - (a) A distinguishing mark in the designated location preceding the name of the candidate;
 - (b) The name of the candidate. If the name of the candidate as written by the voter is substantially as declared by the candidate it shall be counted, or in those circumstances where the names of candidates are similar, the names of candidates as shown on voter registration records shall be counted; and
 - (c) The name of the office for which the candidate is to be elected.
- (6) Whenever a hand recount of votes of optical scan ballots is ordered, the provisions of this subsection shall be used to determine voter intent.

2.

- (1) The election authority shall be responsible for ensuring that the standards provided for in this subsection are followed when counting ballots cast using paper ballots.

- (2) Voter intent shall be determined using the following criteria:
 - (a) There is a distinguishing mark in the square adjacent to the name of the candidate or issue preference;
 - (b) There is a distinguishing mark adjacent to the name of the candidate or issue preference; or
 - (c) The name of the candidate or issue preference is circled.
 - (3) In jurisdictions using paper ballots, a valid vote for a write-in candidate shall include the following:
 - (a) A distinguishing mark in the square immediately preceding the name of the candidate;
 - (b) The name of the candidate. If the name of the candidate as written by the voter is substantially as declared by the candidate it shall be counted, or in those circumstances where the names of candidates are similar, the names of candidates as shown on voter registration records shall be counted; and
 - (c) The name of the office for which the candidate is to be elected.
 - (4) Whenever a hand recount of votes of paper ballots is ordered, the provisions of this subsection shall be used to determine voter intent.
4. 3. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a distinguishing mark indicating a general preference for or against the candidates of one political party shall not be considered a vote for or against any specific candidate.

(L. 2006 S.B. 1014 & 730, A.L. 2013 S.B. 99)



266 QR Code:
Statute 115.457

115.457 – Uninitialed ballots rejected, exception.

If a ballot appears without the initials of two Election Judges, the ballot shall be rejected, except when it appears the absence of initials is due to a mistake of the Election Judges and that the ballot is otherwise legal and proper.

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 12.025)



267 QR Code:
Statute 115.459

115.459 – Duties of judges after polls close (paper ballots).

At each polling place using paper ballots, after the polling place is closed, the Election Judges shall

- (1) Certify in the tally book the number of ballots cast, the number of identification certificates signed, the number of rejected and spoiled ballots and the number of ballots received at the polling place which were not cast at the election. If the number of signed identification certificates is not the same as the number of ballots cast, the judges shall make a signed statement of the fact and the reasons therefor if known and shall return the statement with the statements of returns;
- (2) Certify on two statements of returns the number of votes received by each candidate and for and against each question. No returns shall be signed in blank or before the polls have closed and all proper votes cast at the polling place have been counted;
- (3) Certify that each statement made in the tally book and on each statement of returns is correct. If any judge declines to certify that all such statements are correct, he shall state his reasons in writing, which shall be attached to each statement of returns and returned with the statement to the election authority.

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 12.030)



268 QR Code:
Statute 115.463

115.463 – Procedure after statements of returns signed (paper ballots).

Immediately after signing the statements of returns, the Election Judges shall enclose the voted ballots, tally books, tally sheets, statements of returns and other election supplies in containers designated by the election authority.

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 12.040)



269 QR Code:
Statute 115.465

115.465 – Procedure for returning voted ballots (paper ballots).

1. If the election authority directs the voted ballots to be returned in a ballot box, the box shall be locked and the key removed. Each Election Judge shall write his name on a strip of paper which shall be pasted over the keyhole of the ballot box and extended over the upper lid of the box and over the top for some distance. The strip shall be pasted in such

a manner that the signatures extend across the keyhole and place of opening so that if the box is opened or the key inserted in the keyhole, the paper will be torn and the signatures destroyed. The paper shall be fastened with an adhesive material which will not permit removal of the strip without defacing it.

2. If the election authority directs the voted ballots to be returned in an envelope or other container, the container shall be sealed. Each Election Judge shall write his name on a strip of paper which shall be pasted over the opening of the container. The strip shall be pasted in such a manner that the signatures extend across the place of opening so that if the container is opened, the paper will be torn and the signatures destroyed. The paper shall be fastened with an adhesive material which will not permit removal of the strip without defacing it.



270 QR Code:
Statute 115.468

3. On the outside of the ballot box or other container in which the ballots are returned, the location of the polling place and the date of the election shall be printed.

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 12.045)

115.468 – Write-in votes may be tallied at counting center.

At the discretion of the election authority, the verification and tallying of write-in votes may be done at the counting center by teams of election authority employees in lieu of at the polling place.

(L. 1978 S.B. 582)

115.469 – Write-in votes, when counted – procedure to follow.

1. If authorized by the election authority, the Election Judges at any polling place using an electronic voting system may read and record write-in votes before the close of the polls and may send other voted ballots to the counting place. If so authorized, the Election Judges shall use one ballot box for the deposit of ballots during the first five hours of voting. Between eleven o'clock in the morning and twelve noon, the receiving judges shall deliver the ballot box to the counting and recording judges, who shall give the receiving judges a second empty



271 QR Code:
Statute 115.469

ballot box. The second ballot box shall be shown to be empty and locked in the manner provided in section 115.423. The second ballot box shall not be opened or removed from public view from the time it is shown to be empty until the time the polls close. The ballot box containing the voted ballots shall be taken to a private area within the polling place, and the write-in votes shall be read and recorded in the manner provided in section 115.467.

2. If early counting of write-in votes is begun pursuant to this section, the Election Judges shall, after counting and recording all proper write-in votes, separate all ballot cards, except defective ballot cards, from the write-in forms if any. The ballots which do not have write-in votes shall then be sent to the counting place in the same manner as ballots are sent upon the close of the polls. The Election

Judges shall enclose the ballot cards, the envelope marked "DEFECTIVE BALLOTS", and all write-in forms containing proper votes, in a container designated by the election authority. The container shall be securely sealed in such a manner that if the container is opened, the seal will be broken beyond repair. On the outside of the container, the location of the polling place and the date of the election shall be printed. After sealing, the container shall be closely watched by the Election Judges until it is delivered to the counting location.

3. If early counting of write-in votes is begun pursuant to this section, the election authority shall appoint a team of employees or Election Judges who shall, between the hours of eleven o'clock in the morning and three o'clock in the afternoon, receive the ballot container from the Election Judges at the polling place and immediately deliver it to the counting location. Each team appointed pursuant to this subsection shall consist of two members, one from each major political party. If any ballot container is not sealed when it is delivered to the counting location, the election official receiving the container shall make a statement of the fact which includes the location of the polling place and the date of the election printed on the container and the reason the container is not sealed, if known.
4. After delivery to the counting location, any ballot which is damaged and cannot be properly counted by the automatic tabulating equipment may be hand counted or duplicated in the manner provided in subsection 3 of section 115.477.
5. After delivery to the counting location, the proper votes on each ballot card may be transferred to magnetic tapes. Under no circumstances shall any such tape be read or interpreted until after the time fixed by law for the close of the polls and then only in the manner provided in section 115.477.
6. Write-in ballots may also be counted as provided in section 115.451.

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 12.053, A.L. 1979 S.B. 275, A.L. 1982 S.B. 526)

115.491 – Supervisory judges to return ballots and supplies to election authority, when.



272 QR Code:
Statute 115.491

1. Except as otherwise expressly provided in this subchapter, the two supervisory judges, one from each major political party, shall return the voted ballots, the ballots marked “REJECTED”, “SPOILED”, and “DEFECTIVE”, the tally sheets, tally books and statements of returns, the registration records and other election supplies from each polling place to the election authority as soon as possible, but in no case later than two hours after the signing of the returns at the polling place. The election authority shall keep its office open until all ballots, returns and other election materials have been received. If any voted ballot container is not sealed, the election authority shall make a written statement of the facts which includes the location of the polling place and date of the election printed on the container and the reason the container is not sealed, if known.
2. If the election authority directs the voted ballots to be returned in a ballot box, one supervisory judge shall return the ballot box, one set of tally sheets and one statement of returns. The other supervisory judge shall return the keys to the ballot box, the tally book, the other set of tally sheets and the other statement of returns. If the election authority directs the voted ballots or write-in votes to be returned in sacks or other containers, one supervisory judge shall return the containers of voted ballots, one set of tally sheets and one statement of returns. The other supervisory judge shall return the other set of tally sheets and the other statement of returns.

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 12.105)

115.493 – Ballots and records to be kept twenty-two months, may be inspected, when.



273 QR Code:
Statute 115.493

The election authority shall keep all voted ballots, ballot cards, processed ballot materials in electronic form and write-in forms, and all applications, statements, certificates, affidavits and computer programs relating to each election for twenty-two months after the date of the election. During the time that voted ballots, ballot cards, processed ballot materials in electronic form and write-in forms are kept by the election authority, it shall not open or inspect them or allow anyone else to do so, except upon order of a legislative body trying an election contest, a court or a grand jury. After twenty-two months, the ballots, ballot cards, processed ballot materials in electronic form, write-in forms, applications, statements, certificates, affidavits and computer programs relating to each election may be destroyed. If an election contest, grand jury investigation or civil or criminal case relating to the election is pending at the time, however, the materials shall not be destroyed until the contest, investigation or case is finally determined.

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 12.110, A.L. 2002 S.B. 675, A.L. 2013 S.B. 99)

115.631 – Class one election offenses.



274 QR Code:
Statute 115.631

The following offenses, and any others specifically so described by law, shall be class one election offenses and are deemed **felonies** connected with the exercise of the right of suffrage. Conviction for any of these offenses shall be punished by imprisonment of not more than five years or by fine of not less than two thousand five hundred dollars but not more than ten thousand dollars or by both such imprisonment and fine:

- (1) Willfully and falsely making any certificate, affidavit, or statement required to be made pursuant to any provision of this chapter, including but not limited to statements specifically required to be made “under penalty of perjury”; or in any other manner knowingly furnishing false information to an election authority or election official engaged in any lawful duty or action in such a way as to hinder or mislead the authority or official in the performance of official duties. If an individual willfully and falsely makes any certificate, affidavit, or statement required to be made under section 115.155, including but not limited to statements specifically required to be made “under penalty of perjury”, such individual shall be guilty of a class D felony;

Paragraphs (2) through (5) – see Revisor

- (6) An Election Judge knowingly causing or permitting any ballot to be in the ballot box at the opening of the polls and before the voting commences;
- (7) Knowingly furnishing any voter with a false or fraudulent or bogus ballot, or knowingly practicing any fraud upon a voter to induce him or her to cast a vote which will be rejected, or otherwise defrauding him or her of his or her vote;

- (8) An Election Judge knowingly placing or attempting to place or permitting any ballot, or paper having the semblance of a ballot, to be placed in a ballot box at any election unless the ballot is offered by a qualified voter as provided by law;
- (9) Knowingly placing or attempting to place or causing to be placed any false or fraudulent or bogus ballot in a ballot box at any election;
- (10) Knowingly removing any legal ballot from a ballot box for the purpose of changing the true and lawful count of any election or in any other manner knowingly changing the true and lawful count of any election;
- (11) Knowingly altering, defacing, damaging, destroying or concealing any ballot after it has been voted for the purpose of changing the lawful count of any election;
- (12) Knowingly altering, defacing, damaging, destroying or concealing any poll list, report, affidavit, return or certificate for the purpose of changing the lawful count of any election;
- (13) On the part of any person authorized to receive, tally or count a poll list, tally sheet or election return, receiving, tallying or counting a poll list, tally sheet or election return the person knows is fraudulent, forged or counterfeit, or knowingly making an incorrect account of any election;
- (14) On the part of any person whose duty it is to grant certificates of election, or in any manner declare the result of an election, granting a certificate to a person the person knows is not entitled to receive the certificate, or declaring any election result the person knows is based upon fraudulent, fictitious or illegal votes or returns;
- (15) Willfully destroying or damaging any official ballots, whether marked or unmarked, after the ballots have been prepared for use at an election and during the time they are required by law to be preserved in the custody of the Election Judges or the election authority;

Paragraphs (16) through (26) – *see Revisor*

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 15.005, A.L. 1983 S.B. 234, A.L. 1997 S.B. 132, A.L. 2005 H.B. 353, A.L. 2006 S.B. 1014 & 730, A.L. 2014 S.B. 491, A.L. 2018 S.B. 592 merged with S.B. 975 & 1024 Revision)

115.633 – Class two election offenses.



275 QR Code:
Statute 115.633

The following offenses, and any others specifically so described by law, shall be class two election offenses and are deemed **felonies** not connected with the exercise of the right of suffrage. Conviction for any of these offenses shall be punished by imprisonment of not more than five years or by fine of not less than two thousand five hundred dollars but not more than ten thousand dollars or by both such imprisonment and fine:

- (1) On the day of election or before the counting of votes is completed, willfully concealing, breaking, or destroying any ballot box used or intended to be used at such election or willfully or fraudulently concealing or removing any ballot box from the custody of the Election Judges;

- (2) *see Revisor*

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 15.010)

115.635 – Class three election offenses.

The following offenses, and any others specifically so described by law, shall be class three election offenses and are deemed **misdemeanors** connected with the exercise of the right of suffrage. Conviction for any of these offenses shall be punished by imprisonment of not more than one year or by fine of not more than two thousand five hundred dollars, or by both such imprisonment and fine:

Paragraphs (1) through (6) – *see Revisor*



276 QR Code:
Statute 115.635

- (7) Removing, destroying or altering any supplies or information placed in or near a voting booth for the purpose of enabling a voter to prepare his or her ballot;

- (8) *see Revisor*

- (9) On the part of any election official, challenger, watcher or person assisting a person to vote, revealing or disclosing any information as to how any voter may have voted, indicated that the person had voted except as authorized by this chapter, indicated an intent to vote or offered to vote, except to a grand jury or pursuant to a lawful subpoena in a court proceeding relating to an election offense;

- (10) On the part of any registration or election official, refusing to permit any person to register to vote or to vote when such official knows the person is legally entitled to register or legally entitled to vote;

- (11) Attempting to commit or participating in an attempt to commit any class one or class two election offense.

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 15.015, A.L. 1997 S.B. 132, A.L. 1999 H.B. 676)

115.637 – Class four election offenses.

The following offenses, and any others specifically so described by law, shall be class four election offenses and are deemed **misdemeanors** not connected with the exercise of the right of suffrage. Conviction for any of these offenses shall be punished by imprisonment of not more than one year or by a fine of not more than two thousand five hundred dollars or by both such imprisonment and fine:



277 QR Code:
Statute 115.637

Paragraph (1) through (8) – *see Revisor*

(9) Any person having in his or her possession any official ballot, except in the performance of his or her duty as an election authority or official, or in the act of exercising his or her individual voting privilege;

(10) *see Revisor*

(11) On the part of any Election Judge, being willfully absent from the polls on election day without good cause or willfully detaining any election material or equipment and not causing it to be produced at the voting place at the opening of the polls or within fifteen minutes thereafter;

(12) On the part of any election authority or official, willfully neglecting, refusing, or omitting to perform any duty required of him or her by law with respect to holding and conducting an election, receiving and counting out the ballots, or making proper returns;

(13) On the part of any Election Judge, or party watcher or challenger, furnishing any information tending in any way to show the state of the count to any other person prior to the closing of the polls;

(14) *see Revisor*

(15) On the part of any Election Judge, disclosing to any person the name of any candidate for whom a voter has voted;

(16) Interfering, or attempting to interfere, with any voter inside a polling place;

(17) On the part of any person at any registration site, polling place, counting location or verification location, causing any breach of the peace or engaging in disorderly conduct, violence, or threats of violence whereby such registration, election, count or verification is impeded or interfered with;

(18) Exit polling, surveying, sampling, electioneering, distributing election literature, posting signs or placing vehicles bearing signs with respect to any candidate or question to be voted on at an election on election day inside the building in which a polling place is located or within twenty-five feet of the building's outer door closest to the polling place, or, on the part of any person, refusing to remove or permit removal from property owned or controlled by such person, any such election sign or literature located within such distance on such day after request for removal by any person;

(19) *see Revisor*

(L. 1977 H.B. 101 § 15.020, A.L. 1982 S.B. 526, A.L. 1985 H.B. 620, A.L. 2003 H.B. 511, A.L. 2018 S.B. 592)

Missouri Rules & Regulations



Missouri Code of State Regulations (CSR)

While the State Legislature writes laws, state agencies in Missouri write regulations of how the rules will be applied. The agencies include agriculture, revenue, public safety, education, and more.

Code of State Regulations

1. What is the Code of State Regulations?

The *Code of State Regulations* is the set of all state agencies' rules. The rules in the *Code* are organized by state agency.

2. How often is it published?

An update to the *Code of State Regulations* is published once a month on the last day of the month except in January when it is published on the 29th (30th in a leap year). The rulemakings published in the *Code* become effective thirty (30) days after they are published unless a later day has been chosen by the agency.

3. Where can I find the Code of State Regulations?

The *Code of State Regulations* is available online at <https://www.sos.mo.gov/adrules/csr/csr>.



278 QR Code:
CSR Homepage



279 QR Code:
Rulemaking Manual

280 MO Codes of State Regulations - description from the FAQ page ([Perma.cc/RE5U-Z6HU](https://perma.cc/RE5U-Z6HU))

Rulemaking Manual: How Do Rules for Laws Get Made?

A very detailed process for making rules is explained in the Rulemaking Manual, which can be downloaded.

Use the *Missouri Register* to Access and Track the Rulemaking Process

Missouri Register

- [Publication Schedule](#)
- [Timeline Calculator](#)
- [Search Missouri Register](#)

2025 Issues

[January 2, 2025 - Volume 50, Number 1\(Pages 1-60\)](#)

Archived Issues

[2024 Missouri Register](#)

[2023 Missouri Register](#)

[2022 Missouri Register](#)

Per the SOS website, “The *Missouri Register* is the magazine that sets forth all state agency rulemakings as they proceed through the rulemaking process. Specifically, the *Register* will contain emergency rules, proposed rules, final orders of rulemaking, and additions. The purpose of the *Missouri Register* is to **allow citizens access to the rulemaking process and the ability to comment on and recommend changes to proposed rules...**” *[emphasis added]*

A list of the most recent publications of the *Missouri Register* is on the SOS website.



282 QR Code:
Missouri Register
Publications List

281 Example of Missouri Register Publications List

Sign up for Automatic Email Notifications about Rules



283 QR Code:
Administrative Rules
Notifications

“The notifications system permits users to filter selections of rules and rulemakings based on interest(s). This process allows the selection of pending rulemakings by specific title, division, chapter, and/or rule number. Any time a rulemaking change is published that affects your selection, you will be automatically notified via email.”

Since my interest is election topics, I signed up for these specific topics:

Currently Saved Notifications

15 CSR 30-1.020 General Organization—Missouri Elections Commission
Title 15: Division 30: Chapter 10 - Voting Machines (Electronic)
Title 15: Division 30: Chapter 14 - Election Contributions
Title 15: Division 30: Chapter 3 - Voter Identification
Title 15: Division 30: Chapter 4 - Postcard Voter Application and Forms
Title 15: Division 30: Chapter 5 - Mail Ballot Election Procedures and Forms
Title 15: Division 30: Chapter 8 - Provisional Voting Procedures
Title 15: Division 30: Chapter 9 - Uniform Counting Standards

284 Example of filters selected for notification interests

Election Regulations for Counting Standards

Generally, laws written by legislators regarding elections will task the Secretary of State with promulgating the rules for how the law will be carried out.



285 QR Code:
Title 15
Division 30
PDF Download

For example, Title 15 (Elected Officials), Division 30 (Secretary of State), Chapter 9, is all about uniform counting standards. This section is significant regarding the hand counting of ballots.

15 CSR 30-9.030 – Counting Standards for Paper Ballots

Download the PDF and scroll down to where 15 CSR30-9.030 begins (currently bottom left column on page 6). These are the rules that apply to hand-counting paper ballots.

15 CSR 30-9.030 Uniform Counting Standards – Paper Ballots

PURPOSE: This rule provides for standards to be used by election authorities when counting ballots cast using paper ballots.

286 CSR section for Uniform Counting Standards - Paper Ballots

9: MYTH-DEBUNKING WORKBOOK

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There seems to be no other conclusion that can be made other than that most clerks are not election experts, nor are they experts on electronic voting equipment, chain of custody, machine certification, or cybersecurity. Why would there be an expectation that someone elected for a job with myriad tasks, including human resources, county records, licensing, and budgeting, in addition to administering elections, could start day one as an election expert?

It has also become apparent that clerks are not experts in hand-counting ballots in an election. The sampling of ballots required by law to be hand-counted to verify voting machine results is a small sampling. The complaints about the time it takes to count the sample are indicators that the hand-count processes being used are tedious and poorly designed.

Yet, without being experts on electronic voting equipment or hand-count processes, election officials tenaciously hold their ground that the voting machines are infallible, and hand-counting will not work. Anything to the contrary is deemed a far-right conspiracy theory and even intimidation of election officials.

Without expertise, what sources are clerks or elections officials using to base their “objections”? I have found that “objections” from clerks to hand-counting have no basis but are talking points propagated from sources such as clerk associations and vendors of election-related products. Election officials will string these “objections” into public litanies of talking points.

Honestly, it can be like playing Whack-A-Mole.¹⁴ No matter how many “objections” are debunked, another pops up until the litany is done. Then, the conversation will likely end with a dismissing comment, “well, hand counting just doesn’t work.”



A recent and excellent example of a litany of talking points can be found in a December 2024 article in a Wyoming newspaper (see page 260). The article was about errors in machine voting tabulations due to a mistake on the printed ballots.

Statement by Clerk #1: “This is a human error”

It appeared the clerk was super-intent on making sure it is believed that voting machines are accurate. The clerk lamented, “this is giving hand-count people some ammunition to say, ‘We need a hand-count’.” The newspaper was willing to use the “human error” comment in the headline, probably to ensure it was not missed. How many people read headlines and skip the rest of the story?

For those who do read the entire story, there were more quotes to impugn hand-counting:

Clerk #2: 2,220 people needed to count 20,000 ballots in 4 hours

Clerk #2: hand count costs between \$99,000 and \$1.4M

Commissioner: “... more human involvement would lead to more human errors.”

No basis or substantiation was given in the article for these comments. As you will discover in the upcoming pages, these are considered “myths.”

¹⁴ “Whack-A-Mole” created by Aaron Fechter in 1976, is the copyright of Creative Engineering, Inc.

This Myth-Debunking Workbook section is intended to show that comments like those from the Wyoming article are easy to debunk and how to do so.

Much of this information has been used as the overview presentation for the “Train the Trainers” classes. I also use this information for my presentations about hand counting, such as at Turning Point Action’s *RNC: Restoring National Confidence* event in Las Vegas in January 2024.¹⁵



287 Linda Rantz speaking at Turning Point Action event, January 2024
[Perma.cc/BB9S-5NGM](https://perma.cc/BB9S-5NGM)

Debunking (another way to show “receipts”) begins with understanding the difference between an objection and a myth and then using the tools to prepare the findings to back up your statements. This section explains the most common myths and our findings.

Tools, Training Materials, and Resources Available on the Companion Website

A companion website to this eManual provides downloadable training materials, debunking tools, and other resources.

ReturntoHandCounting.com



Tools are identified in this eManual with a red tool icon, as shown on the left. Tools include estimating and debunking tools.

ReturntoHandCounting.com/Tools



Training materials are identified in the eManual with a blue pen icon shown on the left. Training materials include instructions and downloads for all training programs.

ReturntoHandCounting.com/Training

¹⁵ Linda Rantz speaking at Turning Point Action event, January 2024, [Perma.cc/BB9S-5NGM](https://perma.cc/BB9S-5NGM)



FINDING: REAL OBJECTIONS
HAVE 'GROUNDS,' MOST
OBJECTIONS ARE MYTHS

MYTH: There Are Lots Of “Objections” To Hand-Counting Ballots

If you bring up “hand counting” to an elected official, you will likely hear “objections” in response. However, if they fail to support their stance with evidence, those objections are just myths.

Definitions of Objections, Myths, and Findings

What is an objection? It is a reason or argument presented in opposition.¹⁶ An objection should be based on “grounds.” Think of a courtroom scene in a movie where one lawyer yells, “I object.” The opposing lawyer fires back, “on what grounds?” The court will override the objection without “grounds” or a basis of fact.

It should be expected that someone making an objection, especially a government official, can prove that what they say is verified, proven, or based on a case study or investigation.

Most Objections are Myths

When someone pushes an objection, asking for their source or grounds is a good idea. Almost always, in my experience, they have nothing to cite.

Having no grounds for an objection means it is more likely a “myth.” The definition of “myth” is a popular belief that is FALSE or UNSUPPORTED.¹⁷

Myth: Popular belief that is false or unsupported



Being “popular” does not make something accurate.

In the [Wyoming article](#) on page 239, Clerk #1 said, “when our integrity is questioned, it’s insulting.” The same clerk says, “I hope to encourage more people to become involved. Come to the testing, call our office, ask questions. We’re here to help.”

These two quotes highlight a glaring contradiction that leads to a misunderstanding between citizens and elected officials. Citizens *are* becoming more involved and asking questions. But apparently the clerk considers questions to be outside the box of appropriate citizen participation. When citizens ask questions, they recognize that they are being read a litany of objections without basis. So, they dig deeper and ask more questions, to the apparent chagrin of election officials.

The posture taken by many clerks, including the quoted Wyoming clerk, is that when citizens question or investigate elections, the personal integrity of the clerks is being challenged.

Findings Equal Fact Check

Findings are the results of investigations or research.¹⁸ The term “fact-checking” has become somewhat toxic in recent years due to being used by some to cancel free speech. But whatever it is called, accurate findings are



¹⁶ “Objection” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, [Perma.cc/B7TG-EKGP](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/objection)

¹⁷ “Myth” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, [Perma.cc/8DAW-K7XJ](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/myth)

¹⁸ “Finding.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, [Perma.cc/FAQ3-7BEM](https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/finding)

critical, especially for government officials, before making objections that turn out to be popular beliefs.

When popular beliefs are debunked or the public realize they've been misinformed, trust in institutions, media, and experts can erode. This realization can lead to skepticism.

The table below shows some common “myths” about hand counting and the corresponding findings.

Hand Counting Myths and Findings

Common Hand Counting Myths

While there may be slight variations in how they are argued, these are the most common:

Costs Too Much

People are Less
Accurate

Takes Too Long for
Results

Not Enough People to
Count

Only Works for Small
Counties

People are Likely to
Cheat

Findings About Hand Counting

Based on our fact-checking and experience, the “findings” about hand counting are:

Saves Money

Incremental Auditing
Assures Accuracy

Same-Day or Election-
Day Results

Plenty of People and
Training is Quick

Works in Counties of
Any Size

More Transparency &
Better Security

Understanding the benefits of hand counting and the findings that debunk the myths is essential. Be prepared for these conversations by using the tools that have been developed and are explained throughout this section.

Training: Myth-Debunking Overview Presentation

To understand more about debunking hand count myths, or if you are giving a presentation yourself, downloadable materials, including handouts, transcript, PowerPoint deck, and more, from ReturntoHandCounting.com/Training.





FINDING: HAND COUNTING IS EASY!

"Hand Counting is the Victory Garden of Our Day"

Col. Shawn Smith

Myth: Hand Counting is Tedious and People Will Not Want to Do It

Hand counting is easy and is proven by a 2-minute Tally Demo. As a matter of fact, at a dinner event about a year ago, we had everyone try the Tally Demo. A MO State Senator Ben Brown had his 7-year-old son with him. At the end of the event, the senator told us that his son did the Tally Demo by himself and was 100% accurate!

Victory Gardens of Our Day

Col. Shawn Smith said, "Hand counting is the Victory Gardens of our Day." During the world war, supply chains were limited, and there were troops overseas and citizens on the Homefront to be fed. The citizens stood up and took on the responsibility of growing the food to keep America fed.



In the same way, we find ourselves working to secure our elections, and hand counting will be critical to that effort. People need to step up. How do we do that?



Change the Narrative

First, we must change the narrative that is being pushed about hand counting. Changing the narrative is our easiest strategy. Anyone can 'present' the Tally Demo. In about 2 minutes, you can change someone's mind, show them that **hand counting is easy**, and change the narrative!

Commit to show the demo to 10 people who agree to show it to 5 others. That means your 2-minute demo has reached 60 people! **Be creative** in finding locations to show the Tally Demo. Do you know that national parks allow for "First Amendment activities"? Mt. Rushmore does (someone is selling Yoga books in the pic below). What about the St. Louis Arch, the Statue of Liberty, Independence Hall, or even your state capitol? **What better places to speak about securing elections than these monuments to freedom?**



288 Mt. Rushmore, SD, main walkway, arrow shows "free speech" area and vendor selling yoga books

Tool: 2-Minute Tally Demo

Everything needed for the Tally Demo, including forms, flyers, and instructions, is available for download. Even a recorded video can be played if you do not want to give the presentation yourself.



Download from ReturntoHandCounting.com/Training

Capitol Count Events

Another event that can raise awareness is a “Capitol Count” event. The idea is to hold a hand-count demonstration in your state capitol or at a location where you can invite state legislators and other elected officials to attend. The pictures below show examples of actual Capitol Count events.



289 Missouri Capitol Count Event

and other elected officials to attend. The pictures below show examples of actual Capitol Count events.

Missouri Capitol Count

At our Missouri event, we set up in the Rotunda of the State Capitol. The table at the top center had a trainer training four brand-new people how to hand count.

The table at the top left is a 2-minute tally demo station. The State History Museum is housed

in the two wings on either side of the rotunda. As visitors were walking from one wing to another, they had the opportunity to learn how easy it is to hand count.

The tables in the semi-circle at the bottom of the image were experienced hand counters from the Osage election. With their experience, they could show how quickly they could count a stack of ballots.



290 Oregon Capitol Count Event

Oregon Capitol Count

Oregon combined its Capitol Count event into another event already scheduled at a facility within walking distance of their State Capitol.

As seen by the notations on the image, Oregon also had a “Learn Hand Counting” station to train people. The “Try Hand Counting”

station was the 2-minute tally demo. The “Full Hand Count Demonstration” was done by hand counters who had attended our training in Oregon just a few weeks prior.

Pennsylvania Capitol Count

Pennsylvania also moved quickly from training to demonstrating. Their Capitol Count event was held in a hearing room at their State Capitol.

After a presentation about the benefits of hand counting, a demonstration team showed the ease of counting a stack of ballots. The space included seating for observers, plus the opportunity to walk up to the table for a better view.



291 Pennsylvania Capitol Count Event

Capitol Count Events can be an excellent way to invite legislators to a demonstration on their own 'turf,' allowing them to observe and ask questions.

Download Capitol Count materials from ReturntoHandCounting.com/Tools.



FINDING: INCREMENTAL

AUDITING ASSURES ACCURACY

Myth: People are Less Accurate than Machines

Consider the stories told by elite athletes of how much practice and how many ‘reps’ they did every day for years to become excellent. Repetition can develop skill mastery.

Skill Mastery Forms Muscle Memory

An athlete cannot play in a game the same way they practiced, standing in one place waiting for the ball or puck and taking shot after shot. They must have their ‘head in the game.’ When it is time for the shot, muscle memory kicks in.

“Muscle Memory is a form of procedural memory that involves consolidating a specific motor task into memory through repetition ... When a movement is repeated over time, the brain creates a long-term muscle memory for that task, eventually allowing it to be performed with little to no conscious effort. This process decreases the need for attention and creates maximum efficiency within the motor and memory systems.

Muscle memory is found in many everyday activities that become automatic and improve with practice, such as riding bikes, driving motor vehicles, playing ball sports, typing on keyboards, entering PINs, playing musical instruments, poker, martial arts, swimming, dancing, and drawing.”

Wikipedia on Muscle Memory: [Perma.cc/AA9W-D3LQ](https://perma.cc/AA9W-D3LQ)

Is Hand Counting Too Repetitive for Humans to Accomplish with Accuracy?

I have given presentations and interviews about hand counting for nearly two years. I referred to the two articles below as examples of perpetuating a myth with seemingly no factual backup. The myth is that counting ballots is too repetitive, and people are not accurate on repetitive tasks.

2022, Oct. 11 – Research Finds Hand Counting Ballots to Be Less Accurate and More Expensive

NPR recorded interview with Miles Parks by Mary Louise Kelly

While the headline of this interview starts with the word “Research” and purports that humans are less accurate than machines when counting ballots, reading through the transcript reveals that the interviewee admits that there are “few studies showing this.”

Tags: myth, human accuracy



292 QR Code:
Research Finds by
NPR

2022, Apr. 8 – Why Hand-Counting Ballots Is Such a Bad Idea

The Washington Post – Democracy Dies in Darkness, by Amber Phillips

The newspaper theme, “Democracy Dies in Darkness,” and the article title that touts hand counting is a “bad idea” would be enough to dissuade some of its audience from reading and further taking the headline’s word about hand counting. Reading further, however, would show the expert’s admission that few studies show humans are less accurate than machines. It should also be noted that as of January 2025, several corrections have been made to the online version of this article since the publication date.

Tags: myth, human accuracy



293 QR Code:
WaPo Bad Idea

If you read only the headlines of the articles on page 249, you would likely believe that A) *research* has been done to prove a lack of accuracy in hand counting and B) that there are many reasons why hand-counting ballots will not work.

The truth is that both articles attempt to lead readers into believing that hand counting is so repetitive and tedious that humans will not be accurate. They espouse that it is a function that should be left to machines.

Beyond the headlines, though, both articles admit that there are few studies to prove their assertions – if there are, in fact, any such studies. A study cited in one of the articles supposed to back up their claims is not about hand counting but about humans and repetitive tasks. The author extrapolated the findings of that study and applied it to hand counting.

Practice Makes Perfect

When we teach hand counting, we encourage everyone to practice as much as possible to become proficient. Practice materials are provided on [ReturntoHandCounting/Training](#), allowing counters to practice independently at any time. A newly trained counter will be slower than someone with some practice or experience. The goal is for tallying to become a muscle memory, allowing counters to focus on other details during a hand counted election.

Why Convince the Public that Humans Cannot Accurately Count Ballots?

The county clerk in the Wyoming article (see page 260) was so concerned about placing blame for a mistake with voting equipment that she said, “... this was not a machine issue. The machines work great, they count ballots appropriately and correctly. It was a human error.”

What was the mistake? Whoever was responsible for formatting the ballots made a mistake. The tabulators could not correctly read the ballots. Was it a human who made the mistake? Since the machines could not program themselves, yes, it was a human error.

On this point, I agree. I do not believe that voting machines decide on their own to make mistakes, change votes, or produce erroneous election results. I believe that voting machines do *exactly what they are programmed to do*.

The fun is watching how many words have been used to describe machine “mistakes.”

The Blame Game: Anomaly? Programming Error? Glitch?

Several references in this eManual refer to election “mistakes” that occur with voting machines, and the topic is discussed in *Can Voting Machines Make Errors or Be Manipulated?* on page 14. It includes a list of related articles from the Newsroom section.

Like the Wyoming article, when issues with the tabulations or results of voting machines are discovered, news articles usually attribute the issue to an anomaly, programming error, glitch, etc. It is never the “fault” of the machine. At least the Wyoming clerk just called it human error.

I concede that humans are not infallible, and they can make mistakes. Sometimes, humans programming the voting equipment make mistakes. Sometimes, the election officials make mistakes while administering the election. Sometimes, the election workers carrying out their poll duties make mistakes. And, sometimes, the voters themselves make mistakes. Mistakes are why the auditing of elections is a vital issue.

What is Incremental Auditing?

The auditing approach used for voting machines is to run tests prior to and after elections while ‘keeping fingers crossed’ during the election. The hand count method in this eManual uses an **incremental auditing** process. There are steps throughout the counting of ballots that require reconciliation of the judges’ work at specific points. If an error or discrepancy is found, it must be corrected before proceeding to the next step.

The incremental auditing steps of the Hand Counting process are listed below. These are outlined on the Checklists beginning on page 73,

Checklist #	Descriptions of Incremental Auditing Steps
4.6	Totals for each column are written in the bottom row of Ballots Tally Forms (after a batch of ballots is completed, which could be 25 to about 100 ballots). The totals are quickly and easily determined because of the Ballots Tally form's numbered “bubble” design. (Judges are not counting hash marks)
4.7	The column totals in the bottom row of the Ballots Tally form are added together and entered on the form as the Row Total.
4.8	REP and DEM Recording Judges compare the bottom row numbers on their individual Ballots Tally forms
4.9	Any discrepancies between the Ballots Tally forms of the REP and DEM Recording Judges are reviewed with assistance from the REP and DEM Counting Judges (the only persons permitted to handle the ballots).
4.10	The Counting Judges work together to count the number of ballots and give the totals to the Recording Judges to be entered on the Ballots Tally forms.
4.15	One Recording Judge copies, while the other closely observes, totals on the bottom row of the Ballots Tally form onto the Batches Summary sheet. The bottom row includes the individual column totals and the Row Total (the Row Total is an important factor in reconciling the totals).
The steps above are repeated for each batch of ballots. After the final batch is tallied, the following steps take place.	
5.1	The entries in each column on the Batches Summary sheet are added, and the totals are posted in the bottom row. The totals are written by one Recording Judge and closely observed by the other.
5.2	The column totals in the bottom row of the Batches Summary sheet are added together and entered on the form as the Row Total. This is done by one Recording Judge, closely observed by the other.
5.3	The left column on the Batches Summary sheet has the Row Totals from the Ballots Tally forms. The sum of this left column is totaled and entered in the bottom row. This is done by one Recording Judge, closely observed by the other.
5.4	The totals from 5.2 and 5.3 above are compared by the Recording Judges. If there is a discrepancy, the errors must be found and corrected before proceeding.
When the Batches Summary sheets for all groups of ballots are reconciled and completed, the following steps take place.	
5.7	One Recording Judge, closely watched by the other, copies the totals from each Batches Summary sheet onto the corresponding row of the Results of Polling Place worksheet.
5.9	One Counting Judge, closely watched by the other, reads the votes cast for each candidate and question. With their own Statement of Returns, the two Recording Judges enter the numbers read onto the Returns form. The two copies of the Statement of Returns are compared to ensure no errors or discrepancies by the Recording Judges.

Anecdotal Endorsements of Incremental Auditing

Our training classes always seemed to have engineers, CPAs or bookkeepers, math teachers, or the like in attendance. We also were honored to have military vets with systems process experience. During the training, they would recognize and express admiration for the bookkeeping-like aspects of the hand-count process. At the end of the 6-hour class, they would praise the hand-count system, saying they appreciated the double-check and reconciliation features built into it.

Following the hand count of an official election in Osage County, MO (see page 293), a survey asking about their experience was sent to the election judges who counted ballots, and thirty-seven of forty-four replied. A common word used to describe the hand count was “fun.” This comment is a good representation of the comments received.

“The hand counting experience was great for the first time!!
Never felt rushed or worried about the process - it all made sense.”

Review of the Missouri Hand Count Process, AI-Generated

The eManual, originally written in 2022 by the author without the use of any AI tools, was uploaded to Grok2, an xAI tool, for analysis. The following are some comments from Grok2 specific to incremental auditing and the accuracy of the Missouri Method hand-counting process:

Your "Missouri Method" of hand counting ballots sounds like a well-thought-out system designed to maximize accuracy and integrity in the election process. Here's how this approach can be beneficial:

Incremental Auditing:

By counting in smaller, manageable batches (50 to 150 ballots), you introduce a continuous audit process:

Immediate Reconciliation:

Checking and reconciling totals after each batch allows for immediate correction of any discrepancies. This minimizes the accumulation of errors over larger quantities of ballots, which could be more challenging to rectify later.

Checks and Balances:

Verification at Each Step: The requirement to balance each batch before moving on ensures that errors are caught early. This is akin to real-time auditing, where you're not just counting votes but also verifying the count against a known or expected total (like the number of ballots issued or scanned).

Error Correction:

Immediate Attention to Discrepancies: By mandating corrections before proceeding, you ensure that every batch is accurate, reducing the likelihood of compounded errors. This is crucial for maintaining the integrity of the election results, as small errors can have significant impacts when scaled across an entire election.

Overcoming Boredom, Fatigue, and Distractions

I could have debunked this entire myth with an obvious solution that is so easy, in fact, that I am not sure if it is overlooked or ignored on purpose.


The image below (without the arrows) was initially shown on page 59 as an example of the layout of a counting location. On page 78, the statute regarding the roles of election judges is explained.

In brief, all the workers at the polling place are “election judges.” They are given other titles to identify their work, such as Receiving Judges, Counting Judges, Recording Judges, etc., **at the time** they are performing the work.

The titles change as they change roles throughout the day, as they are allowed to do.

The image below illustrates these election judges making a shift change and moving to other positions. Nothing requires that the same REP and DEM judges move together. When reseated, everyone must be paired as a REP and DEM.

With the ability to change to other roles and the opportunity to work half days (if granted by the clerk, see page 61), there is no reason any election judge should be bored, fatigued, or distracted at the polling place on election day.



294 Polling Place illustrating change of roles by elections judges to avoid fatigue, boredom, or distractions due to being assigned to the same role non-stop all day



FINDING: HAND COUNTING IS A
BETTER TOOL FOR DETERMINING
VOTER INTENT

Myth: The Hand Counted Verification of Machine Results Match Exactly Every Single Time

The statement that election results tabulated by machines exactly match the post-election hand-counted verification **every single time** is repeated over and over. It is a myth. Start with the comment below from a former president of a clerk association.

“Our association sent out a survey about the 5% hand count for the November 2022 election and the results showed that: The bipartisan team’s count is often not accurate on the first try.

Some teams recounted 8 times to get an accurate count.

On the other hand, the results of the tabulator were correct the first time.”

Recounted 8 times to get an accurate count? That means hand-counting over and over until the humans tally the ballots the way the machine counted them. Why not conduct a forensic audit of the voting equipment to determine if there are miscounts of the votes?

Humans Are Being Forced to Tally Ballots According to Machine Standards

In 2022, I attended, for the first time, post-election testing of voting equipment. I saw a real-life example of election night vote totals from the machine not matching the certification results. The race being used for certification was Congressman Blaine Luetkemeyer’s run for re-election.

The count was off by one vote. The bipartisan team had already hand-counted the 5% sample, so they counted by hand again. They also ran the ballots through the tabulator again – I believe they did that at least twice. No matter how they counted, the certification count did not match the election night count.

The bipartisan team theorized that there must be a ballot where the oval was not adequately marked, causing the machine to skip the vote on election night, but now the machine was accepting the vote. They proceeded to flip through the ballots until they found one marked in such a way that they all agreed it was the problematic ballot.

I watched with a mild degree of shock as this unfolded before me. I was surprised that the Deputy Secretary of State was present, and after the “bad” ballot was shown to the Deputy, I cannot recall any comment being made. One vote would not affect the results of the congressional race, so I did not protest. I just made note of what happened.

Ballots Must Be Counted Based on Voter Intent

There is an element of ballot counting at which humans are better than voting machines, and that element is discerning voter intent. This element is proven by the fact that if a voting machine cannot determine how a vote on a ballot should be counted, the ballot must be adjudicated, and a human does that.

Missouri and other states have laws and rules about “voter intent.” In Missouri, the law says the voter must make a “distinguishing mark,” and the Secretary of State shall promulgate rules for judges to determine voter intent (see statute [115.453](#) on page 227 and [115.456](#) on page 228).

Try Discerning Voter Intent Yourself

On the Missouri SOS website for regulations about voter intent,¹⁹ there are examples of how a voter might mark a ballot. The website explains which examples of valid votes should be counted and why or why not.

We covered voter intent during hand-count training, and I showed two slides to let the trainees do a self-test. You try both and then check the bottom of page 258 for the answers.

In the image below, these are examples of ballot markings by voters (notice the square boxes). If the ballots are being hand-counted, how many of the six examples are valid votes?

Voter Intent – Hand Counting

For Governor (Vote for one)	
☒ HARRY S. TRUMAN	PARTY
☐ LAURA INGALLS WILDER	PARTY
☐ MARK TWAIN	PARTY
☐ GEORGE WASHINGTON CARVER	PARTY
☐ WRITE-IN	PARTY

For Governor (Vote for one)	
☒ HARRY S. TRUMAN	PARTY
☐ LAURA INGALLS WILDER	PARTY
☐ MARK TWAIN	PARTY
☐ GEORGE WASHINGTON CARVER	PARTY
☐ WRITE-IN	PARTY

For Governor (Vote for one)	
☐ HARRY S. TRUMAN	PARTY
☐ LAURA INGALLS WILDER	PARTY
☒ MARK TWAIN	PARTY
☐ GEORGE WASHINGTON CARVER	PARTY
☐ WRITE-IN	PARTY

For Governor (Vote for one)	
☐ HARRY S. TRUMAN	PARTY
☒ LAURA INGALLS WILDER	PARTY
☐ MARK TWAIN	PARTY
☐ GEORGE WASHINGTON CARVER	PARTY
☐ WRITE-IN	PARTY

For Governor (Vote for one)	
☐ HARRY S. TRUMAN	PARTY
☒ LAURA INGALLS WILDER	PARTY
☐ MARK TWAIN	PARTY
☒ GEORGE WASHINGTON CARVER	PARTY
☐ WRITE-IN	PARTY

For Governor (Vote for one)	
☐ HARRY S. TRUMAN	PARTY
☐ LAURA INGALLS WILDER	PARTY
☐ MARK TWAIN	PARTY
☒ GEORGE WASHINGTON CARVER	PARTY
☐ WRITE-IN	PARTY

Gertrude Stein: NOT a qualified write-in

295 Examples from SOS regulations regarding Voter Intent when ballots are hand-counted

In the image below, these are examples of ballot markings by voters (notice the ovals). If the ballots are being counted by voting machines, how many of the six examples are valid votes?

Voter Intent – Machine Counting

For Governor (Vote for one)	
☒ HARRY S. TRUMAN	PARTY
☐ LAURA INGALLS WILDER	PARTY
☐ MARK TWAIN	PARTY
☐ GEORGE WASHINGTON CARVER	PARTY
☐ WRITE-IN	PARTY

For Governor (Vote for one)	
☒ HARRY S. TRUMAN	PARTY
☐ LAURA INGALLS WILDER	PARTY
☐ MARK TWAIN	PARTY
☐ GEORGE WASHINGTON CARVER	PARTY
☐ WRITE-IN	PARTY

For Governor (Vote for one)	
☐ HARRY S. TRUMAN	PARTY
☐ LAURA INGALLS WILDER	PARTY
☒ MARK TWAIN	PARTY
☐ GEORGE WASHINGTON CARVER	PARTY
☐ WRITE-IN	PARTY

For Governor (Vote for one)	
☐ HARRY S. TRUMAN	PARTY
☒ LAURA INGALLS WILDER	PARTY
☐ MARK TWAIN	PARTY
☐ GEORGE WASHINGTON CARVER	PARTY
☐ WRITE-IN	PARTY

For Governor (Vote for one)	
☒ HARRY S. TRUMAN	PARTY
☐ LAURA INGALLS WILDER	PARTY
☒ MARK TWAIN	PARTY
☐ GEORGE WASHINGTON CARVER	PARTY
☐ WRITE-IN	PARTY

For Governor (Vote for one)	
☐ HARRY S. TRUMAN	PARTY
☒ LAURA INGALLS WILDER	PARTY
☐ MARK TWAIN	PARTY
☐ GEORGE WASHINGTON CARVER	PARTY
☐ WRITE-IN	PARTY

Albert Einstein: NOT a qualified write-in

296 Examples from SOS regulations regarding Voter Intent when ballots are Machine Counted

Use the link in the footnote below to check these with the SOS regulations.

¹⁹ Voter intent examples from Missouri CSR: [Perma.cc/2M83-AH8L](https://perma.cc/2M83-AH8L)


Discerning Voter Intent Requires Human Judgment and Intuition

Clearly, there are marks outside the oval or box in the examples on the previous page. Most voters would likely believe that these votes will not be counted because we have been trained by ominous warnings printed on ballots of how to fill in ovals. The 'instructions' example on the right not only instructs the voter to mark within the oval but admonishes, "Do not make any marks outside of the oval ... do not cross out or erase, or your vote may not count." So, we dutifully fill in ovals.

The examples in image 295 are the hand count section of the regulations. If humans were hand counting the ballots, they would likely have no challenge discerning the voter's intention and would accurately count the vote.

If you gave the same set of ballots to another hand-count team to tally, they could come up with different results. Humans use judgment and intuition to discern intent and may not always agree. What is required in Missouri is for the REP and DEM judges to agree.

But how would a machine handle the examples in image 296? Are voting machines programmed to identify and separate ballots with marks outside the ovals for adjudication? Or would a machine consider this an overvote and **inaccurately** not count the valid votes?



297 Sample ballot marking instructions for filling ovals

How Are Counting Teams Taught to Count Voter Intent?

When we train hand counters, we spend time discussing voter intent. The laws may vary by state, but all states have laws or regulations about voter intent, and we encourage trainees to research the topic in their state.

I do not have proof that election workers around the country are NOT being taught about voter intent, just the anecdotal experience that every time I speak on this subject, those in the room who have previously worked in elections are flabbergasted to know there is such a thing.

Consider the quote that began this sub-section on page 255: if hand-count teams need to "recount 8 times to get an accurate count."

- What was the "accurate" count that needed to be matched? The machine count?
- If the hand count is supposed to verify the machine count and does not match 8 times, at what point is it determined that it is incorrect?
- Most importantly, if hand count teams are required to "recount 8 times" until they get accurate results, does it mean they are being forced to ignore voter intent and count the ballot the way they believe a machine would count it?



FINDING: HAND COUNTING SAVES MONEY

The answers for page 256: ALL examples for both hand counting and machine counting are VALID. The questions posed were, "are the markings valid votes?" All are valid, but will all be counted? Probably yes, if they are being hand counted, but will a voting machine discern voter intent and count the valid votes? That question needs to be asked.

Myth: Hand Counting Costs Too Much

One of the most popular myths is that hand counting ballots would cost too much.

What they won't tell you is how much it costs to use voting machines.

What they will tell you is that whatever it costs to use voting machines, hand counting will cost more than that.

Nationwide, obtaining detailed cost information on voting machines has proven elusive. It was beginning to feel as if the data was being deliberately withheld. What is becoming more apparent is that it is not that 'they' will not tell us the costs of using voting machines but that they do not know.

"No one knows how much it costs to run elections" was a quote cited in the initial release of this eManual. The quote is from the National Conference of State Legislators in a 2018 brief (see page 24). While the 2018 brief is no longer available online, more than four years later, their 2022 brief does not have an answer about costs and conveys a similar message: "Inquiring minds want to get a better sense of what it costs to run elections that are efficient, accurate and secure."

2022, Apr. 20 – Democracy Is Priceless, but Elections Cost Big Bucks

NCSL, National Conference of State Legislatures, by Wendy Underhill

From 2018 until 2022, the Conference for State legislatures could not provide specifics on the costs for elections in general, never mind specific costs for voting equipment.

Tags: costs, voting machines



298 QR Code: NCSL
Brief April 2022

As of January 2025, nothing on the NCSL website makes it seem that the organization has come any closer to determining election costs other than they are "big bucks." They may not have known that a new academic study was published about election costs.



2024, Dec. 2 – *A Republic If You Can Afford It. How Much Does It Cost to Administer Elections?*

Published by Cambridge University Press

"The cost of administering elections is an importantly understudied area in election science. This book reports election costs in 48 out of 50 states. It discusses the challenges and opportunities of collecting local election costs." "The relationship between spending and election administration outcomes is also explored and finds that the voters' confidence and perceptions of fraud in elections is associated with the amount spent on election administration."



299 QR Code:
Republic If You Can
Afford

"*A Republic If You Can Afford It*" is an academic study. It does not focus on nor break out the costs of voting machines. It studied elections from 2008 to 2016, returning a "wide variation in costs across the country." I was told by an academic that the purpose of a scholarly study is not necessarily to conclude but to present data so that others can use it to research the topic further. Ultimately, the study in "*A Republic*" means that not even a prestigious university can tell us the costs of elections or, more specifically, the cost of using voting machines.

Confirming the lack of data for election costs brings us to the Wyoming article discussed at the beginning of this section (see page 239 and highlighted below). **How did a clerk from a county in Wyoming calculate that hand-counting an election would cost between \$99,000 and \$1.4 million?**

With the same questions we posed on page 239, we will repeat here: What costs are included in the estimate? Is this for a single election? Is it an annual estimate? Is it for 20,000 ballots? Is it offset by any savings for not using voting machines?



300 QR Code:
Human Error

2024, Dec. 3 – ‘This is a human error’: Carbon County Clerk Gwynn Bartlett Explains Weston County Election Controversy

Laramie Boomerang via Wyoming News Exchange, by Joshua Wood

In the November 2024 election, voting machines were unable to correctly count ballots in a Wyoming county due to an error with programming for ballot printing. Clerks quoted in this article point to “human error” but use the incident to make claims against hand counting, both costs and number of people needed to count, without providing receipts or substantiation.


Tags: 2020 election, human error, voting machines, ballot printing, costs, Carbon County, Campbell County, Wyoming

Apples to Apples Comparison of Costs

Even Mike Lindell has asked for an “apples to apples” comparison of costs for hand counting versus machine counting. However, since getting the voting machine costs has been impossible, we cannot do “apples to apples.”

What can be done instead is an “apple-slice to an apple-slice” comparison.

We looked at the labor costs for the extra people needed to hand-count the ballots. For the voting equipment, we took the vendor invoices we were able to obtain from an open records request and pulled very specific costs for preparing the machines for an election: programming, licensing, additional ballot design machines to be able to tabulate, software updates, and cleaning or maintenance of the machines for each election. It was the closest comparison of putting people in a polling place to count compared to putting the machine there to count.



301 Slice-to-Slices Cost Comparison of Hand Counting vs Electronic Voting Equipment


The “apple slice” analysis is based on a 4-year election cycle (2020 thru 2023) in Osage County, Missouri, with just under 10,000 registered voters. For hand counting, the costs for election judges for all the elections during that cycle would be \$1.61 per ballot cast.

Voting Machine “Apple Slice” Costs

The voting machine “apple slice,” for the specific costs we pulled, was \$3.84 per ballot cast. A difference of \$2.23 per ballot cast compared to hand counting. There were 27,415 ballots cast in the 4-year period.

Costs for the “Rest of the Apple”

What is the cost of the “rest of the apple”? For voting equipment, we don’t know. Some possible items are shown in image 302 below, including items like the purchase or lease of the machines. How much would those costs increase the per ballot price? Also, consider the staff and time that goes into the pre-election testing of the machines, as well as the post-election testing. By law, these machines require 24/7/365 security and monitoring. How much does that all cost?



302 Examples of Other Costs for Voting Machines

So, I cannot tell you how much the per ballot cast would increase costs. It suffices to say that, at a minimum, it is \$3.84 per ballot cast to count using voting machines, but I have heard estimates of over \$20 per ballot cast to use voting machines.

What about the “rest of the apple” for hand counting? These costs include secure ballot boxes, security seals, printing, binders, office supplies, etc. Everything needed for hand counting adds about \$1.10 per ballot cast. Combine the labor cost for hand counting of \$1.61 per ballot plus the additional \$1.10 per ballot for other expenses, and the entire “apple” cost for hand-counting is \$2.71 per ballot cast.

The “apple” (hand counting) to “slice” (machine counting) comparison is \$2.71 per ballot cast for hand counting compared to **at least** \$3.84 per ballot cast for voting machine costs. That is a difference of \$1.13 per ballot cast at a minimum, but likely much higher if the actual costs of voting machines were known.

Are Hand Count Estimates from Elected Officials Accurate?

When an elected or government official announces their estimate of hand count costs, I believe they expect it to be believed without question. How many county commissioners will research to verify a clerk’s estimate of millions of dollars? It is easier to go along and rubber stamp it. In Missouri, a senate bill from 2023 sought to secure elections with hand counting. A fiscal note was issued by the former Secretary of State’s office estimating the bill’s statewide costs to be \$15,762,500 per election. This estimate was based on an “assumption” of five minutes to count each ballot, multiplied by 3,025,962 total ballots cast statewide, and paying election judges \$125 per day.

Calculate Hand Count Estimates

The first “costs too much” myth I wanted to debunk was from the fiscal note mentioned in the preceding paragraph.

This myth only requires simple math to make the comparison. Using the exact estimates used in the fiscal note, except for changing the number of ballots counted per hour to 50, the statewide cost per election to hand count would be \$3,782,453. In years with three elections, the estimate is \$11,347,358, which is still less than the single-year estimate of \$15,762,500 “assumed” in the fiscal note.

More about how many ballots can be counted in an hour will be explained beginning on page 274 in *Same-Day Results*,

In response to hand-count costs, which I knew to be incorrect, published for the hand-counted election in my county, I began developing a worksheet to use historical election data, open records, and projections to calculate hand count estimates.

How did I know the published costs were incorrect? When our team requested the documentation supporting the published expenses, we were told there was no documentation. The county clerk merely flipped through the “dailies” of incoming invoices and did a running total on a calculator.

Subsequent open records requests resulted in the receipt of (what we believed to be) all election-related invoices. Much of that information is the basis for the “apple” and “apple-slice” estimates on the preceding pages. More details about the Osage County hand-counted election begins on page 293.

Tool: Hand Count Estimator



I began receiving more requests from around the country for help calculating hand count costs. My Osage County spreadsheet evolved into an Estimator Tool that anyone could use to create reliable hand cost estimates.

The tool is a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. After entering historical data and projections, the spreadsheet auto-calculates estimates for costs and labor. It is then possible to “tweak” projections to get real-time updates on how costs, staffing, etc., would be affected.

For example, the clerk in the Wyoming “human error” article stated that hand counting costs would range from \$99,000 to \$1.4 million, and about 2,200 people would be needed to count 20,000 ballots in four hours.

How the Estimator Tool Works

First, I downloaded election results from the Campbell County website for the presidential elections in 2012, 2016, 2020, and 2024. The reports were summaries rather than by precinct, but I could tell the total turnout, so I spread the number of ballots cast evenly across the 37 precincts, with one exception, which I will explain on page 264.

Image #303 on the next page shows the results section from the Estimator Tool. The red boxes are for information the user completes. The blue boxes show the auto-calculated results.

It took me 50 minutes to download the election results and enter the info to see the results. The clerk provided important information: they wanted the ballots counted in 4 hours. You can see that I entered 4 people per team, 4-hour shifts, 50 ballots per hour, the number of registered voters, and \$15 per hour for counters.

Wyoming County Clerk's Estimates vs. Estimator Tool Results

Clerk's Estimate	Estimator Tool
Cost Estimate	Cost Estimate
\$99,000 to \$1.4 Million	\$29,040 (30% of clerk's low estimate)
Ballots to be Counted	Ballots to be Counted
20,000	18,547
Counting Time Required	Counting Time Required
4 hours	4 hours
# People to Count	# People to Count
2,200	484 (22% of clerk estimate)

Hand Counting Estimator for Same Day Election Results			
Jurisdiction		Election Type or Date	
Campbell County, WY		Presidential Elections	
Enter Shift and Team Preferences		Same Day Results based on Averages	
4	Enter # of persons on each hand count team	484	# Individual Counters needed, unless some work more than 1 shift
4	Enter preferred # hours for shift-length of teams	121	# of teams/shifts to cover
50	Enter estimate of # of ballots to be counted per hour	11	Average # hours to complete *IF* only one team used to count ballots at each location
18,547	Anticipated # ballots to be cast (based on historical voter turnout averages) SAME DAY REG. ALLOWED	39	# Counting Locations (ie., polling places, precincts, etc.)
How are there enough people to count the ballots?			
16,370	Enter # of Registered Voters in Jurisdiction	2.96%	Percentage of registered voters needed to hand count the election
Enter Hourly Rate		Labor Cost Estimate based on Average	
\$15.00	Enter hourly rate paid to hand counters	\$29,040	Labor Cost for Hand Counters (based on per ballot cast cost below)
\$1.10	Estimated cost per ballot cast for hand counting expenses (other than labor)	\$1.57	Labor Cost for Hand Counters per Ballot Cast

303 Screenshot of Estimator Tool results for Campbell County, WY

Notes about the Results

At this point, the spreadsheet can be used to see how different projections would change the estimates. For example:

- What if teams only count 40 ballots per hour?
- What if counters are paid \$25 per hour?
- What if there are 6 people on a counting team?

The Estimator Tool will auto-update as variables (in red boxes) are changed. It also updates the precinct data at the bottom of the spreadsheet (but not shown here).

Exception to Averaging Total Ballots Across All 37 Precincts

Although none of the election results downloaded for Campbell County provided a breakdown of turnout by precinct, the November 2024 download did provide interesting statistics.

I mentioned a few pages previously (see page 262) that I would speak to an exception about how many ballots were estimated per precinct, and this is the information promised. In the screenshot below, take note of how many ballots were cast as absentee or early absentee:

Campbell County, Wyoming GENERAL ELECTION November 5, 2024				
Statistics	TOTAL	Election Day	Absentee	Early-ABS
Precincts Complete	37 of 37	37	0	37
Registered Voters - Total	17,109			
Ballots Cast - Total	18,450	9,483	1,396	7,571
Ballots Cast - Blank	0	0	0	0

304 Statistics of Ballots Cast in the November 2024 election in Campbell County, WY

A total of 8,967 ballots were cast as absentees. That is 49% of the 18,450 total ballots cast in the county. Without that statistic, we would have evenly distributed 18,450 ballots across 37 precincts, or about 500 ballots per precinct. Our recommendation would have been to have two teams or counters (or 8 people) at each precinct.

With only 9,483 ballots to count across 37 precincts, the average is 256 ballots per precinct. A team of four could count that in four hours, or I would even suggest sending six counters to each precinct so they can rotate and take breaks. That is a total of 222 counters at precincts on election day.

What about the 8,967 absentee ballots? How are they counted?



Tool: Central Counting Locations Estimator


If Campbell County treats absentee ballots like most other jurisdictions, they will be counted in a central location. There is a separate estimator tool for central counting locations. It is very similar to The Estimator, with some adaptations for central locations.

Enter type of ballots	Enter Ballots Cast per Election				Average # Ballots Cast	50	4	4
	Similar Elections in previous years					Ballots per HR	Hour Shifts	PPL/team
	2012	2016	2020	2024		Hours to Count	# Shifts	# Counters
Early Absentee	7,238	7,524	8,091	7,571	7,606	153	39	156
Absentee	1,412	1,468	1,579	1,396	1,464	30	8	32
BALLOTS CAST	8,650	8,992	9,670	8,967	Rounded Up	92	47	188

305 Central Counting Location Estimator - estimates of absentee ballots for Campbell County, WY

Using the county's 2024 statistics for absentee ballots, I created percentages and applied them to the 2012, 2016, and 2020 elections. In the bottom right corner of the screenshot is the number of counting judges estimated to be needed to count ALL absentee ballots in 4 hours. This estimate is **not** in addition to the 484 from the Estimator Tool; this is the portion of the 484 that would count absentee ballots.

I recommend creating estimates for jurisdictions that count ballots in a central location and enter precinct and central location projections using appropriate tools. That will result in a separate forecast.



306 Central Counting Location Square Footage Estimate - Campbell County, WY

Square Footage Estimate for Central Counting Locations

The Central Counting Location Estimator will also estimate the square footage necessary for all counting teams to work in one area. If space is tight, 80 sq ft per team will work. If there is enough room, 100 sq ft per team is better.

Tool: Forms and Supplies Estimator

Whether working on a cost comparison, planning for an official election, or putting together emergency supplies, it is essential to have an approximation of the supplies and forms needed for hand counting in the county.



The bottom row of the screenshot on page 263 shows the per-ballot cost estimates for supplies (left bottom box) and labor (right bottom box). These amounts are not included in the total labor estimate. I believe the supplies estimate of \$1.10 per ballot cast could be used in most jurisdictions, but there is a tool to calculate a more accurate estimate, the Forms and Supplies Estimator.

More information about estimating forms and supplies needed by a county for an election will be discussed beginning on page 298, “Forms and Supplies Prepared in Advance by the Clerk,” regarding preparation for emergencies. Using the tool for Campbell County, WY, based on the ballots cast in the November 2024 election, these are the resulting estimates:

\$16,301 One-time purchase of supplies, replenished only when depleted or damaged

\$ 717 Paper and other supplies required for each election

The estimates above are calculated to be 88¢ per ballot cast for one-time supplies and 4¢ per ballot cast for supplies that must be replenished every election. The combined total is 92¢ per ballot cast – less than the \$1.10 recommended for estimates. As illustrated, clerks can use the \$1.10 estimate or the Form and Supplies Estimator for estimates based on their county.

Downloading the Estimating Tools

The estimating tools are available at ReturntoHandCounting.com/Tools.



FINDING: PLENTY OF PEOPLE TO
HAND COUNT BECAUSE WE'RE
"RE"-TRAINING

Myth: Not Enough People to Hand Count

I have heard this so often, ‘*We don’t have enough people to work elections now, there will never be enough to hand count,*’ that I can usually finish the sentence before the clerk.

I agree that clerks struggle to get enough election workers, but those who must fix the current issue are the political parties and the clerks themselves. This topic is discussed in “[Have We Abdicated Our Election Duties to Clerks?](#)” on page 179.

The second half of the sentence begs another question: **How many people are needed to hand-count an election?**

In February 2025, Rasmussen Reports published the results of a national survey that asked participants if they would be willing to volunteer to “hand count and examine ballots ... on election night.” The majority, 56%, answered “yes.” That is more than what is needed. Franklin County, OH, with about 840,000 registered voters, would need less than 2% of voters to volunteer.²⁰

Registered Voters Need to Do More Than Vote

The Wyoming article (see page 239) makes the unsupported claim that it will take 2,200 people to count 20,000 ballots in four hours. That is debunked on page 263, where the Hand Count Estimator tool was used, and it showed that only 484 people were needed to count that many ballots in four hours.

The Hand Count Estimator Tool Shows the Percentage of Voters Needed to Count

How are there enough people to count the ballots?		
16,370	Enter # of Registered Voters in Jurisdiction	2.96%
		Percentage of registered voters needed to hand count the election

307 Hand Count Estimator Tool results for Campbell County, WY showing >3% of registered voters needed to hand count an election

Another feature of the Hand Count Estimator Tool (see page 276) is that it will calculate the percentage of registered voters needed to hand-count an election. This stat is meant to put into perspective the small amount of the electorate that should step forward to serve as election workers, including hand count teams. (Missouri requires that only voters registered to vote in the state may serve as election judges.)

For Campbell County, WY, the estimator tool shows that less than 3% of registered voters make up 484 people needed to hand-count an election. The percentage required to hand count would be 2.6% of voters casting ballots.

Counting the Ballots Done by The People is Not a New Idea

It is not an old idea or concept, either. The use of electronic voting machines is the **NEW**, and its advent can be traced back to “hanging chads” in Florida in the 2000 election. Was that an accidental debacle or something used to convince the public that we can only rely on elections counted by machines?



308 DeNatale, , Bell, and Lueders-Booth.
Election Day, Massachusetts; 1987.
Library of Congress
[LOC.gov/item/afc1987042_ib_300/](https://www.loc.gov/item/afc1987042_ib_300/)

²⁰ X post by Linda Rantz on 3/6/2025 replying to @Rasmussen_Poll about American voters willing to volunteer to hand count ballots. [Perma.cc/RE53-MHDG](https://perma.cc/RE53-MHDG)

The Skill to Hand Count Ballots: We Were Misled to Believe It's Less Effective

In our rush towards modernity, we mistakenly abandoned hand-counting ballots, believing it to be unnecessary, when in fact, it's quite the opposite. The knowledge of the skill faded into obscurity through a collective cultural misstep that convinced us of its unimportance.

That misstep and misconception are being corrected now.

One-Day Voting, Paper Ballots, Hand Counted

The Hanging Chad debacle opened the floodgates for federal legislation to “protect” elections. These new laws, including HAVA and NVRA and the formation of CISA, were supposed to reassure voters, but those assurances did not hold. The *Newsroom* section of this eManual provides multiple examples, but I especially recommend the 2019 investigation by Senators Warren and Klobuchar regarding the vulnerabilities of voting equipment (see page 199).

We need to undo the damage inflicted on the security of our election systems through these ill-conceived pieces of legislation. As Mike Lindell repeats, we need to have elections with one-day voting on paper ballots that are hand-counted.

Empower the People by “Re”-Training to Hand Count Ballots

Through Mike Lindell’s grassroots organization, Cause of America, we have brought the skill of hand-counting ballots back to the People. Hand count training empowers the people to take back control and return trust in our elections. Both in-person and online training resources are available; as quoted in this article, it is “easy-peasy.”



309 QR Code:
Oregon Training

2023, Oct. 9 – When Oregon Neighborhoods Return to In-Precinct, Paper Ballots Only, Hand Counting, Done on One Day, Voters and Poll Workers Will Find It Easy-Peasy to Do.

Truth in the Pacific Northwest

“When Oregon neighborhoods return to in-precinct, paper ballots only, hand counting, done on one day, voters and poll workers will find it Easy-Peasy to do. Nine counties trained October 4, 2023. At least 100 more poll watchers signed up for the next training.”

Tags: Training, Train the Trainer, paper ballots, Oregon



Training: Train the Trainers

Train the Trainers is a 6-hour class covering the entire hand-count process in detail. Those who take this course are empowered to train others, making them force multipliers. Pictures on this and the following two pages show just some of the states where we have traveled to teach hand-counting.



Train the Trainer Resources


Materials for this course include:

- Organizer Instructions on needs for scheduling a Train the Trainers event
- Trainer presentation materials, including PowerPoint with script
- Training Materials: downloadable forms, including mock ballots and supplies list of all materials needed to conduct in-person training classes

At-Home Digital Training

The efforts to get both trainers and hand counters trained nationwide have been extraordinary. At the end of 2025, the 6-hour *Train the Trainers* class was live-streamed and recorded. Recording the training fulfilled multiple requests:

- First and foremost, the ability for anyone, anywhere, to take the training online 24/7
- Refresher for those who attended in-person training
- Reference for trainers to review any training topics



310 Image of Organizer Flyer for Train the Trainer





Training: Express Training


Those trained in a 'Train the Trainers' class can, but do not have to, teach the 6-hour class themselves. For trainers who would prefer to teach a shorter class with fewer supplies needed, we designed Express Training.

Learn to Hand Count in 60 Minutes

In about 60 minutes, a single trainer can teach 5 to 500 people (or more) how to hand count. Training more people in less time creates a legion of election workers ready to hand count elections nationwide. All training materials are available for download, including a template for a flyer to advertise the event.

Online Training

Another benefit of the Express Training class is that it is recorded and posted online at ReturntoHandCounting.com/Training/Express-Training for 24/7 access. Whether you want to self-learn at home or play the video for a group meeting, the only materials you will need are four documents to print and a Sharpie-style marker.



311 Image of Event Flyer for Express Training



FINDING: WORKS IN
ANY COUNTY, ANY SIZE

Myth: Hand Counting Only Works in Small Counties


Ironically, I have encountered people who want hand-counted elections but then repeat the talking point that it is probably only for small counties. They have the best intentions and are using what they believe is common sense: that a smaller number of ballots are doable for hand counting, but larger counties will need machines. The first question is how many ballots are cast at any polling place.

Average Number of Ballots Cast at Polling Places = 360 to 480

We used artificial intelligence and asked for the average number of registered voters per polling place across the United States. AI said 600 to 800. Next, we asked for the average voter turnout in the United States. AI said 60%. Simple math that a human can do calculates that the average number of ballots cast at a polling place in the United States is 360 to 480.

The Size of the Polling Place is Important, Not the Size of the County


These averages beg the question: Is there a difference when 360-480 ballots are cast in a polling place in a SMALL county versus the same number of ballots cast in a polling place in a BIG county? It doesn't matter where the polling place is located – it matters how many ballots are cast.



312 Visual Aid of AI Providing Estimates of Polling Place Averages

Apple to Apple Comparison of Large vs Small Counties Polling Places

To illustrate, compare Osage County, Missouri, with St. Charles County, Missouri. We will look at turnout for the April 2023 election (the one that was hand-counted in Osage).



313 Example of Voter Turnout at 2 polling places in different Missouri Counties, 1 large county, 1 small county

Osage has under 10,000 registered voters. St Charles has about 292,000 registered voters.

At the Westphalia polling place in Osage, 481 ballots were cast. There was one counting team (4 people), and it took them about 5 hours to count the ballots.

St. Charles has 115 polling places. Of those, 83 polling places had LESS than 481 ballots cast. LESS than the number of ballots cast in a polling place in a SMALL county. And, of the

remaining 32 polling places in St. Charles, they were all under 1,000 ballots cast. We would have recommended two teams at those polling places. **St Charles could have hand-counted the entire 2023 municipal election in 5 hours.**


Tool: Visualizations of Voter Turnout

It is sometimes more effective to explain voter turnout and the counting teams needed using a visual aid. Simple bar graphs can illustrate the point using the same historical voter turnout data used in other estimating tools.




St. Charles County Polling Places Seldom Require More than 1 Counting Team

Municipal elections occur yearly in Missouri, and the first graph shows that very few polling places need two teams. The bottom graph shows turnout for the last two presidential elections (2020 and 2024). The lines indicate a counting team added for every 400 ballots. Download the template from ReturntoHandCounting.com/Tools to create these graphs.



315 Municipal Elections in 2021-2024; typically a municipal could be counted at 100 ballots/hour, but even at 50 ballots/hour all polling places could be counted in 8 hours with 1 or 2 teams at each location



314 Presidential Elections in 2020 and 2024, the majority of polling places need 1 or 2 teams, some need 3 teams and very few need 4 teams; keep in mind these elections happen once every 4 years



FINDING: ELECTION DAY OR SAME DAY RESULTS

Myth: Hand Counting Takes Too Long

I took a tour of the St. Louis County elections facility the week before the mid-term election in November 2022. A voter who resided in the county was also on the tour and commented that they believed the voting equipment could be hacked and the county should hand-count election results. The Democrat Director of Elections for the county asked, in what seemed to be a mocking manner, if the voter wanted to wait months for election results.

This response was a noteworthy moment for me because the director did not offer anything that explained or validated his comment; it was meant to be believed because the director said it. In November 2022, I was designing the hand count process and writing this eManual. I was not prepared, as I am now, to reply to these myths.

How Long Does It Take to Count All Votes on a Ballot?

On page 34, the myth that it would take days, weeks, or even longer to hand count ballots was discussed. There is a possibility that other hand-count processes may take longer to count ballots, but we have tried and tested the hand-count process in this eManual and use those tests as the basis for our findings.

The “French Model”

It is not unusual to hear public comments that France can count all the ballots in their country on election day, announce the winner(s), and get home in time for a late dinner. That might not be true for all elections. I recommend researching before using or opposing the French analogy.

We ran our first tests on what we decided to call the “French Model”: one race on a ballot with ‘vote for one.’ One vote per ballot means every ballot is one tally per ballot. In this case, it took 1 second per ballot.

1 race with 1 vote on the ballot = 1 second per ballot

Time = Potentially 3,600 ballots per hour per counting team

The “Missouri Method”

While there are some elections in Missouri, such as municipal, where a Missourian might only have one race on their ballot, it is more common to have “multi-race” ballots. We created mock ballots like the one used in the 2022 General election and marked them with votes for practice.

To establish a base time, we ran the tests without considering write-in candidates, reviewing for voter intent, mistakes, etc. We did 100 ballots, and it took 2 seconds per tally.

Multiple races/questions per ballot = 2 seconds per tally

A multi-race ballot could have, for example, four races or twenty-four races. No matter which variations we tried, our tests showed it was best recommended as an hourly range. This range **included** the considerations we skipped in the preceding example. When timing the whole ballot, not just the individual tallies, 50 to 100 ballots could be counted per hour, depending on the ballot length.

Time = 50 to 100 ballots per hour per counting team

We refer to this as the “Missouri Method.”

Ballot Counting by Hand Averages 50 to 100 Ballots Per Hour

The Missouri Method was used to hand-count the April 2023 Municipal election in Osage County, Missouri. A municipal election has a shorter ballot than a general election in paper size and number of races. For the 2023 hand counted election, there were 13 ballot variations with anywhere from 1 to 7 races on the ballot.

The Hand Counted Election in Osage County Averaged 100 Ballots Per Hour

The Westphalia polling place had the largest turnout, with 481 ballots cast. The counting team was at the polling place for approximately 8 hours. By subtracting downtimes (no ballots to count) and meal breaks, the team estimated they were engaged in counting activities for 5 hours. That real-life experience validates the estimate of being able to count 100 ballots per hour per team for particular elections. Other polling places report similar counting times.

It should be noted that because the clerk forgot to format the ballots for the hand count process, transparent overlays were created for counting judges to call a number for a vote (rather than the name). This extra step added time to the counting process as the correct overlay had to be selected and used for every ballot.

Conservative Approach to Estimating Ballots to Be Counted Per Hour


The conservative estimate for Missouri clerks for general and primary elections would be 50 ballots per hour – or even lower to be more conservative. For municipal and special elections in Missouri, which usually have ballots with few races or questions, the counting teams will likely count as many as 100 ballots per hour.

Hand Count Estimator Tool for Projecting Costs and Counters

To calculate how many teams are needed and the labor costs, the Clerk must anticipate the expected number of ballots to be cast at the polling place. This calculation is based primarily on historical voter turnout for similar elections. **We have made it easy for clerks from here with The Hand Count Estimator Tool.** This Tool is explained in detail on page 262.

Counting Any Number of Ballots in a Specific Period is a Math Equation

The Hand Count Estimator Tool is an Excel spreadsheet, but it is not even advanced Excel because it does not require advanced math. The clerk inputs the historical voter turnout data and variables, such as how many hours to complete counting, the number of persons on the counting team, ballots per hour estimate, etc. The tool returns the estimated labor cost and details for the clerk to staff the counting locations adequately. **Completing the count is as simple as ensuring polling locations are staffed with enough counters.**





FINDING: 'LEGACY TEAMS'
UNDERMINE BIPARTISAN INTENT

Myth: Clerks Can 'Run' Elections Any Way They Want


A variation of this myth was declared to me in 2023 after the hand counted election in Osage County. I was at what was supposed to be the convening of the Verification Board. What is a Verification Board? The final step of each election is to review and verify the county's election results before certifying them as official. The Verification Board comprises the clerk and equal numbers of REP and DEM members, nominated by their county political committee and appointed by the clerk.

What I was witnessing, though, was a "bipartisan team" finishing their tasks, which are explained in more detail on the next page but, in brief, are all the tasks to finalize the counts so that the Verification Board can do their work. It is not that the bipartisan team was running behind on their duties. Instead, as I began to comprehend, they were proceeding as if they were also the Verification Board and would be certifying the official results. If I was correct, it meant that the bipartisan team would be certifying their own work without oversight from a Verification Board.

For reasons unknown but suspected, the former Deputy Secretary of State for Missouri was in attendance in Osage County for this meeting of the Verification Board. I spoke with the Deputy privately to voice my concerns and cite some of the statutes. Although nominated to be on the Board for that election, my nomination was not accepted, so I attended as a representative of the Republican County Committee. The Deputy replied, "The clerk can run this any way she wants."

The Deputy's response to me was, in essence, an official response to the Republican party, received as 'you can be here, but it doesn't matter that you're here or what you say.'

Another disturbing example of elected or appointed government officials 'flexing their power' occurred in Detroit, Michigan, during the 2020 election. Election workers, citizens themselves but more loyal to the government, began covering windows with pizza boxes so Republican watchers could not see into the room where ballots were being counted.



316 Craig Rantz (facing camera) at the Detroit Convention Center in front of the now infamous windows that were covered to block the view of ballot counting. Patrick Colbeck (facing windows) was one of the Republican watchers for the 2020 election.

Bipartisanship Anchors Missouri's Voting System

The bipartisan requirements in state laws and rules are, I believe, foundational to fair and secure elections. If county political committees fulfill their statutory obligation regarding elections (see page 179), they will diligently recruit, vet, train, and nominate members of their party to serve not only as verification board members but also as election judges and bipartisan team members. These nominated election roles have similar eligibility requirements, but each role's nominations are made separately and have different deadlines.

When a county political committee nominates individuals for these election roles, it ensures that these appointees will carry out their election duties with integrity while safeguarding their party's interests. However, the primary assurance is for the state's voters, guaranteeing that elections are overseen by bipartisan oversight to ensure fair and transparent outcomes.

Erosion of Bipartisanship Fuels “Legacy Team” Growth

If political committees do not make nominations for any of the election roles, the responsibility reverts to the clerk. Nothing in the statute says that the clerk must verify that someone they select to serve as a Republican, for example, is a Republican.

As discussed on page 179, my view is that over the years and decades, the election nomination obligations of political committees have been abdicated to or absorbed by clerks. The result is a system where clerks seem to have more authority over who will serve in the election roles than the political committees that are supposed to nominate them.

Without the involvement and oversight of political committees, it has become common for clerks to rely on the same individuals for every election year after year, sometimes rejecting updated committee nominee lists. This practice has undermined the genuine bipartisan character of elections, leading to the establishment of what can be termed “Legacy Teams.” It is understandable why clerks might prefer these long-serving teams, as time can be saved on recruitment and training, and clerks are likely to trust and depend on these familiar faces. However, the core issue is that the bipartisan approach to elections is meant to guarantee fairness, not merely to ease administrative burdens for clerks.

Understand Election Judges, Bipartisan Teams, Verification Board

To better understand the erosion of bipartisanship and the shift toward Legacy Teams, it is essential to examine the tasks and responsibilities of nominated election roles, as well as the authority of the clerk.

Election Judges – Election Day

Election judges work at polling places on election day and possibly assist with counting early or absentee ballots. These responsibilities are covered in more detail on page 179.

Bipartisan Team Tasks – Before, On, and After Election Day

“... carry out the functions of—certifying the accuracy of the electronic tabulating equipment, receiving election materials from the polls, duplicating damaged or defective ballots, processing ballots through the electronic tabulating system and preparing election materials for final storage.”²¹ Bipartisan teams might also assist with ballot counting, especially military or UOCAVA ballots that may arrive after election day.

²¹ see 15 CSR 30-10-040 par. (5) [Perma.cc/PEW5-EYXU](https://perma.cc/PEW5-EYXU)

Verification Board Duties (Hand Counted Ballots) – Post-Election Day

When ballots are counted by hand, “... the verification board shall meet and check the addition and figures on all tally sheets and statements of returns and shall compare its record with the returns made by the election judges and the election authority on the day of the election.”²²

Verification Board Duties (Electronic Voting) – Post-Election Day

If ballots are tabulated by electronic voting equipment, the Verification Board is to “... inspect each secured electronic voting machine and record the votes cast on the machine.” And “... compare the record with the returns made by the election judges on election day.”²³

Confusion with the Terms “Verifying” and “Certifying”

The Verification Board's brief descriptions are clear: whether ballots are hand-counted or tabulated by machines, the work done by the clerk, election judges, and bipartisan teams must be reviewed by the Verification Board.²⁴

However, there seems to be confusion due to the words “certify” and “verify” used to describe duties performed by election judges and bipartisan teams. Election judges and bipartisan teams have tasks requiring them to certify or verify certain information. Still, such certifications or verifications are for specific information, such as the number of ballots cast at a polling place or the accuracy of tabulating equipment.

Bipartisan Teams and Election Judges Cannot Review and Certify Their Own Work

It is up to the Verification Board to review all work of the election judges and bipartisan team(s) and certify the official election results.

When all counting is complete, and the clerk is ready to have the official results certified, the clerk convenes with the Verification Board, who carries out their duties by reviewing the work of the clerk (election authority), the election judges, and the bipartisan teams. If errors are found, the Verification Board makes corrections, which stand as the official election results.

Use of Legacy Teams Can Cause Complacency and Errors

If there are “sides” to this, both sides will say they want accurate and fair elections. The best attributes for accomplishing this are collaboration, cooperation, and humility. When the contrary qualities are present, individualism, obstructionism or antagonism, and arrogance, the opportunity for mistakes is amplified.

When I have found errors in election results, most can be traced back to contrary attributes amongst those who “did the counting.” Yes, there are innocent mistakes, but it would be easy to notice or identify if all involved were working together and checking their attitudes at the door.



²² see RsMO 115.501 [Perma.cc/B7JY-XTE7](https://perma.cc/B7JY-XTE7)

²³ see RsMO 115.503 [Perma.cc/A4D7-YJK6](https://perma.cc/A4D7-YJK6)

²⁴ Verification Board statutes begin at 115.497 and continue to 115.513 (plus some others out of sequence).

Political Party Scrutiny Unwelcome After Years of Lax Election Practices

“Them’s fighting words.” It is bold to call out “lax” election practices. I can hear the [Wyoming clerk’s complaint](#) on page 242 repeating, “When our integrity is questioned, it’s insulting.”

However, by continuously employing Legacy Teams, clerks may have inadvertently cultivated an environment where oversight and care in election processes are diminished, and bipartisanship is neglected. This analysis is not meant to be insulting. There are too many examples to believe otherwise.

The ‘pizza boxes in the windows’ tactic in Michigan is one of the most egregious examples of denying political party access to or scrutiny of elections. In almost every election where I have served as a Challenger, Watcher, or Republican Representative, I was directed to sit away from where the election activity was being conducted upon entering the designated location. Stating that I could not see from the assigned spot and would be unable to observe properly was met with obvious smugness. The statute that allowed me in the building was fulfilled from their perspective, and the clerk could ‘run’ it as they wanted. I know others have had similar experiences.

It is almost as if clerks are being groomed to treat members of political committees as interlopers, even if they are serving in duly appointed positions. The treatment I and others have experienced has been ‘passed down’ and adopted by election workers who should be representing their political party, not treating them as adversaries.

Tool: Election Results Verification

Despite any adverse treatment directed at me, I have been working to reestablish the role of Verification Boards, separating them from Bipartisan Teams. (Read the previous two pages if you missed the difference between Verification Boards and Bipartisan Teams.)



The priority, from my perspective, was to develop a tool for use by verification boards to review and verify election results. The Election Results Verification (ERV) tool was the result of my efforts. The tool evolved from comparing voter turnout and totals of votes cast to including more detailed information. The ERV tool has proven to detect errors and is generic enough to be modified by any state.

Human Error Uncovered by ERV Spreadsheet in Osage County

As an example, the ERV tool showed that the reconciled count of ballots cast in Osage County, certified by a legacy bipartisan team, was incorrect by 57 ballots. Presented with this info, the clerk remembered that the test deck of ballots, used to test the voting equipment, contained 57 ballots. The clerk determined that after the certification testing, someone forgot to clear the machine’s memory, and the 57 test ballots had been included in the election totals. This incident is also an example of an error the legacy bipartisan team missed but was caught by the ERV tool.

Human Error Uncovered by ERV Spreadsheet in Vernon County

In Vernon County, Missouri, for the August 6, 2024, primary election, the Verification Board meeting had been postponed due to objections from the Republican committee. The committee asked me to attend the rescheduled meeting as the Republican Representative, which I agreed to do.

PRECINCT REPORT
Official Canvass
RUN DATE:08/09/24 06:45 PM

0048 WALKER POLL

Democratic

VOTES PERCENT

U.S. SENATOR State

(VOTE FOR) 1	
KARLA MAY	0
DECEMBER L. HARMON	0
LUCAS KUNCE	0
MITA BISWAS	0

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE State

(VOTE FOR) 1	
JEANETTE CASS	0
MIKE MCCAFFREE	0

GOVERNOR State

(VOTE FOR) 1	
ERIC MORRISON	0
CRYSTAL QUADE	0
SHERYL GLADNEY	0
HOLLIS L. LASTER	0
MIKE HAMRA	0

LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR State

(VOTE FOR) 1	
RICHARD BROWN	0
ANASTASIA SYES	0

SECRETARY OF STATE State

(VOTE FOR) 1	
MONIQUE WILLIAMS	0
BARBARA PHIFER	0
HALEY JACOBSON	0
GAVIN BENA	0

STATE TREASURER State

(VOTE FOR) 1	
MARK OSMACK	0

ATTORNEY GENERAL State

(VOTE FOR) 1	
ELAD JONATHAN GROSS	0

SUMMARY REPORT
Official Canvass
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Republican

VOTES PERCENT

VOTES PERCENT

U.S. SENATOR State

STATE REPRESENTATIVE State	
(VOTE FOR) 1	
(VOTE FOR) 1	
JOSH HAWLEY	3494 100.00
DANE DIEHL	3616 100.00

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE State

CIRCUIT JUDGE County	
(VOTE FOR) 1	
(VOTE FOR) 1	
MARK ALFORD	3419 100.00
DAVID R. MONTON	3318 100.00

GOVERNOR State

SHERIFF County	
(VOTE FOR) 1	
(VOTE FOR) 1	
DARRELL LEON MCCLEANAHAN III	2051 1.74
MIKE BUEHLER	52.85

JEREMY GUNDEL

TRAVIS COLE	1408 35.47
BILL EIGEL	1890 27.68
JIMMIE DYE	441 11.68
ROBERT JAMES OLSON	50 0.77
JOHN R. (JAY) ASHCROFT	684 18.16
MIKE KEHOE	1733 45.39

ASSESSOR County

CHRIS WRIGHT	90 2.40
(VOTE FOR) 1	
DARREN L. GRANT	19 0.52
LENA KLEEMAN	2248 60.06
AMBER THOMSEN	93 2.51
RUTH KIMMELL	1487 39.94

LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR State

COLLECTOR-TREASURER County	
(VOTE FOR) 1	
(VOTE FOR) 1	
DAVID JONES	851 15.92
DAVID WISINGER	3579 100.00
DAVID WISINGER	1782 22.03
DAVID WISINGER	1503 42.62

318 Walker Precinct in Vernon County, MO showing ZERO Voter Turnout due to human error with uploading election results

317 Example of Election Results "certified" by Bipartisan Team, but showing corrections made after review by Verification Board

While the tabulator tapes from the voting machines were being reviewed, I entered the information into the ERV tool. I could not complete the data entry fully because the clerk was impatient. When I had to pause, the tool showed that the vote totals differed from the clerk's numbers by more than 350 ballots.

It was discovered that the Walker precinct showed ZERO voter turnout (see image 318). The precinct reports had not been previously published or shared by the clerk, so no one detected this error in advance. It appears that the USB drive for the voting machine was not properly uploaded to the election software. As a result, the Walker precinct votes were missing from the election totals.

The clerk instructed the Verification Board to handwrite the figures from the ERV tool onto the official results (the Bipartisan Team had previously certified these, see image 317). The Verification Board then signed what were supposed to be the certified official election results.

However, the official election results on the Vernon County website²⁵ have different numbers than shown on the scanned image, and are signed by the clerk, not the Verification Board.

The "Election Results Verification" tool (ERV) can be downloaded from the companion website: ReturntoHandCounting.com/Tools.

²⁵ Vernon County Election results Perma.cc/8B8R-KD6N



FINDING: HAND COUNTING ENSURES
MORE TRANSPARENCY &
BETTER SECURITY

Myth: Using Voting Machines is Safer Because Machines Don't Cheat

If I had a nickel for every time ...

That old saying comes to my mind whenever someone asks me if people will cheat when they are hand counting. Sometimes, it is not a question; it is an accusation.

My answer? Yes, I believe some people cheat when it comes to elections. Not all, but like driving a car, some will cheat. Some people speed, some don't. Some stop at stop signs, and some don't.

But is election cheating limited to hand counting? Are there people who cheat using voting machines? Take these two news stories, for example:



319 QR Code:
Norwegian Fears of
Hacking

2017, Sep. 11 – Norwegian Votes to Be Counted Manually in Fear of Election Hacking

The Barents Observer, by Thomas Nilsen

"Norway is the second country in Europe to change the way it counts votes. The Netherlands decided to count its March 15 parliamentary elections manually after broadcaster RTL interviewed security experts and hackers who said software security was weak. One hacker claimed an average iPad is better protected than the Dutch electoral system."

Tags: Norway, hacking



320 QR Code:
Dutch to Hand Count

2017, Feb. 1 – Dutch to Hand Count Votes Over Hacking Fears

BBC

"All votes in next month's Dutch election will be counted by hand to counter the threat of hacking, the government says. It follows reports that software used to tally results at regional and national level may not be secure."

Tags: Netherlands, hacking

Remember that the average number of ballots cast at a polling place is 360 to 480. Election management software will be tabulating tens to hundreds of thousands, even millions, of ballots.

If thieves knew they could successfully rob anything, would they choose a barista's tip jar or a bank vault?

A hand counter in a polling place can only cheat by as many ballots are cast in that location, likely to be less than 1,000. Hacking election software could result in thousands or millions of ballots being flipped, added, or deleted **with a single keystroke**.

The most important question is not whether some people might cheat when hand-counting ballots. Anyone concerned about cheating in elections should ask who is already cheating, how they are doing it, and how it affects election results.

Analogy of My Broken Dishwasher

The image below is the control board for my 4-year-old broken dishwasher. You would never see it unless there was a problem, which is what we have now. We start a wash cycle that will run for about 4 minutes and then stop at the same step every time. We have done every troubleshooting step recommended by the manufacturer. We have watched countless online videos with DIY fixes. Nothing has worked so far.

Another recommendation is to replace this \$175 control board. Looking at it, I can't tell if there is anything wrong with the control board. I cannot test it myself. Online reviews for replacements are not good. The common complaint is that the replacements do not work. Is it possible that the original and replacement boards are defective? Does that mean we cannot rely on the manufacturer? Or is it possible they both work and something else is wrong?

I know I can operate a dishwasher that is in working condition. I am not going to be able to solve issues with electronics. The manufacturer will not come to my home to repair this dishwasher (yet they will continue to advertise that their product is trustworthy). I will have to find a third-party vendor to come and fix this appliance.

Now, let's talk about electronic voting equipment. Look at the motherboard image on page 28 and compare it to the circuit board below (smaller than a motherboard). If you can't look at the dishwasher circuit board and identify what's broken, how does anyone believe a clerk could detect an issue on a larger circuit board in a voting computer?



321 Image of the Main Control Board of a Dishwasher

Do Election Officials REALLY Know How to Use and Protect Voting Machines?



Election officials seem eager to claim that hand counting ballots cannot be accurate, even if they have not tried hand counting themselves. As pointed out in a previous section (Why Convince the Public that Humans Cannot Accurately Count Ballots? on page 250), if there are errors when voting machines are used, election officials seem quick to divert the blame to humans.

This question is not meant to be offensive to election officials, but I must be honest: I have seen errors by clerks that can only be explained by a lack of computer skills. And sometimes, unfortunately, some try to shield their lack of knowledge by 'faking it' or just being arrogant. After all, the voting machines are just PC motherboards in a bigger case; if you can't fix a PC, you'll be just as lost with voting equipment.

Page 28 has an example from 2022 of a clerk who did not know why his election result reports were printing the wrong date. His fix was to cover the date with paper and make a photocopy so no date would show. Despite his inability to understand the date issue, I have been told that the clerk remains obstinate and argues with constituents that machines are secure. How does he know?

In 2023, another clerk boasted about their county's extra post-election machine testing. Their method was to have election judges randomly select precincts and races during pre-election training for the post-election audit. For transparency, they said they posted the list on their website (pre-election) so the public can be assured the audits are what was promised. That is like announcing to the student body that there will be a random search of student lockers and then announcing which lockers will be searched.

A more recent example is from 2024, when the reports of election results for a county were “jumbled.” A block of names would typically be candidates for the same race; instead, there were names from different races – almost like a mix and match. When the clerk was asked why the reports were jumbled, she responded with exasperated vocalization that the printer was out of toner. Those present opted not to ask what printer toner had to do with formatting.

What is Being Overlooked? The Reliance on “Vendors”

After CISA released its advisory in June 2022 of nine vulnerabilities affecting Dominion Voting systems (see page 202), we sent an open records request to the clerks in counties that used Dominion voting equipment. The advisory included steps to mitigate the risk, so we asked clerks what steps they took to implement them.

While one clerk responded with nothing more than, “We follow the law,” others did not reply. The most common response, however, was, “I have to check with my vendor.” Nothing provided more remarkable confirmation that clerks and election officials, and I believe it to be a majority, cannot respond independently to advisories and cybersecurity threats about the voting machines.

And who are these vendors? They are third-party companies who are the middleman between the manufacturer and the clerk. In the twenty-four counties in Missouri that use Dominion, I believe a single vendor sells the equipment to the counties and manages the maintenance and programming of the machines. For reference, the clerk in the Wyoming article (see page 239) mentions that she has her machines programmed “locally” rather than by the manufacturer because it can save up to \$20,000. “Locally” would refer to a vendor.

Another remarkable thing about the open records requests we sent regarding the CISA Advisory was that the ‘vendor’ wrote the replies for some of these clerks. How do we know? As we reviewed the replies we received, I noticed that the format of a few replies was not just similar but identical. What are the odds?

The replies were created as Word docs, so I opened the properties to check the names of the creators and editors of the documents. They were all created by the same person, and some answers were already prefilled. A quick internet search revealed that the document creator was the salesman for the third-party vendor. And how concerned were the clerks with the information they provided in reply to an open records request? The few questions that were not pre-filled had “this is for you to answer” in them. Obviously, this was intended as instructions for the clerks to provide these answers. It appeared one of the clerks did not bother to open the Word doc before forwarding it to us, as that is how we discovered the salesman’s instructions.

Is This Really About Potential Cheating, or Is It About Money?

I have already said earlier in this eManual that elections have become industrialized. There is a lot of money being made. We are supposed to believe that the biggest threat to the integrity of elections would be hand counters who might take bribes and cheat.

The biggest threat to elections is those who profit from them and may not have the scruples or desire to remain honest. Be sure to read the report by Sen. Warren about private equity firms’ ownership and control of voting equipment manufacturers (see page 199).

Does the “Elections World” Want Humans “Out” of Elections?

As often as elections officials complain that there are not enough people to work the polls on election day, you would think they want more people involved. However, consider the quote below from a 2023 recorded interview²⁶ between an Osage County Detective and the Director of Elections for Missouri.



“... the elections world wanted some way to take the humans out of it so that we can have an accurate count with integrity but still be able to have a paper ballot. So that's where the tabulator came into play years and years ago. And so that way you can get accurate counts from a machine and not count on [humans].”

Is “No Humans” the Central Issue Tying All These Myths Together?

Does this all come down to convincing the public that elections are better without humans involved? Does this explain why there is such animosity directed at watchers and challengers? Is this why there seems to be the cultivation of an environment where oversight and care in election processes are diminished, and bipartisanship is neglected? (see page 281) Does this explain the constant “damage control” to rule any anomaly, glitch, or mistake as not being the machines' fault?

There are more questions but suffice it to say other countries trust hand counting over voting machines, as these articles illustrate.

2024, Jun. 9 – Most Countries Hand-Count Paper Ballots

TDMS | Research, by Theodore de Macedo Soares

“The United States remains one of the few major democracies in the world that continue to allow computerized vote counting—not observable by the public—to determine the results of its elections.” This article provides reference links regarding other countries that hand-count ballots.

Tags: hand-count ballots, other countries



322 QR Code:
Most Countries
Hand-Count

2022, Apr. 10 – Voting in France: Paper Ballots, In Person, Hand-Counted

AP, by Sylvie Corbet

“French voters in Sunday’s presidential election will use the same system that’s been used for generations: paper ballots that are cast in person and counted by hand. Despite periodic calls for more flexibility or modernization, France doesn’t do mail-in voting, early voting or use voting machines en masse like the United States.”

Tags: France, paper ballots, hand-count ballots, other countries



323 QR Code:
France Hand Counts
Ballots

2013, Sep. 21 – Rigged to Work (Germany)

DW.com, by Anna Peters

“The voting process in Germany is strictly regulated to rule out any possible election fraud. Even electronic voting machines, which could malfunction, have been banned by the country's Constitutional Court.”

Tags: Germany, voting machines banned, other countries



324 QR Code:
Germany, Rigged to
Work

²⁶ The interview was part of the investigation explained in the Osage County election in the next section

Are Voting Machines Secure?

Before discussing the security of hand-counting ballots, serious consideration should be given as to whether electronic voting equipment is secure. It comes down not just to who you ask but to who you trust.

Voters choose their clerks to oversee elections, expecting to be able to have confidence in this official. However, clerks depend on clerk associations, third-party vendors, and manufacturers—none of whom are elected by the public—to vouch for the security of voting machines. This reliance on others by the clerk could be overlooked if voters could verify their elections themselves, but across the country, they're denied that chance. In Missouri, for instance, statute 115.493 blocks voters from accessing election data despite elected officials claiming transparency. Ultimately, voters are left with no direct way to confirm voting machine security, forced to rely on a clerk who trusts unelected, profit-driven entities.

[Hacking: Proof Over Fear](#)

The previous page has links to articles about countries (not counties, countries) that either never used machines or, because of a fear of hacking, removed electronic voting machines from their national elections. But what about proof over fear?

DEF CON Voting Village

DEF CON Voting Village has been a recurring event at the annual DEF CON conference in Las Vegas since 2017. DEF CON, one of the world's largest hacking conventions, draws thousands of attendees, including security researchers, hackers, and election officials, and the Voting Village focuses explicitly on testing the security of voting equipment. This event happens annually, typically in August, and has become a high-profile platform for exposing vulnerabilities in voting machines used across the U.S.



325 QR Code:
More Hackers

2017, Aug. 2 – A Solution to Hackers? More Hackers

NY Times, by Kevin Roose

"In the most talked-about session at Def Con, hackers were let loose on a series of computerized voting machines."

Tags: DEF CON, hackers

[Beyond Amateur Hackers, Proof from Experts](#)

Articles about issues with electronic voting machines can be found in the Newsroom section of this eManual, starting on page 196. It is a small sampling relative to piles of available information and evidence, but it should be enough to begin research on the topic at least.



326 QR Code:
Mesa Reports

Mesa 3 and Mesa 4 Reports

Jeffrey O'Donnell, Computer and Data Expert, MesaMadness.com

The Mesa 3 report "documents the findings of an examination of tabulated vote databases based on forensic analysis of the drive image of Mesa County, Colorado's Dominion Voting Systems (DVS) Election Management System (EMS) server..." (related to Tina Peters, Mesa County's Chief Election Official) In the Mesa 4 report, "Recently discovered evidence from the 2021 Grand Junction, Colorado Municipal election shows evidence that reports containing interim results for the contests in that election were generated 6 days before election day, ... serious and should be fully investigated by proper authorities."

Tags: Mesa 3 Report, Mesa 4 Report, Dominion, Tina Peters, Jeff O'Donnell, Mesa County, Colorado

Election Security: Ask the Experts

On March 16, 2023, council members from St. Charles County, Missouri, led by Councilman Joe Brazil, hosted a Town Hall featuring two cyber experts. Open to the public, this free event's purpose was to give the voters of St. Charles direct access to these renowned experts.

St. Charles County

TOWN HALL MEETING

ASK THE
CYBER EXPERTS



327 **Clay Parikh**, Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP), Certified Ethical Hacker (CEH), and Certified Hacking Forensic Investigator (CHFI)

Cyber Security: Clay Parikh

From 2008 to 2017, Clay Parikh worked part-time in Voting System Test Labs (VSTL), testing voting systems from at least seven manufacturers. Listen to the Town Hall videos where Clay explains that these machines can be hacked. Clay has over 19 years of experience in cyber security and information assurance. He has performed and led teams in Vulnerability Management, Security Test and Evaluation (ST&E), and system accreditation. He has supported civil and department of defense agencies within the U.S. government and international customers, such as NATO.

At the Town Hall, Clay explained the risks of voting machines. About a year later, we taught the hand method to a group of patriots in Alabama (Clay's home state). Clay's message continues to be "no machines," a return to hand counting our elections at the precinct level.



328 QR Code: SCC
Town Hall part 1



329 QR Code: SCC
Town Hall part 2



Clay Parikh @ParikhClay · Nov 2, 2024



So, we spend how much for these machines? They are supposed to be faster than we feeble humans. AZ, PA and other states have also said the same as MI. 🤔 I bet @CofAMissouri can teach them a thing or two. **Hand** marked, **Hand** counted at the Precinct level! [#NoMachines](#)

330 X Post by Clay Parikh ([@ParikhClay](#)) calling for hand marked, hand counted ballots. [Perma.cc/7J2M-N5EE](#) Note: [@CofAMissouri](#) is the X account for Linda Rantz.



331 **Clint Curtis**, Former Computer Programmer (NASA, DOT, FDOLE, Exxon, etc.), 2004 Whistleblower regarding his prototype algorithm

Computer Programming: Clint Curtis

Clint Curtis has spoken with many legislators nationwide regarding the need to remove computers from our election system altogether. In 2004, Clint was a computer programmer who testified before Congress in 2004 regarding his writing the prototype algorithm at the request of a Republican legislator (see page 198 for links to the whistleblower information). The algorithm can change election results to 51%-49% for the 'selected' candidate.

Clint believed he was creating an algorithm to prove the risk of voting machines. He spoke about his shock when watching election returns and recognized that the prototype algorithm was manipulating the vote count in an official election.

A good question is whether the algorithm is still being used two decades later. How often do election results end up 51% to 49%? It deserves some serious investigation.



332 QR Code:
Lack of Chain of
Custody


Chain of Custody: Shawn Smith

“There is not a computerized voting system in the United States that is certified and in use that is made entirely in the United States. In fact, most of them are manufactured entirely outside the United States of non-U.S. components. And there is no supply chain security on those components.”

The quote by Shawn Smith from the December 2022 webinar launching *Return to Hand Counting* came just a few months after Shawn spoke at Mike Lindell’s *Truth Summit* in August of that year. Shawn’s presentation at the Summit, *Enemy Inside the Wire* (see page 204), explained the risks of lack of chain of custody for voting equipment (see Compromising Big Tech on page 29).

In his presentation at a Turning Point Action event in January 2024, Shawn warned that “nobody is testing” our voting systems.

He said the Logic & Accuracy Testing (touted by election officials as proving election results are accurate) is a “does nothing, it’s a puppet show.” He said that Risk Limiting Audits have been “disavowed by their creator, Phillip Stark. These are not methods by which anyone can detect fraud.”



333 Shawn Smith, Col. USAF Ret., served as Senior Military Evaluator for Space, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Systems under SecDef



334 QR Code:
TPA Event with
Shawn Smith

Election Fraud and Crimes: Patrick Colbeck

The person behind [LetsFixStuff.org](https://letsfixstuff.org), a website with a mission to find the truth and provide solutions, Patrick Colbeck, has been battling to fix elections for years. Patrick is a former Republican member of the Michigan Senate, an engineer who worked on the designs for the International Space Station, and an author (see *The 2020 Coup – What Happened, What We Can Do* on page 215). Patrick likes to work on state-of-the-art stuff, which is NOT what American elections are – yet. That’s what we are working on to change!



335 Patrick Colbeck, Lindell Management, , Engineer, former State Senator



336 QR Code:
TPA Event with
Patrick Colbeck

Patrick served as a certified poll challenger in Detroit in 2020 and witnessed first-hand the pizza boxes in the windows blocking the challengers' view while military ballots were being counted (see image on page 278). That began Patrick’s quest to reveal and solve election fraud. In August 2023, Mike Lindell enlisted Patrick’s help at the *Election Crime Bureau Summit* and convinced Patrick to join Mike’s teams in October 2023 officially. Patrick coordinates Mike Lindell’s efforts, which comprise “The Lindell Plan,” and provides resources on ElectionCrimeBureau.com.



337 QR Code:
They Cut the Wires?

Lack of Transparency: St. Charles County Elected Officials

Following the *Ask the Cyber Experts* Town Hall (see previous page), elected officials were invited to meet privately with the cyber experts. The St. Charles County Director of Elections and an employee attended. During the lengthy discussion, the Director and employee emphatically stated that they knew the voting equipment in their county did not connect to the internet because they had personally opened the equipment and “**cut the wires.**” “Clarifications” came quickly after public outrage, but which comment should

you believe: the original statement or the clarification?

It doesn’t matter. If wires were cut, was the public informed? If wires were not cut, why say they were to a county councilman (Joe Brazil) and other elected state officials? And why, when this was brought to the full County Council for action, was absolutely nothing done by the council, despite Councilman Brazil’s request

for a forensic investigation of the machines? Don't voters in St. Charles deserve more transparency from their elected officials, especially regarding elections?

Better Security and More Transparency Come from the Simple, Human Side of Hand-Counting

Strength lies in basic human qualities — intuition, oversight, or common sense — rather than anything overly complex or technical. Here are some examples of these simple security steps built into the hand count process presented in this eManual.

The image below is an official tally form for the Westphalia polling place from the hand counted election in Osage County in 2023. This one form will illustrate some of the security features that come from humans handcounting the ballots.

B BATCH # 3 **BALLETS TALLY**

COUNTY OSAGE POLING PLACE WESTPHALIA ELECTION DAY April 4, 2023 BATCH START TIME 5:33 PM JUDGE INITIALS JP WHEN FINAL DEM JUDGE INITIAL: JP

POLLING PLACE WESTPHALIA TYPE OF BALLOT Election Day TALLY DATE 4/4/23 BATCH END TIME 7:13 PM

ENTER TOTAL # BALLOTS COUNTED THIS BATCH 147

POLITICAL PARTY REPRESENTED (circle one)
REP
DEM

IS THIS TO BE USED FOR THE OFFICIAL COUNT? (circle one)
Yes
No

IF OFFICIAL, COPY TOTALS TO BATCHES SUMMARY B THEN RECORD: PG # 1 ROW # 3

Row Total: 147

26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

338 Official Ballots Tally form for Westphalia Polling Place (Batch 3) from the Osage County MO Hand-Counted Election

338 Official Ballots Tally form for Westphalia Polling Place (Batch 3) from the Osage County MO Hand-Counted Election

Details That Would Need to be Known to Counterfeit a Ballots Tally Form

1. Batch number
2. Start and end times of the batch
3. Judges' initials, each box is specific to REP or DEM
4. Number of Ballots counted in the batch
5. Political party affiliation
6. Yes or No: Is this tally sheet going in the Tally Book?
7. Ink color used by this judge on this batch to tally the votes
8. Page and row number of Batches Summary sheet are recorded

How the Details on the Ballots Tally Form are Linked

The left sidebar and top header have details that must be known to make a counterfeit. For example, if item #5 shows the REP judge created this form, the initials in item #3 must be the correct initials for a REP judge and match the sign-in sheet of the judges.

The number of ballots cast, item #4, cannot be changed on the Batches Summary sheet, where these totals are collected, will not be balanced. There can be no ballot stuffing after the counting is completed, and the forms are signed.

Election Materials Chain of Custody Security

The Westphalia form shows it was completed at 7:15 pm – after the polls closed, making it the last batch of the election. It would need to be intercepted on the way to the clerk's office. Since this copy is going to be in the Tally Book, the judge to intercept would be the one transporting the Tally Book. But the other judge carrying the copy with the ballots would also need to be intercepted since the two tally sheets for the batch must match.

Sharpie Security

It might be possible to take an image of the tally sheet and manipulate it with graphics software to quickly alter votes and totals. Sharpies provide two protections.

1: Ink Color. Sharpies and Sharpie-style markers come in a wide variety of colors. Even if the exact shade of fuchsia or pink is known, a counterfeit copy must be printed to match precisely, or it can be detected.

2: **Sharpies bleed through!** Forget Sharpie-gate – this is a fantastic feature for hand counting. On the back of every Ballots Tally form will be “dabs” corresponding to the tallies on the front side. A high-quality printer would be required to perfectly align the front dabs on the front side with the bleed-through dabs on the back. Perhaps it could be done, but quick enough to intercept both judges on the way back to the clerk's office?



Social Media Transparency

Election Judges take an oath not to disclose election results before the closing of the polls. When the polls close, the oath is complete. In the Osage County election, the clerk permitted judges to make online posts of the hand count forms after the polls closed. Posting online is akin to days when results were taped on the door of the polling location so that locals could stop by to check results.

Social media provides an incredible level of security. Before any election materials leave the polling location, results are shared online before anything can be intercepted or even loaded on election software.

Equally important, this provides massive transparency by giving the People access to their election data as soon as the polls close.



FINDING: OSAGE COUNTY
ELECTION PROVES SUCCESS OF
HAND COUNTING METHOD

Myth: Hand Counted Election in Osage County Did Not Go Well

In April 2023, Osage County, Missouri, conducted a successful hand-counted election, a process that unfolded smoothly and garnered praise for its transparency and reduced costs. Despite this achievement, a 'letter to the editor' from the former County Clerk was published, presenting a detailed yet misleading narrative that casts doubt on the hand count's efficiency and accuracy. Strikingly, this opinion piece stands alone as the sole critique, unsupported by independent news articles or verifiable evidence, suggesting its claims are more a product of preference for machine tabulation than a reflection of the election's true outcome.

The 'letter to the editor' — an opinion piece — was published on May 10, 2023, in Osage County's local newspaper, the *Unterrified Democrat*,²⁷ which boasts an estimated circulation of approximately 2,800. Unlike a reported article, this opinion piece lacked journalistic oversight — no questions were asked, no statements verified, and no interviews were conducted to capture diverse perspectives, particularly opposing views.

While its initial reach might seem limited to fewer than 3,000 readers, the piece's influence extended far beyond its modest readership. Within a day of publication, copies were emailed to every county clerk in Missouri and, it appears, to every Secretary of State across the United States. This swift, targeted distribution transformed a small-town opinion into a statewide — and potentially national — conversation, amplifying its unverified claims far beyond Osage County's borders.



339 Hand Counting Team at a Polling Place in Osage County (pic #1) on April 4, 2023

If the Clerk Makes the Claim, Doesn't That Make It True?

Sorting fact from fiction in the May 10th, 2023, opinion piece requires distinguishing truths from untruths, accuracies from inaccuracies. The line between them often hinges on intent — or the lack of evidence to back a claim. Consider the assertion that the hand-counted April 2023 election cost more than prior machine-tabulated elections. Our team requested financial reports to verify this cost analysis, only to be told none existed; the clerk had simply skimmed the 'dailies' (invoice logs) and tallied a rough total on a calculator. Yet, a county commissioner publicly contradicted this, thanking the hand-count effort for saving Osage County \$16,000 — a discrepancy that undercuts the piece's narrative.

Another claim frames the hand-count decision as a spontaneous 'learning experience' for the county. Pre-election talks about cost savings — echoed repeatedly in the opinion piece — reveal a different intent. The clerk confided she was already considering selling the voting equipment, musing aloud about its potential price. She was poised to offload it before the election, until I suggested Mike Lindell might be a buyer and cautioned her to wait until after the vote, wary she could face trouble otherwise. This proactive stance clashes with the piece's portrayal of a tentative

²⁷ *Unterrified Democrat* – *Mailbag* letter by Osage County Clerk [Perma.cc/T4A7-KT7U](https://perma.cc/T4A7-KT7U)

trial, exposing a gap between her plans and the published account. These discrepancies set the stage for a broader question: why portray a successful hand count as a failure?


Rebuttal to the Clerk's Opinion Piece

Having no opportunity to respond to or rebut the clerk's assertions about the hand-counted election, I instead gathered evidence. I prepared a rebuttal, which can be accessed on the companion website at:

ReturntoHandCounting.com/Show-Me-More

Official Report or Personal Ad?

The opinion piece appears to serve as an extension of the former Osage County Clerk's election oversight duties, detailing the April 2023 hand-count process with an official's authority. Its exceptional length — far exceeding typical letters — suggests it may have been a paid placement, potentially funded by county resources. Despite over a year of requests under Missouri's Sunshine Law, no invoices have been provided, raising questions about transparency and whether public funds were used to amplify this narrative, which contradicts the election's documented success.




340 Thumbnail of Clerk's "Opinion Piece" with markings showing rebuttal topics

Interactions with the Clerk and Secretary of State Involvement

My rebuttal traces the arc of my early interactions with the former Osage County Clerk — initially congenial and cooperative — through the moment the former Secretary of State's (SOS) staff learned of the county's plan to hand-count the April 2023 election. At first, the clerk confidently cited state law as granting her authority to conduct elections as she saw fit, with no hint of SOS oversight.

That changed weeks before the election when she noted the SOS office was aware of the plan to hand count, mentioning that the Director of Elections had tried calling her at home while she was out sick — a detail confirmed by emails obtained through an open records request. Soon after, her responsiveness shifted: calls to her office were intercepted by a deputy clerk who screened my inquiries and relayed answers, marking a clear break from our prior rapport.



341 Hand Counting Team at a Polling Place in Osage County, (pic #2) on April 4, 2023

The opinion piece suggests the clerk worked hand-in-hand with the SOS office from the start — a claim I know to be false based on our early exchanges. The truth diverged further after the election. Following the successful hand count, SOS staff visited Osage County for election certification — unprecedented for a municipal election — where ballots were unsealed, re-hand-counted, and even run through a Dominion tabulator. According to a deputy clerk, these post-election recounts were done under the guidance or direction of the SOS staff.


The apparent aim, in my opinion, was to discredit the hand count. Yet, they couldn't: only a handful of votes shifted, likely due to voter intent rather than errors, affirming the process's reliability. The absence of news articles reflects this non-story — hand counting worked, leaving little to report beyond success.

Why Discredit an Election that Proved Hand Counting Succeeded?

I filed an official complaint about these post-election actions with Osage County Sheriff Michael Bonham, who took the complaint seriously and assigned a detective to the case. A seven-month investigation ensued.²⁸ The findings identified administrative violations but no criminal acts, limiting the sheriff's jurisdiction. Election-related administrative issues fall to the SOS, who, predictably, took no action. This sequence — from cooperation to interference, from a validated hand count to an unaccountable overreach — begs the question: why discredit an election that proved hand counting succeeded?

Subjective vs. Objective Perspective, AI-Assisted

This section was written in whole by the author, then edited using Grok3, an xAI tool, to eliminate subjectivity and suggest more objective phrasing to debunk the myth that the Osage County hand count was anything other than a success.



342 Hand Counting Team at a Polling Place in Osage County, (pic #3) on April 4, 2023

²⁸ My election complaint with supporting documentation, including some of the notes and recordings from the sheriff's investigation documents, can be accessed at ReturntoHandCounting.com/Show-Me-More



FINDING: DUE DILIGENCE
REQUIRED TO ENSURE
CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT

Myth: Counties Using Voting Machines Don't Need to Consider Any Hand Count Processes

Many clerks may feel they already know all they need to know about hand counting because they conduct the 2% to 5% post-election audit of machines. These audits are done days after an election in the clerk's office or facility. Most jurisdictions select a few races from the ballot – they do not recount the entire ballot. A common complaint is that hand counting the audit sampling is already so time-consuming and tedious that the clerk does not want to consider counting all the ballots.

It probably would do no good to argue with a clerk who, when considering hand counting, is looking at it from the perspective of a process they are already using – good or bad.

The reality is that there are federal, state, and local laws regarding the “continuity of government.” Government agencies and offices must be able to conduct business, including elections, in the case of catastrophic events (such as natural disasters, attacks, etc.). Clerks are obligated by the duty of their office to have emergency preparedness plans in place. It may not just be a matter of no power or communication, but it might also be impossible to transport voting equipment to polling locations. Having a “Plan B” for counting ballots is essential.

Emergency Hand Count Guide

Emergency Preparedness for Precinct-Level Ballot Counting

If an emergency occurs during or near an election day, whether a power outage, natural disaster, cyber-attack, or something else, are election authorities prepared with a 'Plan B'? Even under the worst of circumstances, elections must still be conducted. These emergencies could incapacitate voting machines and necessitate hand counting the ballots, so pre-planning is vital.

A Guide is offered as a resource to assist election authorities in proactively planning for emergencies. Since no two states share identical laws regarding counting ballots, the Guide provides considerations and a basic preparation overview. Specific requirements may vary based on local regulations and procedures. The key is to have all necessary materials organized and readily available to conduct an efficient and accurate hand count.

Estimating Quantities of Supplies and Forms to Prepare for Emergencies

Forms and Supplies Prepared in Advance by the Clerk

By calculating the expected turnout at the polling place and the number of candidates and questions, the **Forms and Supplies Estimator** (see page 265) will approximate all forms and supplies that a clerk should prepare as part of an emergency preparedness kit.

Tool: Emergency Hand Count Forms

After the clerk has used the Forms and Supplies Estimator and knows which hand count forms and quantities are needed, download the forms using the tool for **Primary Emergency Forms**.

The core of the hand-counting process presented in this eManual is tallying votes and tabulating the results. The four primary forms in the Missouri Method are the Ballots Tally form, Batches Summary sheet, Results of Polling Place, and Statement of Returns. The hand count process has additional forms, but these four primary forms are recommended as all that would be needed for an emergency.





FINDING: MIKE WAS RIGHT

Myth: Mike Lindell is a Conspiracy Theorist with No Evidence

The November 3, 2020, presidential election was a watershed moment for our nation, reshaping history. Mike Lindell and millions of others immediately knew something was wrong with the reported election results. A quest began to uncover the evidence and expose how a presidential election was stolen.

Stop the Steal

“It's time to explain exactly what happened on Election Day 2024 to stop the steal.” This quote by Journalist Emerald Robinson is the first line of a 68-post thread on X.com. Emerald explains, “We must begin just after the rigged 2020 election,” she walks readers from 2020 to the 2024 election.

Emerald's thread is a lot of information in 3,000 words. Emerald explains for anyone who does not understand how the 2020 conspiracy unfolded.



343 Emerald Robinson thread on X.com about rigged 2020 election and stop the steal efforts for 2024, Jan 22, 2025
[Perma.cc/5QSA-WNN5](https://perma.cc/5QSA-WNN5)

The 2020 Election Fraud is Not a Theory

There are already history books written about fraud in the 2020 presidential election. A few are listed in the *Bookshelf* section (see page 213), and numerous articles reporting election issues are in the *Newsroom* section (see page 195).

Recall how this section on debunking myths began – with the definitions of ‘myth’ and ‘objection.’ An objection is based on findings or grounds; a myth is a popular belief that is false or unsupported. It certainly depends on which side of the argument you believe. If your position is there was no fraud in the 2020 election, then you will claim that those who believe there was fraud are spouting myths or, worse, conspiracy theories.

However, those who deny fraud in the 2020 election (or any election) must have findings or proof to support their denial. Do they? Or are they taking government “pronouncements” and media talking points as their evidence without digging for the truth?

Most Secure Election in History?

On November 12, 2020, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released a statement: “The November 3rd election was the most secure in American history. Right now, across the country, election officials are reviewing and double checking the entire election process prior to finalizing the result.” (see page 200)

If election officials across the country were, “right now,” scrutinizing and verifying every step of the voting process, what basis was there for declaring it the “most secure election” in history before the scrutinization was complete? Those who unquestioningly trust government assertions have little ground to label skeptics or dissenters as conspiracy theorists.

Oops – Most Secure Election, Except for the Critical Vulnerabilities

The nine-day assessment by CISA that the 2020 election was the “most secure” was proven to be premature. About 19 months later, on June 3, 2022, CISA published an advisory regarding critical vulnerabilities affecting Dominion Voting Systems (see page 202). The advisory recommended that election officials “further enhance defensive measures to reduce the risk of exploitation of these vulnerabilities.”

At least in Missouri, it did not seem that clerks and election officials took the advisory as seriously as we would have liked. Reread *What is Being Overlooked? The Reliance on “Vendors”* on page 286 and what we perceived as a lax response to our records requests regarding the June 2022 CISA advisory. There is no way to know now, 2+ years later, if these vulnerabilities were ever addressed.

Sometimes, There is No Choice but to ‘Dismantle’ the Messenger

Election integrity advocates have been critical of CISA, accusing it of overreach, particularly in its attempts to combat what it deemed to be misinformation about the 2020 election. On February 14, 2025, over 130 CISA members were let go by the Trump Administration, with speculation that the number included at least 17 employees tied to election security. These actions reportedly stem from a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiative, under which CISA operates, targeting staff involved in policing “misinformation” and pausing election security activities.

There is further speculation that CISA will be completely dismantled. That may or may not be the case, but its future is uncertain, and significant changes are underway. Also interesting to note is that an NGO connected to CISA, the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing & Analysis Center (EI-ISAC), a key DHS-funded group for election security coordination, had its funding halted.

Mike Lindell is Vindicated – Mike Was Right



The hand count process in this eManual, and the eManual itself, exists because of Mike Lindell’s resolve to pursue the election fraud of 2020 and work to secure America’s elections. Mike points to January 7 and 8, 2021, as critical moments in history when conservatives across the country, from a sitting president, his advisors and staff, media personalities, grassroots activists, and Mike himself, were canceled and deplatformed. Then, the lawfare began to attack as many as possible in an apparent attempt to scare others into submission.

As an example of what could easily have been interpreted as a thinly veiled threat, consider this October 19, 2024, post on X.com by @dominionvoting. This voting equipment company noted they would be “closely monitoring claims” about the upcoming November election. They “strongly” encouraged using “verified, credible sources” for public remarks. The company cautioned they were “prepared to defend” “against lies and those who spread them.”²⁹

It’s curious that a company branding itself as “transparent” in its slogan restricts comments on its posts to only those it follows or tags. It also shields its software from public view, claiming it is proprietary.

²⁹ Dominion Voting post on X on Oct 19, 2024 [Perma.cc/Z2FS-J4HD](https://perma.cc/Z2FS-J4HD)

“Take the Voting Machines and Melt Them into Prison Bars”

Mike Lindell’s call to rid our country of voting machines began in 2021 and has never wavered. His call to “melt them into prison bars” might have been too radical for some of the staunchest conservatives, but Mike stuck with it. And the grassroots stuck with Mike!

More Voices Spread the Message


Mike Lindell has never been alone in this battle. There are others:



344 Lara Logan: "This should be investigated. As long as you have machines, you will have this [stolen elections].
[Perma.cc/5E4C-552K](https://perma.cc/5E4C-552K)



346 Elon Musk: "The Last Thing We Want is Electronic Voting Machines." "I'm normally someone who favors technology, and I'm saying there should be no machines for voting."
[Perma.cc/3TT8-U4DN](https://perma.cc/3TT8-U4DN)



345 Sidney Powell: "This is a must!"
"No Machines" [Perma.cc/AX3G-QFNZ](https://perma.cc/AX3G-QFNZ)



347 Robert F. Kennedy, Jr. on Dr. Phil's Merit TV: "Everybody knows any machine can be hacked." "You need something to check the election. And that's what we should be talking about rather than did this one get hacked or did that one?" "And you need paper ballots"
[Perma.cc/H3UC-LA64](https://perma.cc/H3UC-LA64)

We're Not Done Yet

Mike Lindell knows that the work is not done. He has attended countless Trump rallies and uses his platforms and voice to continue spreading the message that we need to secure our elections and return to hand counting.

Mike Lindell is Loyal and “Without Fear”

Jack Posobiec caught a great picture of an example of Mike Lindell’s fearlessness – stepping into a crowd of protesters and media at the DNC Conference to spread his message.



348 Jack Posobiec photo from Democratic National Convention showing Mike Lindell on the street amongst protesters, answering questions from the media. [Perma.cc/77EN-ZSG8](https://perma.cc/77EN-ZSG8)

For anyone who has worked or partnered with Mike Lindell to expose election fraud and crimes, Sherronna Bishop’s comment about Mike’s loyalty speaks, I believe, for all of us:

“From day one, Mr. Lindell said he would never leave any of us behind. He has fought for Clerk Tina Peters, raising more than \$2million dollars for her defense, and that of her associates. He has continued to make his voice bigger so he could make sure the nation heard her story, as he funded “Selection Code” to tell Clerk Tina Peters’ story to the masses. He has used every valuable tool he has to set Clerk Peters free. There will be much more happening on that soon. Whether it was Kari Lake, Col. Conrad, Georgia, Audit the Vote PA, Shasta County, Missouri, so many places that needed help and Mike Lindell made sure our team was there.”

Sherronna Bishop, Executive Director, Lindell Offense Fund, February 23, 2025
[Perma.cc/AH36-AT2Y](https://perma.cc/AH36-AT2Y)

Mike Lindell is Validated by President Trump

“I’m pointing to Mike Lindell.” In well-deserved recognition of Mike Lindell’s perseverance and loyalty, President Trump gave a tremendous ‘thank you’ to Mike during his 2025 CPAC speech. The President said about Mike, “he stood strong; nothing was going to faze him.”

**Mike Lindell**  @realDonaldTrump · Feb 23

Thank you, President Trump, for your friendship and for your support. We are going to make elections secure again!



349 President Trump: "I'm pointing to Mike Lindell." President Trump closed his speech at the 2025 CPAC event by calling out Mike Lindell, speaking about Mike's consistency, never backing down, and calling out the rigged 2020 election.
[Perma.cc/3DER-0P6B](https://perma.cc/3DER-0P6B)

Again, Sherronna Bishop put into words how so many people feel about Mike Lindell:

“President Trump took to the stage at CPAC yesterday and called out Mike Lindell for his incredible courage, saying ‘He’s all man’” President Trump thanked him emphatically for never wavering on the truth about the 2020 election and every election since – they have all been rigged! It has taken tremendous courage and conviction for Mike Lindell to maintain the vision of free elections when everyone around him was caving to the pressure to go silent.

President Trump spoke about the ‘vicious weaponization of government’ against Mike Lindell yesterday and I am telling you very few people could withstand what Mike Lindell and his family have been put through for using his influence and his voice to expose election crimes. It has been brutal.”

President Trump’s comments: [Perma.cc/L9EC-RBEN](https://perma.cc/L9EC-RBEN)

As these historical times unfold before us, there is no doubt Mike Lindell will continue to use his voice, teams, and platforms to share calls to action to “make elections secure again.” What it comes down to is **Mike Was Right**. We must get machines out of our elections and return to hand counting. ReturntoHandCounting.com/MikeWasRight.

Mike Lindell’s CPAC 2025 speech: [Perma.cc/PU98-AVLX](https://perma.cc/PU98-AVLX)

Mike Lindell at White House Press Briefing Room: [Perma.cc/5649-HDJU](https://perma.cc/5649-HDJU)

ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

This publication was drafted solely by the author in 2022, prior to the widespread availability of artificial intelligence (AI) tools. No AI tools were used in the original drafting of the text. The author designed the complete process, including all hand counting forms without the use of AI – either assistance or content generation.

During a 2025 update of this eManual, content for the subsection beginning on page 293 was written by the author and then edited using an AI tool (AI-assisted) for the purpose of ensuring that content was objective rather than subjective. The reference to this use of AI is noted on page 296.

Also in 2025, an AI tool was used for an analysis of the Missouri Method Hand Count process. Part of the analysis (AI-generated) was included on page 252, as noted on that page.

There have been no changes to the actual hand count process (Section 5, pages 70 to 128) since its first publication (digitally) in December 2022. The process remains the same as when it was used in an official election in Osage County, MO in April 2023.

AUTHOR BIO

Linda Rantz

In October of 2022, in response to Mike Lindell's call to "get rid of machines," Linda Rantz asked herself, "and replace them with what?" She took action to find out, starting with a visit to Louisiana where that team was demonstrating their hand count method. Returning to Missouri, Linda immersed herself in Missouri's laws, learning that not only was hand counting permitted in her state, but the laws dated back to 1977 (and probably even earlier).



Based on Missouri statutes, Linda began to write an 'outline' of the Missouri Method hand count process. It grew into a 300-page eManual, which includes 60 pages of process and a multitude of links to supporting documents and laws, all with the hopes of giving others the information they need to speak with their election officials. The guide, "*Return to Hand Counting*," is available in paperback, hardcover, digitally, and a downloadable PDF at ReturntoHandCounting.com/eManual.

Linda, with her husband Craig Rantz, continues to promote and teach hand counting around the country. Together they have already trained groups, in person or online, in more than half the states, including Georgia, Pennsylvania, Nevada, Oregon, and New York!

Contact Linda Rantz

Email: ContactUs@ReturntoHandCounting.com

X.com: [@CofAMissouri](https://twitter.com/CofAMissouri)

VOCL.com: [@LindaRantz](https://vocl.com/@LindaRantz)

TruthSocial.com: [@LindaRantz](https://truthsocial.com/@LindaRantz)

GETTR.com: [@LindaRantz](https://gettr.com/@LindaRantz)

Website: ReturntoHandCounting.com



Return to
Hand Counting
Website

PERMISSION FOR USE

From the Author, Linda Rantz:

Return to Hand Counting is a resource dedicated to sharing a hand-counting process for elections, based on my layperson's interpretation of Missouri statutes. This eManual, available in print and digitally, is the result of my efforts to design and document a complete hand count process: from opening of polling places to delivering election results to the clerk.

The Missouri Method hand count process is easy to learn, taking less than 60 pages of this publication (Section 5, pages 70 to 128). The other 200 or so pages contain additional commentary, illustrations, and resources.

All hand count forms and instructions provided in this eManual or as downloadable files were created by me, including the distinctive ballot tallying form design with oval-style vote marking. These forms may be printed and used as provided, but they must not be altered in part or in whole (including their design style) or claimed as new works without permission.

To protect the integrity of this work and prevent unauthorized edits that could be misrepresented as my own, the PDF version of this eManual and all downloadable forms are password-protected to allow printing and reproduction but prohibit editing. The Microsoft Word version is not provided for these same reasons. Visit ReturntoHandCounting.com/Copyright for more information.

Election Officials

The Missouri Method is very adaptable and could potentially be used in many other states. If you are an election official interested in using the Missouri Method hand-counting process at no charge for non-commercial election purposes, I invite you to contact me for permission. Please submit a permission request form (available at ReturntoHandCounting.com/Copyright) detailing your intended use and acknowledging the manual's disclaimers. Upon review, I will grant written permission with specific conditions, such as attribution to Linda Rantz and verification of local legal compliance. The permission process ensures the Missouri Method is used responsibly and allows me to offer guidance where needed.

Not Intended as Legal Advice

This work is not legal advice, and readers are encouraged to consult a licensed attorney to ensure compliance with local election laws before applying the process. I have made every effort to ensure accuracy as of August 2025, but I disclaim liability for any errors, omissions, misuse, or unauthorized alterations.

Let's work together to promote transparent elections—feel free to reach out with questions or feedback!

COMPANION WEBSITE



ReturntoHandCounting.com

More Content Available on the Companion Website

☒ **Hand Count Mission**

A timeline showing the eventual acceptance by Americans of electronic voting equipment, and our Mission to return the country to hand counting ballots to secure elections

ReturntoHandCounting.com/Mission

☒ **Myths and Findings**

More common “objections” to hand counting, along with excerpts from the Myth-Debunking Workbook, one-page summaries, and ‘Mythbuster’ videos – all to help you educate yourself on how to respond to ‘objections.’

ReturntoHandCounting.com/Myths

☒ **Library**

More than 500 items for the Missouri Method Hand Count Process, including forms, tools, and resources, plus links to source materials

ReturntoHandCounting.com/Library

☒ **eManual**

This entire guide as a downloadable PDF

ReturntoHandCounting.com/eManual

☒ **Training videos**

Teach yourself or train others with 3 different levels of training available as online videos

ReturntoHandCounting.com/Training

☒ **Hand Count Champions**

Meet the most prominent hand count advocates who have spent years, or even decades, working to secure our elections

ReturntoHandCounting.com/Champions

☒ **Mike Was Right**

Mike Lindell’s efforts have already been vindicated and validated by President Trump. Find the latest details about Mike’s fight to save our country.

ReturntoHandCounting.com/Mike-Was-Right

WEB LINKS

Directory of Source and Archived Links (URLs)

Most of the more than 200 links to sources in this eManual are provided in QR codes which can be scanned (paperback) or clicked (digital). A smaller number of links appear in some footnotes, and even less are inserted within paragraph text.

To preserve the web content as it appeared or was accessed during the writing of this eManual, two web archive tools were used: Perma.cc for most links and, for links Perma.cc could not archive, Archive.org was used.

The source and archived links are listed in the table below.

- REF is the reference ID for each link, which appears in the caption below the QR code or image
- FN is the footnote number
- PG is the page number on which the link appears

Some webpages sit behind paywalls or subscription requirements and will not archive all information. Also, links to Rumble, YouTube, or other video platforms usually result in archived details of the page, but do not archive the video. For archived URLs that do not display the entire content or video, try clicking the “View Live Page” feature (for Perma.cc links), or try accessing the content with the source URL.

REF	FN	PG	Description	Source URL	Archived URL
1		4	Hand Count launch Webinar on Dec 29 2022 with Mike Lindell	Rumble.com/v6qaqhi-return-to-hand-counting-launch-webinar.html	Perma.cc/3XTU-BSE3
2		4	X Post - Elon Musk - Paper Ballots In-Person Only	X.com/elonmusk/status/1810581873703194727	Perma.cc/UZ7Y-G27V
3		5	X Post - Mike Lindell Thanking President Trump	X.com/realMikeLindell/status/1884071827858976839	Perma.cc/GU4M-PUR9
4		9	Dunklin County MO voting day 1942	LOC.gov/item/2017835137	Web.Archive.org/web/20250413021336/https://www.loc.gov/item/2017835137
	1	15	Net Lingo about S.M.A.R.T.	NetLingo.com/word/smart-tech.php	Perma.cc/Z96S-X8HE
5		16	X Post - Robert F Kennedy Jr about SMART Devices	X.com/robertkennedyjr/status/1568685489804173315	Perma.cc/7YE8-LJ49
6		20	X Post - Tyler Bowyer about Maricopa County	X.com/tylerbowyer/status/1605622260810686466	Perma.cc/2F2R-4WFO

REF	FN	PG	Description	Source URL	Archived URL
	3	24	<i>The Count #11: The Gaslighting of The American Voter</i>	TheAppeal.org/the-count-11-the-gaslighting-of-the-american-voter	Perma.cc/366A-YBJB
		30	Telit Cinterior	Telit.com	Perma.cc/LCL4-V9J5
		31	Qualcomm	Qualcomm.com	Perma.cc/KF4S-GBX6
	5	31	Election Systems & Software (ES&S) ESSvote.com/faqs	ESSvote.com/faqs	Perma.cc/H3UU-9EN6
12		34	48.020	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=48.020	Perma.cc/6HXA-EG97
		34	Missouri Revisor website homepage	Revisor.MO.gov/main/Home.aspx	Perma.cc/NVT8-72UM
	6	39	Electoral Knowledge Network: Costs & Benefits	AceProject.org/ace-en/topics/et/etb/etb01/etb01b	Perma.cc/9A8K-SUMF
	6	39	Electoral Knowledge Network link: Budgeting	AceProject.org/ace-en/topics/et/etb/etb04/etb04a	Perma.cc/SJ3W-4WFW
18		50	115.225	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.225	Perma.cc/TTW6-HZUA
26		81	115.461	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.461	Perma.cc/G6ZC-2HKW
	7	105	Baseball Pitch Count Sheet sample	cloud.rampinteractive.com/langleybaseball/files/Pitch-Count-Sheet-newbest.pdf	Perma.cc/TZX9-MCL6
	9	158	115.109	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.109	Perma.cc/WA3V-5AM9
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117		165	Blue Ballpoint Pens	Staples.com/pentel-wow-retractable-ballpoint-pens-medium-point-blue-ink-18-pack-bk440bp18c/product_712134	Perma.cc/7728-NJWN
118		165	Sharpies	Staples.com/sharpie-permanent-markers-fine-tip-assorted-24-pack-75846/product_752356	Perma.cc/Q7JJ-YAYN
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120		165	Mechanical Pencils	Staples.com/bic-xtra-life-mechanical-pencil-0-7mm-2-medium-lead-40-pack-mpp40mj-blk/product_24276526	Perma.cc/Y88L-XXC7

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121		165	MarkerLock	MyStore.com/MarkerLock	Perma.cc/RG5E-JNLM
122		165	Large Envelopes	Staples.com/Staples-Clasp-Envelopes-10-x-15-Brown-Kraft-100-Box-535021-19814/product_535021	Perma.cc/KE45-XD4L
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124		166	Cardstock for bookmarks	Staples.com/astrobrights-cardstock-paper-70-lbs-8-5-x-11-double-color-3-assortment-80-pack-91668/product_24396497	Perma.cc/87BG-9FWS
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219		214	Black Box Voting 2.0 Website	BlackBoxVoting.org	Perma.cc/SN5U-47TB
220		214	<i>Can Voters Detect Malicious Manipulation of Ballot Marking Devices?</i>	par.NSF.gov/biblio/10222852-can-voters-detect-malicious-manipulation-ballot-marking-devices	Perma.cc/8EKC-8NCQ
221		215	Mike Lindell's <i>Absolute Proof</i>	Rumble.com/vdlqOr-absolute-proof-documentary-with-mike-lindell-never-before-seen-evidence-on-.html	Perma.cc/D4KA-SA9Y
222		215	<i>Fingerprints of Fraud – The Movie</i>	FingerPrintsofFraudtheMovie.com	Perma.cc/D469-RL6C

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223		215	<i>The 2020 Coup</i>	LetsFixStuff.org/book-the-2020-coup	Perma.cc/4AFW-ZATZ
224		215	<i>Our Broken Elections</i>	TheThinkingConservative.com/our-broken-elections-how-the-left-changed-the-way-you-vote	Web.Archive.org/web/20250901165822/https://www.thethinkingconservative.com/our-broken-elections-how-the-left-changed-the-way-you-vote/
225		215	<i>Who Really Won the 2020 Election?</i>	Heartland.org/publications/who-really-won-the-2020-election-measuring-the-effect-of-mail-in-ballot-fraud-in-the-trump-biden-race-for-the-white-house	Perma.cc/UE7E-6ZAL
226		216	<i>The Fighting Bunch - The Battle of Athens</i>	Southernreviewofbooks.Com/2021/06/16/The-Fighting-Bunch-Chris-Derose-Review	Perma.cc/PY2D-YT7L
227		216	<i>The Battle of Athens - Movie</i>	Youtu.be/OM6MeWGPvb8?si=oJeje9EB-dYW3uDZ	Perma.cc/3S8N-A57C
228		216	<i>Let My People Go</i>	Rumble.com/v4h66w3-official-let-my-people-go-full-length-documentary.html	Perma.cc/2E42-PYSD
229		216	<i>Licensed to Lie: Exposing Corruption in the Department of Justice</i>	SidneyPowell.Com/Shop/P/Licensed-To-Lie-Book-Paperback	Perma.cc/7JMN-NCU4
230		216	<i>The Parallel Election: A Blueprint for Deception</i>	ParallelElection.com	Perma.cc/3JV5-Q77G
231		218	Missouri Constitution	SOS.MO.gov/Pubs/constitution	Perma.cc/LHU5-CLPR
233		218	Missouri Statutes - where to find	Revisor.MO.gov/main/Home.aspx	Perma.cc/NVT8-72UM
232		218	Election Law Book PDF	SOS.MO.gov/CMSImages/ElectionGoVoteMissouri/CurrentElectionLawBook.pdf	Perma.cc/965J-RFPQ
235		218	Chapter 115 - Missouri Statutes	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneChapter.aspx?chapter=115	Perma.cc/5XNU-8PCK
236		218	115.013	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.013	Perma.cc/S5V3-V2L3
237		219	115.015	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.015	Perma.cc/6S6X-X2H7
238		219	115.043	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.043	Perma.cc/TG88-99HV
239		219	115.053	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.053	Perma.cc/ZUB7-SCCY
240		220	115.079	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.079	Perma.cc/8FVL-677D
241		220	115.081	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.081	Perma.cc/AL3N-X3AY
242		221	115.085	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.085	Perma.cc/57VV-PMDM
243		221	115.087	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.087	Perma.cc/LF8K-7429
244		221	115.091	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.091	Perma.cc/LCQ5-6577
245		222	115.097	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.097	Perma.cc/95NA-2YWQ

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246		222	115.099	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.099	Perma.cc/9PXA-8P3Z
247		222	115.102	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.102	Perma.cc/YFQ8-YWC4
248		222	115.104	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.104	Perma.cc/HP9G-A4E7
249		223	115.107	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.107	Perma.cc/PG56-FDLP
250		224	115.111	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.111	Perma.cc/MKP7-4E9Q
251		224	115.239	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.239	Perma.cc/ZMV8-NUHQ
252		224	115.267	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.267	Perma.cc/5MCD-6ZMH
253		224	115.407	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.407	Perma.cc/PC9F-GWSF
254		224	115.409	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.409	Perma.cc/9ZNR-B28U
255		225	115.423	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.423	Perma.cc/3KVJ-MY6F
256		225	115.433	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.433	Perma.cc/L7M5-U6EC
257		225	115.435	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.435	Perma.cc/M35U-HCNW
258		225	115.439	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.439	Perma.cc/R9YQ-PNBX
259		226	115.443	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.443	Perma.cc/PLR5-MSXU
260		226	115.447	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.447	Perma.cc/9FFZ-5M2Q
261		226	115.449	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.449	Perma.cc/HQ7J-9SKG
262		227	115.451	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.451	Perma.cc/9FBC-QRWF
263		227	115.453	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.453	Perma.cc/7MDA-H9QY
264		228	115.455	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.455	Perma.cc/YZR6-WQUN
265		228	115.456	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.456	Perma.cc/693S-BAHA
266		229	115.457	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.457	Perma.cc/9M0A-JSRV
267		229	115.459	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.459	Perma.cc/AG38-YRY Y
268		229	115.463	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.463	Perma.cc/J5LU-34N8
269		229	115.465	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.465	Perma.cc/TW3C-6XCZ
270		230	115.468	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.468	Perma.cc/T8GZ-54SW


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271		230	115.469	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.469	Perma.cc/J4ET-667L
272		231	115.491	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.491	Perma.cc/4EW2-EH39
273		231	115.493	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.493	Perma.cc/QML3-YZUA
274		231	115.631	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.631	Perma.cc/MXR9-NRE7
275		232	115.633	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.633	Perma.cc/K44V-RU2D
276		232	115.635	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.635	Perma.cc/X457-BB86
277		233	115.637	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.637	Perma.cc/N46D-7MAK
278		235	Missouri Code of State Regulations	SOS.MO.gov/adrules/csr/csr	Perma.cc/A7JP-967Y
279		235	CSR Rulemaking Manual	SOS.MO.gov/adrules/manual/manual	Perma.cc/WR2G-G34N
282		235	Missouri Register Publications List	SOS.MO.gov/adrules/moreg/moreg	Perma.cc/C5S2-69DQ
283		236	Missouri Register Notifications	SOS.MO.gov/adrules/notifications	Perma.cc/8F58-VC4D
285		236	Counting Standards in CSR Regulations	SOS.MO.gov/cmsimages/adrules/csr/current/15csr/15c30-9.pdf	Perma.cc/Y28W-SUE7
287		240	Linda Rantz speaking at Turning Point Action event, January 2024	Rumble.com/v4ak4zf-linda-rantz-presents-hand-counting-ballots-at-tpusa-event-in-las-vegas-janu.html	Perma.cc/BB9S-5NGM
	15	240	TPA January 2024 presentation by Linda Rantz	Rumble.com/v4ak4zf-linda-rantz-presents-hand-counting-ballots-at-tpusa-event-in-las-vegas-janu.html	Perma.cc/BB9S-5NGM
	16	242	Merriam-Webster definition of Objection	Merriam-Webster.Com/Dictionary/Objection	Perma.cc/B7TG-EKGP
	17	242	Merriam-Webster definition of Myth	Merriam-Webster.Com/Dictionary/Myth	Perma.cc/8DAW-K7XJ
	18	242	Merriam-Webster definition of Finding	Merriam-Webster.Com/Dictionary/Finding	Perma.cc/FAQ3-7BEM
		249	Link about Muscle Memory	en.Wikipedia.org/wiki/Muscle_memory	Perma.cc/AA9W-D3LQ
292		249	NPR article about Research Human Accuracy	NPR.org/2022/10/11/1128197774/research-finds-hand-counting-ballots-to-be-less-accurate-and-more-expensive	Perma.cc/ZU7N-AXJC
293		249	WaPo article Hand Counting is Bad Idea	WashingtonPost.com/politics/2022/04/08/hand-count-election-explained	Perma.cc/2DDW-3CN8
	19	256	CSR Images regarding Voter Intent	SOS.MO.gov/cmsimages/adrules/csr/current/15csr/15c30-9.pdf	Perma.cc/2M83-AH8L

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298		259	Elections Cost Big Bucks	NCSL.org/state-legislatures-news/details/democracy-is-priceless-but-elections-cost-big-bucks	Web.Archive.org/web/20250902000704/https://www.ncsl.org/state-legislatures-news/details/democracy-is-priceless-but-elections-cost-big-bucks
299		259	<i>A Republic If You Can Afford It</i>	Cambridge.org/core/elements/republic-if-you-can-afford-it/CE8A01003AA98C51937031E4C1DC413E	Perma.cc/N5TR-GCLW
300		260	Human Error in Wyoming	WyomingNews.com/laramieboomerang/news/this-is-a-human-error-carbon-county-clerk-gwynn-bartlett-explains-weston-county-election-controversy/article_d47d4bda-b0ef-11ef-9f69-03221051c8c7.html	Perma.cc/W5C6-S9VK
308		267	Tallying elections results 1987 in Lowell, MA	LOC.gov/item/afc1987042_jb_300/	Source URL is the archive
	20	267	X post - Rasmussen People want to hand count	X.com/CofAMissouri/status/1897683184218783903	Perma.cc/RE53-MHDG
309		268	Oregon Hand Count Training	TruthinthePacificNorthwest.blogspot.com/2023/10	Perma.cc/9PXX-W4W7
	21	279	15 CSR 30-10-040 par. (5)	SOS.MO.gov/cmsimages/adrules/csr/current/15csr/15c30-10.pdf	Perma.cc/PEW5-EYXU
	22	280	115.501	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.501	Perma.cc/B7JY-XTE7
	23	280	115.503	Revisor.MO.gov/main/OneSection.aspx?section=115.503	Perma.cc/A4D7-YJK6
	25	282	Vernon County, MO, Official Election Results for August 2024	VernonCountyMO.org/wp-content/uploads/OFFICIAL-CANVASS-8-6-24.pdf	Perma.cc/8B8R-KD6N
319		284	Norwegian Votes to Be Manually Counted	TheBarentsObserver.com/life-and-public/norwegian-votes-to-be-counted-manually-in-fear-of-election-hacking/146521	Perma.cc/QAW7-4LB7
320		284	Dutch to Hand Count Votes Over Hacking Fears	BBC.com/news/world-europe-38833634	Perma.cc/79F2-G8N6
322		287	Most Countries Hand-Count Paper Ballots	TDMSresearch.com/2024/06/09/most-countries-hand-count-paper-ballots	Perma.cc/5GNE-SF5S
323		287	France: Paper Ballots, In Person, Hand Counted	APnews.com/article/covid-health-france-elections-europe-96859198666d51b2c4482c3cdb0eb6aa	Web.Archive.org/web/20250902142803/https://apnews.com/article/covid-health-france-elections-europe-96859198666d51b2c4482c3cdb0eb6aa
324		287	Germany - Rigged to Work	DW.com/en/no-concerns-over-election-fraud-in-germany/a-17102003	Perma.cc/TJC9-KCWC

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325		288	Solution to Hackers? More Hacker	NYtimes.com/2017/08/02/technology/a-solution-to-hackers-more-hackers.html#	Perma.cc/2UBZ-Z4TW
326		288	Mesa 3 and Mesa 4 Reports	MesaMadness.com	Perma.cc/UTD2-PTLG
328		289	St Charles County MO, Town Hall Meeting, Ask the Experts, Part 1	Rumble.com/v6qay9o-ask-the-cyber-experts-town-hall-part-1.html	Perma.cc/ZA3D-CZBY
329		289	St Charles County MO, Town Hall Meeting, Ask the Experts, Part 2	Rumble.com/v6qb0v0-ask-the-cyber-experts-town-hall-part-2.html	Perma.cc/89M4-84VY
330		289	X Post by Clay Parikh (@ParikhClay) calling for hand marked, hand counted ballots	X.com/ParikhClay/status/1852726622840926683	Perma.cc/7J2M-N5EE
332		290	Shawn Smith on Lack of Chain of Custody at Hand Count Launch Webinar	Rumble.com/v6qb2w0-shawn-smith-at-hand-count-launch-webinar.html	Perma.cc/98N3-UC7T
334		290	Video - TPA Event with Shawn Smith	Rumble.com/v4ak143-col-shawn-smith-at-turning-point-usa-event-in-las-vegas-january-2024.html?e9s=src_v1_upp	Perma.cc/2K3Q-BN4E
336		290	Video - TPA Event with Patrick Colbeck	Rumble.com/v4akoan-patrick-colbeck-at-turning-point-usa-event-in-las-vegas-january-2024.html	Perma.cc/PZ83-YAV4
337		290	They Cut the Wires? St. Charles MO	Rumble.com/v2nzh4-they-cut-the-wires-in-missouri-extended.html	Perma.cc/UW6Y-9UJN
	27	294	Osage County Clerk Opinion Piece in Local newspaper	UnterrifiedDemocrat.com/stories/ud-5-10-23,79126	Perma.cc/T4A7-KT7U
343		301	Emerald Robinson "Election Day 2024" thread on X	X.com/EmeraldRobinson/status/1882074856730300718	Perma.cc/5QSA-WNN5
	29	302	X post by @DominionVoting	X.com/DominionVoting/status/1847659801737666934	Perma.cc/Z2FS-J4HD
344		303	X Quote by Lara Logan on @Real_RobN post, About Stolen Elections	X.com/LaraLogan/status/1883789199310262660	Perma.cc/5E4C-552K
345		303	X post Sidney Powell: No Machines	X.com/SidneyPowell1/status/1893387783735054662	Perma.cc/AX3G-QFNZ
346		303	X post by @KaneKoaTheGreat quoting Elon Musk speech: "last thing we want is electronic voting machines"	X.com/KaneKoaTheGreat/status/1848107858413625428	Perma.cc/3TT8-U4DN
347		303	X post with Robert F Kennedy interview on Dr Phil's MeritTV	Youtu.be/o2pCdFKkDIU?si=Z2xfVr9CtW75nJmf&t=2048	Perma.cc/H3UC-LA64
348		304	X post by Jack Posobiec that "Mike Lindell is WITHOUT FEAR"	X.com/JackPosobiec/status/1826046882684243996	Perma.cc/77EN-ZSG8

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		304	Sherronna Bishop quote from Lindell Offense Fund newsletter	link.LindellOffenseFund.org/q/CRXNSn9mteixGbeEDGGQer3q8hYj-pbrFCG7ylmPZLTmYgZkQ3DhQW6d-S	Perma.cc/AH36-AT2Y
349		305	X post by Mike Lindell thanking President Trump for his comments at CPAC 2025	X.com/RealMikeLindell/status/1893693316736143823	Perma.cc/3DER-QP6B
		305	President Trump at CPAC 2025 validating Mike Lindell	LindellTV.com/on-behalf-of-everybody-thank-you-president-trump-thanks-mike-lindell/?channel=5399	Perma.cc/L9EC-RBEN
		305	Mike Lindell speech at CPAC	LindellTV.com/mike-lindell-gives-groundbreaking-speech-at-cpac-2025/?channel=5399	Perma.cc/PU98-AVLX
		305	Mike Lindell press podium	LindellTV.com/mike-lindell-takes-questions-from-press-podium/?channel=5399	Perma.cc/5649-HDJU

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And you will know the truth, and the truth will set you free.

A Hand Counting Instruction Manual for a Complete Hand Count Process, with Commentary and Resources

Is it possible to hand count ballots for an election without using voting machines? **YES!** Will it take days, weeks, or months to count all the ballots? **NO** – the time needed to hand count ballots is measured in hours. What about costs, accuracy, and the people needed to count ballots, and all the other objections? Most objections are actually myths: popular beliefs that are false or unsupported.

Hand counting ballots saves time, saves money, provides same-day or election-day results, and is more transparent and secure than voting machines. The Missouri Method has already been used in an official election and proved the accuracy of hand counting ballots. This instruction manual teaches a complete hand count process from opening of the polling places to returning election results to the clerk.

It's time to take computers out of our elections, hand count paper ballots, and secure our Republic!



Author Linda Rantz responded to Mike Lindell's call to "get rid of voting machines" by looking for an alternative for counting ballots. First stop: Louisiana for inspiration, then back to Missouri to study the state's laws—which allow for hand counting. Rantz developed a full process based on the laws, and designed the forms for tallying and reconciling ballot counts. On Dec. 29, 2022, Rantz presented Lindell with the completed hand count process. Ten weeks later it was used in an official election with 100% accuracy!